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Abstract (German) 
Die Beziehung zwischen Theory of Mind (ToM), inhibitorischer Kontrolle (IK) und 
Verhaltensproblemen von Kindern im Vorschulalter wurde bisher empirisch wenig 
untersucht und zeigt zudem uneinheitliche Ergebnisse. Eine Erklärung für diese Ergebnisse 
könnte darin begründet sein, dass der Fokus meist auf einer einzelnen Dimension der ToM 
lag, dem Verstehen falscher Überzeugungen. Die alleinige Untersuchung dieser Dimension 
reicht jedoch nicht aus, um ein umfassendes Profil der ToM im Vorschulalter abzubilden. 
Zudem blieb IK, welche häufig einen positiven Zusammenhang zur ToM zeigt, oftmals 
unbeachtet. Die Mehrheit der Studien verwendete verbale Aufgaben und untersuchte daher 
Kinder ab 4 Jahren. Die Frage nach einem früheren Zeitpunkt eines Zusammenhangs bleibt 
damit ebenfalls offen. Um umfassende Informationen über die Zusammenhänge zwischen 
ToM, IK und Verhaltensproblemen in der frühen Kindheit zu liefern, wurden Kinder im Alter 
von 2, 3 und 4 Jahren (N= 252) mit einer umfangreichen Batterie von ToM- und IK-
Aufgaben untersucht. Zudem wurde ihr Sprachverständnis, Verhalten und Temperament mit 
einem Multi-Informanten Ansatz erfasst. Das Sprachverständnis steht ab dem Alter von 2 
Jahren in positivem Zusammenhang zur IK, sowie ab 4 Jahren in positivem Zusammenhang 
zur ToM. Zudem zeigte sich, dass 4-jähirige Kinder mit hohen IK-Werten wenige 
Verhaltensprobleme zeigten. Gegensätzlich dazu zeigten 4-jähirige Kinder mit hohen ToM-
Werten mehr Verhaltensprobleme. Das Temperament zeigte keinen einzigartigen 
Zusammenhang zu IK und ToM. Die Ergebnisse weisen drauf hin, dass sich ein direkter 
Zusammenhang zwischen ToM, IK und Verhaltensproblemen erst ab einem Alter von 4 
Jahren entwickelt. Des Weiteren werden mögliche Erklärungen für die Beziehung von ToM, 
IK und Verhaltensproblemen unterschiedlicher Erscheinungsform diskutiert. 
Schlagwörter: Theory of Mind, Inhibitorische Kontrolle, Temperament, Verhaltensprobleme 
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Abstract (English) 
The relationship between Theory of Mind (ToM), inhibitory control (IC) and 
behavioral problems has attracted little empirical investigation to date and delivered mixed 
findings. An explanation for these mixed findings might lie in focusing on a single mental 
state (i.e., false-belief understanding), which might not account for a comprehensive profile 
of children’s ToM. Furthermore, IC, often positively correlated to ToM, remained unattended 
by the majority of studies. Due to the use of verbal tests, investigations mostly focused on 
children from 4 years of age onwards. Thus, the time of emergence of a relationship also 
remains an open question. To provide comprehensive information on possible correlations 
between ToM, IC and behavioral problems in children’s early years, 2- , 3- and 4-year-old 
children (N= 252) were presented with a broad battery of ToM and IC tasks, and tested for 
receptive language abilities, complemented by comparable multi-informant assessment of 
their behavior and temperament. Language was positively correlated to IC from 2 years 
onwards, and to ToM only at 4 years of age. With regard to caregiver ratings, I found that for 
4-year-old children higher scores in IC were associated with fewer behavioral problems. In 
contrast, higher scores in ToM were associated with more behavioral problems. No such 
associations were found for 2- and 3-year-old children. Considering temperament 
dimensions, only the measure of activity was negatively correlated to IC at the age of 2 years. 
However, taking language abilities into account the unique contribution disappeared. The 
results suggest that robust relationships between ToM, IC and behavioral problems start to 
develop at the age of 4 years. Different explanations for the patterns of association will be 
discussed, especially for the contribution of ToM and IC to the development of different 
manifestations of behavioral problems. 
Keywords: Theory of Mind, Executive Functions, Inhibitory Control, Temperament, 
Behavioral Problems 
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1 Introduction 
The research field of psychology has always tried ever since to explain mental 
processes and behavior and to set both areas in relation to each other in order to predict 
human behavior based on psychological characteristics. An important aspect which 
distinguishes humans from other species is the development of social-cognitive abilities, such 
as social engagement and mental representations (Tomasello, Carpenter, Call, Behne, & Moll, 
2005). Humans as social beings surround themselves and communicate with others. To enable 
sophisticated social cooperation, it is essential to interpret other people's thinking and 
behavior. Only in this way is it possible to successfully interact with one another. During the 
course of development, human beings acquire the unique ability to understand others’ mental 
states. Cognitive growth is caused by interactive and co-operational processes with others 
(Vygotskiĭ & Cole, 1978), and cognitive processes, in turn, are reflected in behavior. Thus, it 
is logical to assume that the social-cognitive ability to understand the others' mind may 
influence one's own behavior and emotional state. Everything a person perceives will be 
considered in relation to herself, integrated into existing schemes, and will be further used to 
create a view of the world and the people in the person’s environment. If the perceived 
content of the social environment thus provides the basis for how a person interprets the 
world, then this perceived content would also affect the way this person reacts in response to 
her environment. In addition to social-cognitive abilities, other cognitive processes might also 
play a role in behavioral manifestations; more precisely, the ability to manage one’s own 
thoughts and actions is of significance. A society, conceived as a space of cohabitation, is 
subject to normative rules, which at best should be tracked by all members (Durkheim, 1950). 
Thus, social coexistence requires a certain degree of normative behavior. Deviating behaviors 
might be perceived as unusual, disturbing or inappropriate, because they hold the potential to 
jeopardize a successful participation in social interactions. The occurrence of behavioral 
problems for centuries in works of literature, e.g., „The Story of Fidgety Philip“ (Hoffmann, 
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1847), can be interpreted as signifying that certain forms of behavior have been considered 
problematic since time immemorial. The research field of psychopathology continuously 
captures the differences in behavior, classifies behavioral problems and tries to explain their 
origins. However, to predict the occurrence of behavioral problems or to alter affect existing 
behavior, crucial determinants must be identified. The investigation of possible risk factors, 
would allow for early prevention of behavioral problems or to initiate interventions to support 
the child’s development in a positive way. Studies have shown that behavioral problems are 
not always a temporary phenomenon and that behavioral problems, which roots can be found 
early in childhood, can manifest later (Campbell, Pierce, March, Ewing, & Szumowski, 1994; 
Hinshaw, 1992). Therefore, one responsibility of research is the identification of early 
predictors. Besides other factors, it is conceivable that social-cognitive abilities and the ability 
to inhibit one’s own thoughts and actions are related to the formation of behavioral problems, 
since both concepts underlie human actions.  
Therefore, this dissertation addresses the question of whether the ability to understand 
others’ mental states and the ability to control one’s own thoughts and actions are linked to 
possible behavioral problems at preschool age. To answer this question comprehensively, the 
investigation will include children from three different age groups to gain evidence from 
different stages of early development. Results of this study will provide important information 
about possible correlates of behavioral problems which create the foundation for conceptual 
designs of successful prevention programs.  
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1.1 Theoretical Background 
For this study, which investigates possible correlates of preschoolers’ behavioral 
problems, I will provide a brief theoretical background about the constructs involved. I will 
first define the term ‘Theory of Mind’ and give an overview of the different dimensions of 
mental state understanding by introducing four important mental states, including common 
methods of measurement and empirical findings for specific age groups. I will continue with 
clarification about the processes of ‘Executive Functions’ and focus on inhibitory control, as 
one important domain of behavior regulation mainly developing during childhood. Aside 
from the social-cognitive constructs, I will discuss two aspects of behavioral characteristics 
important for this study. First, temperament will be defined, divided into its dimensions and 
explained in terms of the effects on children’s behavior. Second, I outline the characteristics 
of behavioral problems occurring in childhood, classify specific syndromes and will briefly 
report the main correlates, which are expected to be of significance. 
Theory of Mind – Different Mental States 
As social beings, humans communicate as soon as their life begins. Forms of 
communication start with simple nonverbal gestures and develop into complex verbal 
scenarios. Regardless of its level, communication is always directed at another individual, at 
least at one interaction partner. The sender transfers a message to the receiver and the receiver 
has to decode the incoming signals. Even for verbal messages, the process includes 
unobservable components, which require not only decoding but also reasoning about the 
receiver’s intended message (Sperber & Wilson, 2002). The ability to reason about others’ 
thoughts is a unique part of human cognition, underlies mental representation processes, and 
belongs to the mechanism of mental state understanding. The capacity to attribute mental 
states to others and to oneself is commonly known as the ‘Theory of Mind’ (ToM) and can be 
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considered as a crucial cognitive development during childhood (Gopnik & Astington, 1988; 
Premack & Woodruff, 1978; Wellman & Liu, 2004). Depending on the situation, people can 
hold several mental states. Imagine an everyday situation: A child wants to go to a lake to 
catch a fish with a net. This seemingly simple act involves a complex structure of internal 
states, which will lead to a certain action performance. To start with the beginning of the 
chain, the child holds the desire to catch a fish. He believes there are fish in the lake. Based on 
this, an intention is created by setting the goal to catch a fish and choosing the specific means 
to do this with the net. This example emphasizes four different mental states: goals, 
intentions, desires, and beliefs, which all are of significance in cognitive development. An 
important characteristic of mental states is that they are unobservable but are reflected in 
people’s behavior and, therefore, have to be inferred by interpreting others’ actions in a larger 
context. Possible developmental processes of the ToM continue to be discussed in science. 
Explanations show two prominent directions, the so-called positive gain accounts and the 
negative-release accounts (Low & Perner, 2012). The positive-gain accounts suggest that 
different systems are operating in mental state understanding. The first limited system that is 
used to explain other’s mentalistic actions is active in infants’ early years before a second 
system starts to function when children start to explicitly express false-belief understanding 
(Apperly & Butterfill, 2009; Low, 2010). Characteristics of the systems vary according to 
accounts, but there is a general agreement about a conceptual change, which enables children 
to make use of the second system. This perspective also includes a distinction between 
different mental states, claiming that children first register goals and intentions, before mental 
state reasoning in the form of belief understanding evolves (Apperly & Butterfill, 2009; 
Tomasello et al., 2005). Similarly, another account suggests that ToM tasks are solved by 
applying behavioral rules and that children only later develop a deeper understanding of 
behavior (Apperly & Butterfill, 2009; Perner & Ruffman, 2005). Developmental relations are 
expected, but should appear situation-specific rather than on a general basis. The second 
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direction includes the negative-release accounts. Models of this approach suggest that the 
ability to understand others’ mental states in its full dimension is present from very early on, 
but the ability to express it, e.g. by the use of language and with the help of inhibition skills, is 
crucial and needs to be developed for successful operation in certain situations (Baillargeon, 
Scott, & He, 2010; Carruthers, 2013; Leslie, Friedman, & German, 2004). In this sense, it is 
suspected that even infants apply psychological reasoning in a mentalistic manner, although it 
is not excluded that experience might play a role in development (Luo & Baillargeon, 2010). 
Neither of the two directions has been undoubtedly confirmed and discussions about the 
developing mechanisms are still ongoing. Within the framework of this dissertation a 
clarification of this issue cannot be addressed. However, it is undisputable that mental state 
understanding is a sophisticated operation of social cognition, grounded in the question of 
asking why humans act in the way they do. Recent research reported that signs of an 
understanding of different mental states appear early in life, long before children’s fourth 
birthday. In the following, these findings and the characteristics of four mental states will be 
described. 
Goals. Humans show the unique ability and aim to cooperate with others by sharing 
their psychological states (Tomasello et al., 2005). To successfully interact, an understanding 
of others’ actions in terms of their goals is needed. A fundamental and early developing 
ability is to understand others’ actions as goal-directed. By identifying another person’s goal, 
one can answer the question of “What a person is doing.” (Buttelmann, Carpenter, Call, & 
Tomasello, 2008). This means that an individual recognizes and connects the behavior of 
others related to a certain aim. Consequently, the individual represents this aim as a mental 
representation of the end state, and precisely this mental representation corresponds with the 
term goal which is used for the purpose of this dissertation. Studies have revealed that infants 
already start to interpret others’ actions by inferring another person’s goal before their first 
birthday, e.g. by reproducing only goal-relevant parts of actions (Behne, Carpenter, Call, & 
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Tomasello, 2005; Hamlin, Hallinan, & Woodward, 2008). Moreover, even by the age of 6 
months, infants are able to encode the goal object of a reaching act demonstrated by a model 
(Woodward, 1998). In a habituation paradigm, infants were shown two objects 
simultaneously which had been placed next to each other (object A and object B). In a 
familiarization phase, they observed a human hand repeatedly grasping object A but not 
object B. For the test phase the positions of the objects were switched. Results showed that 
infants looked reliably longer when they observed the situation when the hand used the old 
path but now grasped the new object B, compared to the situation when the hand went the 
new path and grasped the old object A. Woodward (1998) introduced additional  condition, 
where infants saw the same procedure with a mechanical claw instead of the human hand and 
could not find the same effect, and interpreted this difference as evidence for actual goal 
interpretation instead of the allocation of visual attention. Other empirical evidence for a 
selective process of action interpretation is delivered by various imitation paradigms. 
Different studies used scenarios of simple actions, with an underlying complex structure of 
multiple goals, demonstrated by a model (i.e., gestures implying more than one goal). If 
cognitive capacity is limited early in the development, children are not able to consider all the 
goals presented by an actor. Therefore, they break down the complexity by imitating the goals 
which appear as the most relevant ones. An action is then separated into various goals. For 
instance, in a study, 18-month-old children observed an actor presenting different actions and 
tended to copy these actions selectively, depending on what they identified as the actor’s goal 
(Carpenter, Call, & Tomasello, 2005). Further results demonstrate that goals are organized 
hierarchically, existing on multiple levels, and that the capacity for goal understanding 
improves with age (Bekkering, Wohlschläger, & Gattis, 2000).  
Intentions. More evidence for an early interpretation process of actions and 
specifically, a differentiation between the concepts of goals and intentions, is given by 
children’s rational imitation of actions. Infants at 14 months of age imitated actions in a goal-
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directed way by considering the context in which  this action took place (Gergely, Bekkering, 
& Király, 2002). It is suggested that infants took the actor’s intention into account 
(Buttelmann, Carpenter, Call, & Tomasello, 2007). In the study of Gergely et al. (2002) 
infants saw a model who performed an unusual, irrational action to reach a goal (i.e., the 
model sat at a table and turned on a lamp, which was placed on the table, by using her head 
instead of her hand). In one condition the model was physically unconstrained and performed 
the unusual, irrational action willingly (i.e., had her hands free while demonstrating the act). 
In another condition the model was physically constrained and, therefore, was forced to 
perform the unusual, irrational action. (i.e., held a blanket wrapped around her body). When 
infants themselves got the chance to turn on the lamp they produced the unusual, irrational 
action, if they previously saw the model in the unconstrained condition; whereas infants did 
not reproduce the unusual, irrational action but performed the rational act to reach the goal 
(i.e., infants used their hands to turn on the lamp), if they previously saw the model in the 
constrained condition. A clear distinction between a goal and an intention appears 
challenging. Goals can be organized in a hierarchical structure. This means that a person can 
have a goal, which consists of several sub-goals, however, the specific chosen means to 
achieve a goal can be considered as the intention. To distinguish between both concepts, 
intention can be defined as “a plan of action the organism chooses and commits itself to in a 
pursuit of a goal” (Tomasello et al., 2005, p. 676). This definition of intention will be used for 
the following work and refers to the question “How a person is trying to achieve a goal.” With 
this description in mind, an intention always is connected to a certain goal and  is involved in 
forming and implementing plans (Bratman, 1987). In the work of Heckhausen and Gollwitzer 
(1987), within the field of motivation psychology, this formation process was also depicted in 
the Rubicon Model, which describes action formation and execution as a process of transition 
from a motivational state of mind to a volitional state of mind. According to this model, in the 
motivational state of mind people desire something and set a certain goal, whereas in the 
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volitional state of mind people form actual intentions and commit themselves to a specific 
way to reach this goal. In contrast to a goal, which can be achieved in different ways, an 
intention has to be fulfilled in the exact way it was intended to be carried out (Schult, 2002; 
Searle, 1983). Even if the aforementioned definition separates the terms from each other, for 
some cases it remains difficult to maintain a distinction between them and the observer’s 
perspective is decisive. An action itself could also be a person’s goal, for instance if it does 
not cause a special effect on the environment or is directed at an end-state, e.g., a dancer’s 
goal is simply to perform a bodily movement (Tomasello et al., 2005). However, if there 
might be a higher goal, e.g., to entertain an audience, then the former goal (bodily movement) 
transforms into the specific means to achieve that higher goal.  
In line with the study of Gergely et al. (2002), further evidence of an rudimentary 
intention understanding was found for infants from 12 months of age onwards (Buttelmann et 
al., 2008; Zmyj, Daum, & Aschersleben, 2009). Infants imitated the tool use of a model more 
often when this model freely chose to use the tool compared to when the model was forced to 
do so due to physical constraints. This indicates that children have an insight beyond surface 
behavior. Recognizing a failed attempt reflects these abilities. By the age of 18 months infants 
gained information from failed attempts and showed an interpretation of observed actions 
(Meltzoff, 1995).  Later in development a more sophisticated understanding of intentions 
emerges that concerns the causal relation between an intention and an action in terms of a 
goal and which includes the concept of intentionality. At this point it is important to note that 
there is a clear differentiation between intentions and intentionality. Whereas an intention 
refers to the mental state, and to the specific means created to achieve a certain goal, 
intentionality refers to the awareness to perform an action (Malle & Knobe, 1997). To 
simplify, one could say an act is performed intentionally or by accident. Namely, it is possible 
that an intention is created, but not fulfilled because an unintended action happened, which 
nevertheless might have led to the same goal. To give an example, imagine that a person 
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creates an intention, which is driven by the goal to feed fish and the specific means of putting 
one piece of food after another into the water. If this person accidentally drops all the food at 
the same time into the water, the goal to feed the fish is fulfilled but not by the intended 
means. If conditions allow the existence of a fulfilled goal and at the same time that of an 
unfulfilled intention, children at the age of 3 years struggle with distinguishing between the 
two mental states (Schult, 2002). In an experiment, a situation was created where participants 
made a plan of action as to how to achieve a certain goal (i.e., children chose one of two 
boxes to hit with a ball, because they suspected a reward was in this box). They indeed 
achieved their goal (i.e., they found the reward), but not by the planned action they previously 
set (i.e., they accidentally hit the other box and surprisingly found the reward in this box). The 
fulfilled goal seemed to dominate children’s representations, because they ignored their prior 
intention and alternated it in favor of matching their goal. When asking for their prior 
intention (i.e., “Which one were you trying to hit?”), they answered by naming the actual 
event that happened and brought success, not by stating their former plan of action. Only 
later, by the age of 4 and 5 years were the answers correct. Further supported by other 
findings, it is suggested that during later preschool age, children build up the awareness of the 
commitment that intentions entail and that children start to distinguish between the mental 
states goal and intention (Astington, 2001; Schult, 2002).  
Desires and preferences. Desires are the start of the chain by determining goal and 
intention formation, since they cause the general motivation for certain actions (Heckhausen 
& Gollwitzer, 1987; Moses, Coon, & Wusinich, 2000). Desires can be classified in an 
objective or in a subjective concept. The objective concept represents the relation between a 
person and an object in the physiological sense of approaching, grasping or referring to an 
object in various manners, whereas the subjective concept represents the attitude of a person 
towards something, e.g., a desired end state or a specific object a person is longing for 
(Doherty, 2009). For the purpose of this work the subjective concept of desires, which refers 
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to attitudes that form the basis of behavior, will be of significance. Attitudes are 
psychologically generated and built upon experience, hence, they vary between individuals. 
They are relatively consistent over time and can be expressed by emotional signals such as 
showing pleasure towards or aversion to a certain object. As a result of their continuity, 
attitudes become apparent in preferences that people create over the course of their 
development. Physiologically-generated desires (e.g., being thirsty and therefore desire 
something to drink), however, show no consistency over time (Moses et al., 2000) and change 
or disappear as soon as the specific desire is fulfilled. For the following investigations, the 
focus will lie on attitude-generated desires in the sense of preferences. Experiments revealed 
an early understanding of preferences. Thus, the ability to interpret another person’s 
emotional communication was already seen for infants at 14 months of age (Repacholi, 1998). 
Infants were able to understand emotional signals, which were demonstrated by a model and 
referred to an object. Later, by the age of 18 months, infants were able to recognize that other 
people hold preferences that differ from their own and, furthermore, were able to act in 
accordance with this knowledge (Repacholi & Gopnik, 1997). Infants observed an 
experimenter who showed a preference for a food they themselves rejected, and who showed 
a rejection for a food they themselves preferred. In this situation the experimenter showed 
preference for a piece of vegetable and rejection for a cracker. When the experimenter 
requested after his demonstration that infant give him one of the two foods, infants were able 
to identify the correct one and give him the piece of vegetable. This indicates a decoupling 
process, because children had to restrain their own preference and perceive the deviating 
preference of someone else. However, complexity of mental states rises with extended 
scenarios. Taking a situation of decision-making as an example with the possibility of various 
choices, it is conceivable that a person holds multiple desires or even that desires conflict 
within this person’s mind. Bennett and Galpert (1993) found 5-year-old children understand 
the existence of multiple simultaneous desires, e.g., wanting two things at the same time. In 
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their study, children listened to a story of a person who wanted to go to two birthday parties, 
which were held at the same time. They were asked if they think that the person could be at 
one of the birthday parties but wants to be at the other birthday party at the very same time, 
and the significant majority of children answered with yes. On the other hand, desires that 
cause an internal conflict, e.g., wanting something and not wanting it at the very same time 
because of certain circumstances, are understand only by 11 years of age. Described in more 
detail, in the cited study only 11 year old children understood that a person wants to go to a 
party, but also does not want to go because there is another party at the very same time that he 
wants to join (Bennett & Galpert, 1993). 
Beliefs. The last dimension of mental state understanding, which is significant for the 
following study, is beliefs. To understand that people hold beliefs requires the imagination 
that other people can mentally represent any possible content of the world (Wellman, Cross, 
& Watson, 2001). To symbolize this, one can imagine that humans represent each other with 
thought bubbles containing representations of objects, situations or any other aspects of the 
world.  One characteristic of beliefs is that they do not necessarily reflect reality. Beliefs are 
supposed to be true, since people’s behavior is based on their knowledge about certain 
circumstances. However, mistaken assumptions due to lack of knowledge are part of everyday 
life and accordingly, beliefs also appear to be false. The ability to read others’ false beliefs is 
a sophisticated cognitive performance, because it requires the reconciliation of own 
knowledge, which is necessary to detect deviations. To investigate preschoolers’ false-belief 
understanding, two standard paradigms, based on verbal constructs were created during the 
1980s and have subsequently gained wide acceptance. Firstly, I will describe the unexpected-
transfer task (Wimmer & Perner, 1983). Children observe a scene with two covered 
containers (A and B) positioned next to each other. The first agent enters the scene carrying 
an object, places the object into container A and covers the container. The agent leaves the 
scene and in his absence the second agent appears, transfers the object from container A to 
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container B, covers the containers and leaves as well. The test question for this task is where 
the agent will search for his object when he returns. Secondly, I will describe the unexpected-
content task which is another widely used measurement (Hogrefe, Wimmer, & Perner, 1986). 
Children observe a scene with a closed box. This box has to be familiar to the children (e.g., a 
box of well-known chocolate). After presenting the closed box to children they are asked what 
they think is inside of the box. If they answer by naming the expected content (e.g., 
‘chocolate’ or ‘sweets’) the box will be opened and an unexpected content (e.g., pencils) will 
be revealed. Afterwards, the box will be closed again and children receive the test question. 
The question here is about what a person, who was absent when the unexpected content was 
revealed, would think is in the box. Both paradigms investigate an explicit false-belief 
understanding by demanding verbal answers and requiring the explicit statement about the 
false belief of another person. Children around the age of 4 to 5 years are able to significantly 
pass these traditional tasks. Further research showed successful performances by 3-year-olds 
by reducing the task demands, especially the verbal requirements (Hansen, 2010; Rubio-
Fernandez & Geurts, 2012). During the last two decades non-verbal paradigms were invented 
to provide evidence for an early implicit understanding of others’ false beliefs.  Experimental 
study designs for infants often involve looking time paradigms. For investigating an implicit 
understanding of false beliefs, the violation-of-expectation paradigm is widely used. 
Participants observe a scene where an agent holds a false belief, e.g., children observe the 
procedure of the unexpected-transfer task, and look reliably longer at the scene in the 
condition where the agent acts according to a true belief (e.g., the agent approaches the 
location, where the target object is actually hidden currently), compared to the condition 
where he acts according to his false belief (e.g., the agent approaches the location, where he 
previously put the target object. Infants from 13 months onwards showed attribution of beliefs 
in such a study design (Onishi & Baillargeon, 2005; Surian, Caldi, & Sperber, 2007). Another 
research method is given by anticipatory looking tasks, in which children visually anticipate 
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the agent’s action according to his belief. This means for example, children watch a scene, in 
which an agent observes an object moving from one container A to another container B. 
Afterwards the agent disappears while both containers (covered) remain present. After a short 
pause, the agent reappears and looks into container B. Since the agent was able to observe the 
transfer of the object, he acts according to a true belief. To make sure the children show an 
anticipatory looking behavior the location of the children’s eye gaze is analyzed shortly 
before the agent reappears. If children show an anticipatory looking behavior, they will fixate 
on container B. This procedure is repeated and serves as a familiarization phase. In the test 
phase, children watch a scene in which the agent is distracted and is not watching an 
additional transfer of the object. This time, the object does not stay at location B but moves 
back to location A. Here again, children’s eye gaze is analyzed shortly before the agent 
reappears. If they consider the agent’s false belief, they fixate location B. Infants at the age of 
18 months showed this pattern of anticipatory looking (Thoermer, Sodian, Vuori, Perst, & 
Kristen, 2012). Crucial evidence that goes beyond the mere registration of false beliefs was 
delivered via active helping paradigms (Buttelmann, Carpenter, & Tomasello, 2009; 
Buttelmann, Over, Carpenter, & Tomasello, 2014). Children at the age of 18 months were 
able to identify a person’s goal based on his belief. Described more precisely, children 
observed an agent in a typical procedure of the unexpected-transfer task or the unexpected-
content task. They had to recognize the agent’s false belief by observing his actions and had 
to assist accordingly by helping him to achieve his goal. To gain insight into the structure of 
the paradigm, I will describe the procedure of the unexpected-transfer task (Buttelmann, 
Carpenter, & Tomasello, 2009). Two containers A and B were present and children observed 
an agent who put one object into container A and then left the scene. In the absence of the 
agent children watched a second agent transferring the object from container A into container 
B and covered both containers. When the first agent returned, he went to container A but was 
not successful in opening this container and hesitated, and the children were encouraged to 
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help him. If children were able to correctly identify his false belief, they opened container B. 
Considering the rich body of research, it is suggested that children before the age of 4 years 
start to gain knowledge about others’ beliefs and that the ability to verbally express 
themselves referring to others’ mental states increases with age (Wellman et al., 2001).  
By applying ToM humans are able to react appropriately according to others’ 
expectations, can adjust own actions, or are even able to manipulate others in accordance to 
their own interests. To execute actions one’s own behavior and thoughts have to be controlled 
and regulated as well. These processes belong to the area of executive functions and will be 
discussed in the following.  
Executive Functions – Inhibitory Control 
There is no generally accepted definition for the term ‘executive function’, but the 
majority of literature describes executive functions as a set of higher-order self-regulatory 
processes, which contribute to the adjustment of own thoughts and behavior (Miller & 
Marcovitch, 2012; Miyake & Friedman, 2012). It involves mechanisms that coordinate the 
operation of cognitive sub processes, regulate the dynamics of cognition, and are located in 
the prefrontal cortex (Miyake, Friedman, Emerson, & Wager, 2000; Verhaeghen, 2011). 
Three major domains are affected by executive functions: working memory, inhibitory 
control, and flexibility in rule use (Miller & Marcovitch, 2012; Miyake et al., 2000; Müller, 
Liebermann-Finestone, Carpendale, Hammond, & Bibok, 2012). Namely, processes like 
memory updating, accessing recall, comprehension, resisting to interference, controlling 
motor responses, delaying gratification and flexibility in shifting can be captured under the 
umbrella term ‘executive functions’. Although these processes do not provide an exact 
definition for executive functions, they highlight the fields where these functions work and by 
this display possible cognitive processes, which may serve for investigations (Zelazo, Müller, 
Frye, & Marcovitch, 2003).  
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For this dissertation the domain ‘inhibitory control’ (IC) will be of significance. IC can 
be described as the ability to inhibit a response to a dominant, but irrelevant, stimulus in order 
to focus on the less dominant, but relevant stimulus, which is important for coping with a 
wide range of tasks (Carlson & Moses, 2001). Deficits in IC show direct impact on motor 
control and affect other neuropsychological abilities like motivation and arousal, working 
memory, internalization of speech and reconstruction (Barkley, 1997). Even though different 
components of executive functions may influence each other to some extent, they can be 
clearly considered separate and do not contribute in the same manner to performances in 
complex tasks (Miyake et al., 2000). IC abilities continuously develop over the early years of 
childhood and display significant improvement between the ages of 3 and 6 years (Carlson 
& Moses, 2001; Gerstadt, Hong, & Diamond, 1994; Kochanska, Murray, Jacques, Koenig, & 
Vandegeest, 1996). They can be measured with tasks that require the inhibition of a dominant 
prepotent response in favor of a subdominant response, or with tasks that require the 
inhibition of a dominant prepotent response for a certain amount of time (Mischel, Shoda, & 
Peake, 1988). The most established designs to measure IC are the inhibition-of-conflict 
paradigms (conceptual conflict and spatial conflict) and the delay-of-gratification paradigm. 
These paradigms are used to create tasks to successfully measure early inhibitory abilities of 
children from 2 years onwards. An example for a spatial-conflict paradigm is the so called A-
not-B task. Participants are habituated to search for an object at location A, but later have to 
switch and search at location B. By doing so, they have to overcome the impulse to search at 
the habituated location. Children by the age of 2 years start to perform correctly, although 
there is a clear improvement with increasing age (Espy, Kaufmann, McDiarmid, & Glisky, 
1999). Therefore, it is particularly important to determine age-appropriate demands when 
creating novel tasks. An extended meta-analysis, for instance, indicated that the reduction of 
habituation trials (i.e., the amount of trials searching in location A) helps children to perform 
better (Marcovitch & Zelazo, 1999). An example for a conceptual-conflict paradigm is the 
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bucket task, which requires the restriction of a dominant response, and the execution of 
another response which is in conflict (Carlson, Mandell, & Williams, 2004). Children are 
presented with two buckets at the same time, one large and one small bucket. Furthermore, 
they receive large and small blocks and are familiarized by sorting the large blocks into the 
large bucket and the small blocks into the small bucket. By this means, they build up a 
conceptual association. Later they are instructed to sort the blocks in a reversed manner, thus, 
they have to overcome and suppress the conceptual association. An example for the delay-of-
gratification paradigm is the waiting task (Mischel et al., 1988). Children are presented with a 
tempting reward and are promised a desired second one, but only if they resist eating the 
reward and are able to wait for a certain duration. From 2 years onwards, children are able to 
follow simple task instructions and start to successfully resist the temptation by suppressing a 
dominant prepotent response (Carlson et al., 2004). In this type of task, setting an age 
appropriate waiting time is important, as well as a reward that  elicits desire, since the 
attractiveness of the reward is crucial for performance (Golden, Montare, & Bridger, 1977). 
For older preschoolers, the same paradigms are used, but vary according to the task 
demands. Children by the age of 3 and 4 years are able to follow more complex instructions 
and to handle stronger stimuli. A widely-used example of a conceptual-conflict paradigm is a 
Stroop-like task. Participants are shown cards, one by one, with either a day symbol or a night 
symbol on them (e.g., a sun or a moon). They are requested to name the opposite concept to 
the one they associate with the symbol shown (e.g., say “night” when the day symbol is 
shown and vice versa). Stroop-like tasks are manageable from 3 years onwards and 
performance significantly improves with age (Carlson & Moses, 2001; Gerstadt et al., 1994). 
An example of a more advanced spatial-conflict paradigm is the windows task. Preschoolers 
participate in a sticker winning game, playing against an opponent. The aim of the game is to 
win as many stickers as possible. A child and their opponent are sitting at a table, facing each 
other. The opponent behaves neutrally and does not show any emotional reactions. Children 
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are shown two identical boxes with windows opened by an experimenter in only in their 
direction. Thus, the opponent is not able to see the content of the box. Children are explicitly 
instructed to win as many stickers as they can. One sticker is hidden by the experimenter in 
one of the boxes. To win, the sticker children are instructed to point at the box that the 
opponent should receive. Therefore, children have to resist pointing to the desired object, 
which appears as a dominant response. Obviously the task demands are high as they require a 
certain level of rule understanding and memory besides IC.  
Regardless of children’s age, there are significant individual differences found in IC, 
which show persistence during the first 4 years of life and even up until adulthood (Carlson et 
al., 2004; Kochanska et al., 1996; Miyake & Friedman, 2012). Other findings provide support 
for the correlation of IC to other competences, for example IQ, verbal fluency, internal state 
language and the ability to concentrate (Carlson et al., 2004; Golden et al., 1977; Mischel et 
al., 1988). For a more detailed report on relations between children’s inhibitory abilities and 
diverse behavioral characteristics see Section 1.2. The capacity of regulation and control, inter 
alia, is also to be found in the concept of child temperament. It is directly reflected in different 
temperament dimensions and contributes to the individual way of experiencing and coping 
with things and situations of everyday life.  
Temperament 
Humans vary in their intensity to react to certain situations, persons or stimuli. 
Emotional and physical reactions to an event might be strong and intense for one child, but 
moderate or low for another in the exact same situation. These reactions and their regulation 
are set by temperament characteristics. Temperament can be defined as a construct, which 
includes “emotional, motor, and attentional reactivity and self-regulation” (Rothbart & Bates, 
1998, p. 109), differs among individuals, and shapes social interactions as well as behavior 
(Rothbart & Bates, 1998). Temperament traits can be considered as biological features and in 
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this sense count as a subset of personality traits, without including cognition-like concepts 
about the self and others (Rothbart, 2011). It is considered to be relatively stable over the life 
span, even though temperament traits are not completely constant (Bates & Pettit, 2007). 
Considering children’s temperament as biological anchored, its impact on developmental 
processes is of interest in clinical and personality psychology, as well as in pedagogy. There is 
no universally accepted classification of temperament dimensions, so instead I will briefly 
summarize the five most popular accounts. A well-known approach is suggested by 
Goldsmith, Lemery, Aksan, and Buss (2000), who describe temperament as a basic behavioral 
level consisting of reaction modes, which are shaped by environmental influences and apply 
mainly to emotional expression and regulation. This indicates a genetic factor but extends the 
view to possible changes shaped by individual experiences.  Buss and Plomin (1984) on the 
other hand, focused on characteristics which show continuity over time, and highlighted the 
aspect of heritability. They include the dimensions of emotionality, sociability, activity and 
impulsivity. Similar categories are to be found in the work of Chess and Thomas (1996) who 
emphasize that temperament traits should be clearly distinguished from personality traits 
because they refer to the specific style of behavior, not to the motivation or content of the 
behavior. With the help of nine categories (activity level, rhythmicity, approach or withdraw, 
adaptability, threshold or responsiveness, intensity of reaction, quality of mood, distractibility, 
attention span and persistence), children can be assigned to the constellations ‘easy child’, 
‘slow-to-warm-up child’ and ‘difficult child’ (Chess & Thomas, 1996). Considering the 
positive and negative connotation, this ranking goes beyond a description of temperament 
traits, because it evaluates children’s behavior with respect to the demands of the 
environment. Notably, these terms do not serve as psychopathological criteria, but rather 
indicate a wide range of behavior styles among normally developing children. An approach 
which focuses more on the level of reactivity and self-regulation is the neurobiological 
approach of Rothbart (2011). She provides a structure of three main dimensions with four to 
THEORY OF MIND, INHIBITORY CONTROL AND BEHAVIORAL PROBLEMS 19 
 
six subordinated scales. The first dimension ‘surgery’ contains children’s activity level, 
approach, high-intensity pleasure, impulsivity, shyness, and laughter. The second dimension 
‘negative affectivity’ covers, for example, anger and frustration, discomfort and fear. The 
third dimension ‘effortful control’ refers to attention focusing and IC, to name a few. Support 
for this dimension formation is delivered by multi-cultural studies using the Children’s 
Behavior Questionnaire (Ahadi, Rothbart, & Ye, 1993; Rothbart, Ahadi, & Hershey, 1994). 
Finally, to combine the well-examined aspects of these aforementioned approaches, an 
integrative perspective is given by Zentner and Bates (2008), which reduces the dimensions to 
social inhibition/shyness, frustration, positive emotionality, activity level, and attention, and 
adds sensory sensitivity. The dimension of inhibition/shyness describes a child’s behavior 
when he or she meets unknown people or is confronted with unknown situations. Some 
children react in a rather inhibited and shy manner, whereas others are open-minded and 
respond without hesitation when meeting the unknown. Positive emotionality, as the second 
dimension, captures behaviors like positive anticipation, smiling and laughing, as well as 
novelty-seeking. The dimension of frustration covers the general level of irritability and 
frustration tolerance, which for example becomes apparent if expectations are violated. 
Activity level, as offers as a dimension, describes a child’s drive for movement. Some 
children seem to be full of energy, whereas others appear to be rather calm and relaxed. 
Within the dimension of attention, a child’s ability to concentrate and to stay focused, even if 
challenges arise, is depicted, and the dimension sensory sensitivity characterizes to what 
extent a child reacts to visual, auditory or tactile stimuli. Some children are very sensitive to 
temperature, noise or taste, whereas others are rather insensitive. Finally, Zentner (2011) 
argues that it remains unclear whether positive emotionality is really an independent 
characteristic or rather a system of associated features. Activity and social inhibition, for 
instance, are influenced by positive emotions. That is, a high level of positive emotion pushes 
the level of activity, whereas a low amount might enhance social inhibition. Based on the 
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integrative perspective (Zentner & Bates, 2008), the Integrative Child Temperament 
Inventory (Zentner, 2011) was invented and will be used for the present study. It contains five 
dimensions excluding positive emotionality.  
Since temperament characteristics shape humans’ behavior, it is not surprising that 
temperament stands in direct relation with behavioral problems and also in indirect relation, if 
environmental influences promote certain development (Rothbart, 2011). A high level of 
anger and frustration at 10 to 11 years of age, for example, predicted externalizing and 
internalizing behavioral problems a few years later (Ormel et al., 2005). Early impulsivity and 
high activity were also identified as predictors for externalizing behavioral problems at 
preschool age (Hagekull, 1994), whereas children high in fear, shyness and effortful control 
showed lower externalizing behavioral problems (Lengua, 2003; Morris et al., 2002; Ormel et 
al., 2005; Rothbart & Bates, 2006; Russell, Hart, Robinson, & Olsen, 2003). However, 
shyness seems not to serve a general protective function against the development of 
behavioral problems, since a shy temperament in childhood was identified as a risk factor for 
anxiety problems in adolescence (Prior, Smart, Sanson, & Oberklaid, 2000). As an example 
for the indirect relation between temperament and behavioral problems, the variable 
‘parenting’ is of major interest. Whereas a well-developed effortful control may protect 
children from the effects of poor parenting (Morris et al., 2002; Rubin, Burgess, Dwyer, & 
Hastings, 2003), children and their parents could also enter a coercive cycle of interaction. 
Mothers of distress-prone children are more likely to use aversive discipline and their 
children, in return, are more likely to resist their mothers’ attempts. Thus, aggression 
increases in both interaction partners (Patterson & MacCoby, 1980). Thinking about this 
pattern of behavior, it is conceivable that temperament could be surely affected by 
environmental influences, which promote or suppress individual characteristics and could lead 
to behavioral problems. The classification, prevalence and impacts of behavioral problems in 
childhood will be discussed in the following section. The aforementioned findings 
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demonstrate a sizeable body of research on the relation between temperamental factors and 
behavioral problems. A relationship, which was rarely studied, is the link between 
temperament and social-cognitive abilities, more precisely ToM. There is a small body of 
research, which suggests a connection between both constructs in the way that certain 
temperamental factors may influence children’s participation in social interactions, which in 
turn could enhance or reduce the possibilities to learn about the others’ minds (Suway, 
Degnan, Sussman, & Fox, 2012; Wellman, Lane, LaBounty, & Olson, 2011). This 
relationship is of major interest for the current study and will be further discussed in Section 
1.2. 
Behavioral Problems in Childhood – Classification, Prevalence and Possible Correlates 
Any abnormality in behavior or health is associated with subjective symptoms or 
objective measurable signs. A collection of concurrent symptoms and signs is called a 
syndrome (Cullinan, 2004). The Achenbach System of Empirically Based Assessment 
(ASEBA) is used in clinical practice, as well as in research for diagnosing forms of 
maladaptive behavior and provides different syndrome scales aligned on the DSM-IV 
(Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fourth Edition). For preschool 
children, different syndrome scales examine internalizing and externalizing behavioral 
problems. Internalizing problems include the symptoms of emotional reactivity, anxiousness 
and depression, somatic complaints and withdrawal (Achenbach & Rescorla, 2000). These 
types of syndromes tend to be introversive or intrapersonal in nature and children do not 
necessarily show disconformities or problems in discipline (Webber & Plotts, 2008). Due to 
these characteristics, internalizing problems are less striking than externalizing problems and 
might remain unnoticed for a longer time by caregivers or parents. Different internalizing 
symptoms often co-occur and do not always allow a clear distinction between different 
syndromes. For instance, early signs of depression could be sadness, social withdrawal, loss 
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of appetite, headaches, stomach-aches and other physical symptoms (Webber & Plotts, 2008). 
Anxiety disorders also show comorbidity with depression, and measurements of the two 
syndromes were found to be highly correlated (Brady & Kendall, 1992). Furthermore, 
cognitive symptoms like irritability or the inability to concentrate may be present and, hence, 
overlap with externalizing behaviors (Webber & Plotts, 2008). Achenbach and Rescorla 
(2000) classify the symptoms of aggression and attention problems under the score of 
externalizing problems. Externalizing disorders demand the attention of children’s 
environment because they are extroversive or interpersonal in nature and stand in conflict 
with social requirements (Webber & Plotts, 2008). Attention-deficit hyperactive disorder 
(ADHD), which includes symptoms of inattention, impulsivity and hyperactivity (American 
Psychiatric Association, 2013), or conduct problems, like aggressive and anti-social behavior, 
rank among them. With respect to the issue of the unclear boundaries between the individual 
syndromes, for the present study I will focus on summarized total scores of internalizing and 
externalizing behavioral problems provided by Achenbach and Rescorla (2000). If a child 
scores for example above the 93th percentile of the norm group on interval-scaled variables,  
their behavior is assigned to a borderline range, or if a child scores above the 97th percentile 
of the norm group, their behavior is assigned to a clinical range. For diagnostic and 
therapeutic practice, both cases should lead to further assessment with adequate 
measurements, and suitable intervention should be considered if necessary. 
 The necessity of investigating the correlates of behavioral problems is substantiated 
by high international prevalence rates among preschool children, ranging from 7% to 20% 
(Campbell, 1995; Egger & Angold, 2006).  Even among children of 2 years of age rates of 
11.8% for subclinical and clinical ranges were found, and 32% of these children lacked 
social-emotional competences (Briggs-Gowan, Carter, Skuban, & Horwitz, 2001). Early 
diagnosed behavioral problems show a relatively high stability from early childhood up to 
elementary school years, or  into adolescence, and indicate a higher risk for later academic 
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problems (Campbell et al., 1994; Hinshaw, 1992; McGee, Partitdge, Williams, & Silva, 
1991). Over the previous decades, several variables have been investigated, which are 
suspected to contribute to different extents to behavioral problems. Genetic factors can only 
serve to explain a certain percentage. They account partially for the temporal stability and 
etiology of internalizing traits and anxiety disorders (Franić, Middeldorp, Dolan, Ligthart, & 
Boomsma, 2010; Gregory & Eley, 2007). For externalizing behavioral problems, heritability 
of 50% was indicated (Moffitt, 2005). Aside from the genetic component, physical and 
environmental factors also correlate with children’s behavioral problems. As a physical factor, 
body weight is taken into account. Infants with a very low birth weight, for instance, later 
showed high levels of hyperactivity (McCormick, Gortmaker, & Sobol, 1990). As an 
environmental factor, parents’ behavior towards their child turned out to be a correlate. 
Parenting and education style were found to be related to behavioral problems (Ermisch, 
2008; Mash & Johnston, 1983). Special attention should also be given to cognitive abilities 
and their relation to behavioral problems. If one takes into account that the understanding of 
others’ minds and the inhibition of own behavior are two major components involved in daily 
social interactions, it seems logical to assume that both abilities should contribute to humans’ 
emotional states and to their behavior. More evidence for the assumption of a connection 
among ToM, IC and behavioral problems will be discussed in Section 1.2.  
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1.2 Relations Between the Constructs  
This section will review recent findings about the relations between the concepts 
important for the work of this dissertation. To start with, the link between ToM and IC will be 
discussed taking previous investigations into consideration. Reported correlations and 
possible explanations for the connection between these two constructs will be followed by a 
broader view of their relationships to language abilities, behavioral problems and 
temperament traits. A comprehensive view of important empirical findings will be outlined 
and analyzed with controversial results. During the course of this, I will display current 
shortcomings and submit initial proposals essential for contributing to clarifications and 
filling existing research gaps. 
The Relationship Between Theory of Mind and Inhibitory Control 
The hypothesis of an existing link between children’s ToM and executive functions 
(EF) is widely accepted, but research during recent decades is still discussing explanations 
and causality. Opinions about developmental precursors and similar underlying concepts are 
considered from different perspectives and discussed based on empirical findings in research. 
There are two main directions of interpreting the positive correlation between ToM1 and EF2, 
expression accounts and functional dependency accounts (Kloo, Perner, & Giritzer, 2010). 
Expression accounts refer to the same task demands implemented in EF tasks as the ones in 
and false-belief tasks (Carlson, Moses, & Hix, 1998; Russell, Mauthner, Sharpe, & Tidswell, 
1991). The focus is on IC, which is required for solving false-belief tasks. Children have to 
suppress the dominant response (e.g., the current more salient reality) and instead have to 
provide a less dominant response (e.g., the less salient previous state). Support for this 
                                                          
1 When reporting results of sighted studies, I refer to task batteries of ToM or to single ToM tasks (e.g., false-
belief task). 
2 When using the term ‘EF’ in this section, I refer to task batteries of EF or to single EF tasks (e.g., IC tasks). 
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explanation is delivered by studies, which report a general positive correlation between IC 
and performance in false-belief tasks (Cole & Mitchell, 2000; Ozonoff, Pennington, & 
Rogers, 1991; Russell et al., 1991). However, studies that compared performances in different 
false-belief task designs, which varied in inhibitory demands, delivered contradictory 
findings. On one hand, a meta-analysis revealed that children performed better on false-belief 
tasks with reduced saliency of the current reality than on false-belief tasks of the standard 
design, indicating that inhibitory demands challenge children to pass false-belief tasks 
(Wellman et al., 2001). On the other hand, another study compared both false-belief task 
designs with respect to measurements of IC and could not confirm this assumption. Children’s 
performances on a false-belief task with reduced saliency of reality and children’s 
performances on a standard false-belief tasks were examined and revealed no differences in 
correlation to measurements of IC, which indicates that inhibitory demands cannot be 
responsible for the existing link (Perner, Lang, & Kloo, 2002). A meta-analysis of 
international studies further questioned that IC is solely responsible for the link, since all tasks 
out of EF batteries were positively correlated with false-belief tasks (Devine & Hughes, 
2014). Samples from the United States, United Kingdom, Continental Europe, East Asia, 
Canada and Australia/New Zealand were included into the analyses investigating the link 
between composite scores of EF and false-belief batteries, as well as the link between single 
EF and false-belief tasks. Even though the composite scores showed the largest effects sizes 
for the relation between EF and false-belief understanding, all single EF tasks (i.e., IC, rule 
shifting, working memory and planning) showed positive links to false-belief understanding. 
Additionally, cross-cultural investigations of children from China and the United States 
showed similar links between EF and false-belief composite scores for the samples of both 
nationalities, but interestingly, when comparing the task performances of children from the 
two nations, Chinese children outperformed children from the United States on EF tasks but 
not on false-belief tasks (Sabbagh, Xu, Carlson, Moses, & Lee, 2006). These results further 
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challenged whether executive demands in false-belief tasks are solely responsible for the 
existing link. Other authors refer instead to the general ability to reason, which incorporates 
both concepts (Frye, 1999; Frye, Zelazo, & Burack, 1998). They argue that false-belief task 
designs and EF tasks incorporate embedded rules, which are more complex in hierarchy than 
a simple rule (i.e., “If a, then b.”). Children have to switch between two possible sets of 
conditions before they can apply the simple rule. In the case of solving a false-belief task, the 
two different perspectives (i.e., the own perspective and the perspective of the other person) 
have to be considered before applying the simple rule. In the case of solving the dimensional 
card sorting game (Zelazo, 2006), which measures flexibility in rule use, two perspectives 
(i.e., the dimensions of color and shape) also have to be considered, before applying the 
simple rule. The perspective of embedded rules could be confirmed by a study which showed 
stronger relationships between EF and false-belief performances when EF tasks included 
reasoning about rules (e.g., conceptual conflict) instead of simple inhibition (e.g., go no-go 
task) (Perner et al., 2002). On the other hand, this perspective can be weakened by studies, 
which revealed correlations between simple delay tasks and ToM tasks (e.g., Carlson et al., 
2004). 
The functional dependency accounts argue one step further and refer to cognitive 
capacities as incorporating both concepts, thus, are building a mutually dependency. Based on 
shared cognitive complexity and control mechanisms, both concepts might influence each 
other in a developmental sense. Empirical evidence supports the assumption that EF might be 
a prerequisite for developing ToM, because both concepts are found to be minimally 
connected in early years, and instead correlations start to appear from 3 years onwards. 
Furthermore, it was shown that early EF predicted later ToM (Carlson et al., 2004; Carlson 
& Moses, 2001; Hughes, 1998; Müller et al., 2012). These findings refer to children between 
2 and 5 years of age and results consistently led to the same direction of prediction, although 
the reverse pattern could not be found. For instance, children’s performances on EF tasks at 2 
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years of age positively predicted children’s performances on ToM tasks at 3 years of age, but 
not vice- versa (Carlson et al., 2004). A similar pattern of prediction was found for slightly 
older children. Performances on EF tasks of children from 3 to 4 years of age predicted their 
performances on ToM tasks 13 months later. Authors suspect an effectively operating 
executive system could promote the emergence of mind understanding (Carlson et al., 2004) 
and that self-control may offer children wider possibilities to gain rich experience of others 
and their minds (Hughes, 1998). More support for a functional dependency is given by a 
training study, which showed a transfer between the card-sorting task and false-belief 
performances (Kloo & Perner, 2003). Three to 4-year-old children received training for the 
dimensional card-sorting game and showed improvement on a false-belief task, for which 
performance was assessed before and after the training. Likewise, a second group was trained 
for false-belief tasks and showed improvement on the dimensional card-sorting game. Since 
only one type of task was used in this experimental design for measuring ToM and EF, it 
would be useful to implement more training studies using tasks for different dimensions of 
ToM and EF. 
Finally, other variables like language abilities, social interactions or temperament 
might also be involved in developmental interactions between ToM and EF. Hence, the 
relationship of the two concepts should be examined from a broader perspective.  
Language Abilities – an Important Correlate of Theory of Mind and Inhibitory Control 
The link between language abilities and ToM is discussed by several researchers, and 
investigations revealed close relationships. Sperber and Wilson (2002) suggested similarities 
between the pragmatics of verbal communication and mental state understanding. They point 
out that for a successful operation between communicators, verbal messages have to be 
encoded not only concerning the observable signals, but also concerning non-observable 
signals. This process of pragmatic interpretation contains reasoning about the sender’s 
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intentions and also a relevance-guided inferential comprehension. The authors claim that the 
receiver of a message attributes different levels of relevance to linguistic utterances they hear, 
and, therefore, pay more or less attention to them accordingly. The speaker expects the 
receiver to find the utterance relevant enough to pay attention to it. Both processes, reasoning 
about intentions, as well as presumptions about relevant parts of communication, are required 
in meta-cognitive abilities. More support for a link between language and ToM is given by 
studies on emotion words and mental state talk. Children from 2 years of age onwards start to 
use words referring to mental states and try to manipulate the behavior of others by using 
emotional language, which allows them to reach a level of intersubjectivity and ensures 
mutual understanding (Bretherton, Fritz, Zahn-Waxler, & Ridgeway, 1986; Bretherton, 
McNew, & Beeghly-Smith, 1981). For example, conversations were transcribed in which a 
child said that it loves her mother and wants to hold her mother, after the mother had scolded 
her. The child’s words can be interpreted as an attempt to regain the mother’s affection 
(Bretherton et al., 1986). Furthermore, a correlation between pretend play and the frequency 
of mental state talk among 4-year-old children strengthens the assumption of a positive link 
between language and ToM (Hughes & Dunn, 1997). Language abilities of preschool children 
between 3 and 4 years, especially sentence understanding and morphological rule 
construction, significantly predicted their performances on ToM tasks (Astington & Jenkins, 
1999; Lockl, Schwarz, & Schneider, 2004). Thus, it is assumed that language provides the 
basis for developing ToM abilities. Predictions were not found in the opposite direction, 
namely that ToM would predict later language abilities. By taking into consideration that 
sentence structures of a language, as well as morphological characteristics, require a 
representation of grammatical and syntactic features, one can assume that capacities in this 
area might foster other representational skills as well. A training study, including a control 
group, indicates that sentential complements might play a major role in the development of 
ToM abilities (Lohmann & Tomasello, 2003). Sentential complements are parts of the 
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complex structure of sentences. For clarification and related to the aforementioned study, a 
sentence contains a main clause with a mental state verb, which embeds another clause 
referring to this mental state verb (e.g., Suzie thinks the cat is in the garden. The last part of 
the sentence is the complement referring to the first part.). Children at 3 years of age showed 
an improvement on ToM performances if they had received training in the syntax of sentential 
complements (Lohmann & Tomasello, 2003). Aside from this, evidence for a positive effect 
of verbalizing the change of perspective was delivered as well. Children, who received 
training on general perspective-shifting discourse, improved their ToM performances. The 
evidence that language training and an increased use of mental state talk by mothers in early 
years enhance later ToM abilities in children underpins the idea of a connection between ToM 
and language development and the aforementioned mentioned findings (Guajardo & Watson, 
2002; Hale & Tager-Flusberg, 2003; Symons, Fossum, & Collins, 2006). 
Regarding the link between language abilities and IC, previous findings point to the 
same direction. A positive relationship between IC (e.g., delay-of-gratification tasks, 
conceptual conflict tasks) and language abilities was found by several studies (Carlson et al., 
2004; Mischel et al., 1988; Slade & Ruffman, 2005; Wolfe & Bell, 2004). A possible 
explanation could be found in regulation capacities, which are needed for language 
processing, as well as for the inhibition of thoughts and behavior. Regulation is needed for 
example, for the selection process when recalling the correct word for an activated lexical 
concept, or when language production is affected by interfering stimuli, which have to be 
suppressed for producing the correct word (Green, 1998). In line with this idea, bilingual 
children showed better IC abilities compared to monolingual children, because more 
demanding inhibition processes are needed for regulating two competing languages (Poarch & 
van Hell, 2012). Similar findings are presented in a study about language switching, where a 
link between high IC and the switch costs of trilingual speech production was found (Linck, 
Schwieter, & Sunderman, 2012). English native speakers, who learned French and Spanish as 
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their second and third languages received an IC task. Results showed that better IC 
performances were related to faster reaction times when switching into or out of the native 
language. Moreover, language abilities were not only identified as important correlates of 
ToM and IC, children’s behavior also seems to be linked to their level of language skills. 
Associations between language impairment and behavioral problems were revealed repeatedly 
(Helland, Lundervold, Heimann, & Posserud, 2014; Maggio et al., 2014; McGee et al., 1991; 
Moffitt, 1990; Stevenson & Richman, 1978).  
The Relationship Between Theory of Mind and Children’s Behavior  
The view of existing literature offers a picture of mixed findings concerning ToM and 
its possible connections to behavioral problems. Evidence for a positive relationship was 
delivered by a clinical study involving adults diagnosed with borderline personality disorder, 
a disorder, which shows characteristics of low IC and distorted mental state understanding 
(DSM-IV). One group of participants was treated with special focus on mental state 
understanding, whereas another group was treated without this focus. The group, trained with 
the special focus, showed greater improvement on the reduction of suicide attempts and 
global functioning compared to the group trained without the special focus (Bateman & 
Fonagy, 2008). More positive effects were delivered by studies focusing on children. 
Investigations of ToM at the early age of 2 years, harsh parenting and behavioral problems 
suggested that high ToM could provide a protective effect against negative environmental 
conditions (Hughes & Ensor, 2006, 2007). Children with low and medium ToM abilities who 
were exposed to high levels of harsh parenting, showed a high level of behavioral problems, 
whereas children with high ToM abilities who were exposed to high levels of harsh parenting, 
showed no increase in behavioral problems (Hughes & Ensor, 2006). Another positive effect 
of advanced ToM abilities was found for 4-year-old children. A positive connection between 
ToM and children’s communication with friends was detected (Dunn & Cutting, 1999). 
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Children with good performances on ToM tasks experienced less conflict situations during 
peer interactions and better communication than children who performed poor on ToM tasks. 
These results were independent of children’s language abilities, but notably only children who 
already were involved in firm friendships were selected for the study. Based on these results 
one can speculate that the quality of social interactions might be influenced by ToM abilities, 
but on the other hand, firm friendships existed for all children, hence, it cannot be concluded 
that children with lower ToM abilities are not successful in creating stable social 
relationships. Further findings, however, point out the influence of language abilities. 
Examination of a random sample of children investigated their ToM in relation to their social 
popularity among peers and found that although a positive link between both variables was 
detected, it was strongly influenced by children’s language abilities (Slaughter, Dennis, & 
Pritchard, 2002). A similar finding was delivered by Badenes, Clemente Estevan, and Garcia 
Bacete (2000), who could not detect a positive link between social popularity and typical 
ToM tasks, but for a white-lie task containing figurative language. The aforementioned 
findings refer rather to the link between ToM and qualitative characteristics of social 
interactions, than to actual behavioral problems. Even if behavioral problems might be 
reflected in social interactions, the direct link between ToM and specific behavioral problems 
is of major interest for the purposes of this dissertation and will be considered in the 
following. Evidence for a negative relationship between ToM and children’s behavioral 
problems is delivered by several studies, which revealed negative correlation between ToM 
and aggressive behaviors (Capage & Watson, 2001; Harvey, Fletcher, & French, 2001; Lane 
et al., 2013; Wellman et al., 2011). In contrast, other studies could not confirm this negative 
correlation, and instead found positive correlations. Performances on ToM were positively 
linked to aggressiveness or high sensitivity to criticism (Dunn, 1995; Renouf et al., 2010; 
Walker, 2005). Notably, there were also studies which could not find correlations between 
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ToM and behavioral problems at all (Hughes, White, Sharpen, & Dunn, 2000; Slaughter et al., 
2002; Yiwen, Chongde, & Wenxin, 2004).  
On first view these seemingly contradictory findings appear puzzling. However, 
further detailed analysis of the study designs reveals that there are a number possible 
explanations for the different findings on the relationship between ToM and behavioral 
problems. Differences in the specific tasks, age groups, and control measures can be 
identified, which might explain the different outcomes. Most studies that revealed negative 
links between ToM and behavioral problems investigated children’s ToM from 3 years of age 
onwards (Capage & Watson, 2001; Lane et al., 2013; Wellman et al., 2011). For younger age 
groups, results varied and studies with children below the age of 3 years are rare. In one of 
these investigations, a well-developed ToM by the age of 2 years prevented children from 
developing behavioral problems by the age of 4 years despite the influence of harsh parenting 
(Hughes & Ensor, 2007). However, the majority of previous studies focused mainly on false-
belief understanding, which is only one dimension of ToM and may not provide a 
comprehensive profile of children’s understanding of others’ mental states (Tomasello et al., 
2005; Wellman & Liu, 2004). Furthermore, as discussed in Section 1.2, language is 
considered an important correlate of ToM and of behavioral problems, and consequently, this 
variable should be controlled for. However, not all of the aforementioned studies assessed 
children’s language abilities (Hughes et al., 2000; Suway et al., 2012; Walker, 2005).  
The Relationship Between Inhibitory Control and Children’s Behavior 
For a successful cooperation with others, children have to make use of their executive 
functions, which includes the conscious control of thoughts and behavior (Miller 
& Marcovitch, 2012). Especially when learning how to get along with others in the sense of 
commitments, consideration, and courtesy, IC abilities can affect whether an individual 
functions well or badly in socialization processes (Kochanska et al., 1996). One could assume 
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that for children with higher IC their popularity in a group could increase and simultaneously 
their problematic behavior decrease. Investigations on the relationship between IC3 and 
behavioral problems are fairly consistent. A large number of studies indicate the advantages 
of a high IC. Negative correlations between IC and behavioral problems (e.g., angry and 
antisocial behavior, attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder, aggressive and delinquent 
behavior) were found (Berlin, Bohlin, & Rydell, 2004, Espy, Sheffield, Wiebe, Clark, & 
Moehr, 2011; Hughes & Ensor, 2008; Hughes et al., 2000; Lewis, Dozier, Ackerman, & 
Sepulveda-Kozakowski, 2007; Morris, Keane, Calkins, Shanahan, & O'Brien, 2014; Olson, 
Schilling, & Bates, 1999; Oosterlaan & Sergeant, 1996). 
Longitudinal studies also showed the positive effects of a well-developed IC among 
older preschoolers on various competences in adolescence, particularly emotion regulation, 
social competences, academic success, verbal fluency, and success in coping with frustration 
(Carlson & Wang, 2007; Mischel et al., 1988). IC was also considered as a possible mediator. 
Children with high regulation skills showed less externalizing behavioral problems and more 
social competence compared to children with lower regulation skills. Interestingly, children’s 
regulation skills mediated mothers’ positive and negative emotional expressions on children’s 
externalizing behavioral problems and social competences (Eisenberg et al., 2001). IC also 
mediated the relationship between language abilities at 2 years of age and behavioral 
problems at 4 years of age (Hughes & Ensor, 2008). IC as a correlate to behavioral problems 
should receive particular attention, because individual differences in IC are common and 
mostly persist during the developmental years (Carlson et al., 2004; Kochanska et al., 1996; 
Miyake & Friedman, 2012). It is therefore possible that differences in IC could have long-
term effects.  
                                                          
3 When reporting results of cited studies, I refer to task batteries of IC or task batteries of executive functions, 
which include IC tasks. 
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The Relationship Between Theory of Mind, Inhibitory Control and Children’s 
Temperament 
The correlation between ToM, IC and temperament dimensions is rarely examined. A 
lack of aggressiveness and a shy-withdrawn attitude to social interactions, as well as low 
levels of activity were found to be related with better false-belief abilities (Lane et al., 2013; 
Wellman et al., 2011). The emotional-reactivity hypothesis (Hare & Tomasello, 2005) could 
supply the first explanation for these findings by taking into account self-domestication in 
human phylogeny. This approach refers to the formation of social groups, which is the base 
for the development of cooperative cognition. Individuals who are low in reactivity and 
aggressiveness might have been more accepted by a group and fostered their social cognition 
by participating in social interactions. In contrast, individuals who are high in reactivity and 
aggressiveness might have been less accepted by a group, were rejected from social 
interactions, and limited in developing their social competences. It seems reasonable that 
certain temperament traits promote participation in social cooperation. This, in return might 
causally influences the development of ToM. Which temperament dimensions precisely 
would be involved in this process has not been clarified. Support for a link between 
temperament traits and later ToM comes from longitudinal studies. A shy temperament at 18 
months and 3 years of age was positively related to children’s ToM scores by the age of 3 
years (Mink, Henning, & Aschersleben, 2014). This result could favor the assumption that 
temperament is involved in ToM development. Authors suggest that a shy-withdrawn and 
observant stance towards others could lead to a better understanding of interpersonal 
processes (Mink et al., 2014). However, investigations are rare and the logic of this 
argumentation can easily be reversed by suggesting that shy-withdrawn personalities 
participate less in social groups, and thereby gain little experience in interaction, negotiation 
and in taking others into consideration. Suway et al. (2012), for instance, found a negative 
connection between behavior inhibition (e.g., latency to approach novel stimuli, proximity to 
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mother in novel situations) and ToM. Three-year-old children displayed lower ToM scores if 
they showed high levels of behavioral inhibition combined with mainly negative peer 
interactions at the age of two. No such connection was found for children with few negative 
peer interactions, suggesting that temperament traits might enhance social interactions, which 
then equip children with possibilities to learn about the mental states of others. Furthermore, a 
growing body of research indicates a higher risk of difficulties in social contexts for children 
with a particularly shy temperament (Coplan & Armer, 2007).  
Studies on the link between IC and temperament reported positive correlations 
between performances on IC tasks and the temperament dimensions of focusing and shifting 
attention (Gerardi-Caulton, 2000; Wolfe & Bell, 2004). These results appear reasonable, 
because self-regulatory processes like attention focusing are typically demanded in IC tasks. 
A finding that goes beyond the related features of both concepts is given by a study 
investigating adults. A difficult temperament was connected to aggressive and antisocial 
behavior, and this link was mediated through EF, including IC components (Giancola, 
Mezzich, & Tarter, 1998). Considering the relatively low number of empirical investigations, 
the necessity to include the assessment of temperament as a possible correlating factor on 
ToM or IC becomes apparent.  
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2 Dissertation Project 
The major goal of this dissertation is to identify the link between ToM, IC, and 
behavioral problems in preschoolers. Studies on early behavioral problems and their relation 
to social-cognitive competences and inhibitory abilities are underrepresented in research and 
show a narrow range of investigated mental states, informants and age groups. The relatively 
high rate on indicated behavioral problems at the age of 2 years (see Section 1.1.) emphasizes 
the demand for reliable information about early stages of life. Importantly, I want to clarify if 
a connection is present from very early on or if it gains importance with increasing age. With 
respect to previous research, I assume a negative relationship between IC and behavioral 
problems. Due to the ambiguous findings on the relationship between ToM and behavioral 
problems, the purpose of this study is to clarify the direction of correlation. Since language 
was an important correlate of all three variables (ToM, IC and behavioral problems, see 
Section 1.2.), it has to be included as a control variable in this theoretical model (Figure 1). 
Furthermore, I want to consider temperament. The relationship between temperament and 
behavioral problems was investigated repeatedly (Caspi, Henry, McGee, Moffitt, & Silva, 
1995; Prior et al., 2000; Rothbart & Bates, 1998), therefore focus will be on the link between 
ToM, IC and temperament in early childhood.  
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Figure 1. Theoretical model of suspected correlations between ToM, IC, behavioral problems, 
language and temperament (green line: positive correlation, red line: negative correlation, 
grey dotted line: positive or negative correlation). 
The suspected direction of correlations between IC, ToM and temperament varies 
depending on the dimension of temperament. With respect to previous findings (Olson et al., 
1999; Oosterlaan & Sergeant, 1996) and the similarity between temperament dimension 
characteristics and symptoms of behavioral problems, I assume a positive relationship 
between IC and social inhibition, as well as a positive relationship between IC and attention, 
whereas I assume a negative relationship between IC and activity. Little is known about the 
relationship between ToM and temperament. Controversial approaches suggest, either that 
high inhibition and shyness could enhance ToM, because children might learn about others’ 
mental states by watching and observing others (Wellman et al., 2011); or that a less inhibited 
behavior could enhance children’s social interactions and by this they might learn about 
others’ mental states (Suway et al., 2012). To clarify the direction of correlation, the link 
between ToM and social inhibition will be of particular interest. Since attention focusing is a 
necessary feature for observing the environment and is helpful for a sensitive perception of 
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others, high attention could be also an advantage for understanding others’ minds and a 
positive correlation to ToM is suspected. By contrast, a high activity level could be assumed 
to distract a child from observing others precisely, and therefore, a negative correlation to 
ToM is suspected.   
 
Figure 2. Theoretical model of suspected correlations between ToM, IC and temperament 
dimensions (green line: positive correlation, red line: negative correlation, grey dotted line: 
positive or negative correlation). 
In this dissertation project, three age groups will be included: Children of 2, 3 and 4 
years of age respectively. They will be tested with comparable measurements to gain insight 
into different developmental stages. To create a complex profile of abilities, it is necessary to 
include different dimensions of ToM and IC assessed by age-appropriate tasks. Previous 
studies focused mainly on false-belief understanding and operated on traditional task designs, 
which require a certain level of language comprehension and production, because children 
have to explicitly answer test questions (e.g., ‘What does Person A think?’ or ‘What does 
Person B believe?’). Thereby, children have to understand the meaning behind the mental 
state terms and to which mental constructs they refer. The explicit understanding of mental 
states is usually tested from 4 years of age onwards, where an extensive mother tongue  
vocabulary is developed and used for complex conversations (Menyuk, Liebergott, & Schultz, 
1995). However, this method is not suitable for younger children. Research provides new 
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paradigms to examine ToM already before a child’s second birthday, by creating nonverbal 
designs, which measure either gaze behavior or children’s active helping (Buttelmann, 
Carpenter, & Tomasello, 2009; Buttelmann et al., 2014; Kovacs, Teglas, & Endress, 2010; 
Repacholi & Gopnik, 1997). IC can also be assessed from very early on, for instance with 
age-appropriate waiting tasks or simple Stroop task designs (Carlson et al., 2004; Golden et 
al., 1977).  
To multidimensionally investigate ToM and IC, extensive batteries for 2-year-old, 3-
year-old and 4-year-old children were created. The ToM batteries included tasks to measure 
goal understanding, preference understanding, intention understanding, and false-belief 
understanding, comparably for all age groups. The IC batteries included tasks to measure the 
inhibition of a conflicting concept, the inhibition of a spatial conflict, and the delay of 
gratification, comparably for all age groups. A major advantage of the current study lies in the 
use of implicit task designs: Instead of verbally answering test questions, 2-year-old children 
could solve the tasks completely nonverbally by imitating, assisting or helping the 
experimenter. The 3-year-old children could solve the majority of tasks nonverbally as well, 
as only two ToM tasks and one of the IC tasks required simple language production (e.g., 
naming colors or symbols, and reporting the predicted actions of someone else regarding their 
beliefs). Furthermore, to strengthen reliability of measurements, test-retest reliability was 
assessed for the separate measures. To put children’s extensive profiles in relation with 
behavioral and temperamental factors, parents completed  the Child Behavior Checklist 1 ½ - 
5 (CBCL, Achenbach & Rescorla, 2000) and The Integrative Child Temperament Inventory 
(IKT, Zentner, 2011). To gain multi-informant data about children’s behavior in other 
contexts, caregivers filled out the Caregiver-Teacher Report Form 1 ½ - 5 (C-TRF, 
Achenbach & Rescorla, 2000). To include language as a potential correlate of social-cognitive 
abilities, receptive language abilities of all children were measured with subtests of the SETK 
2 (Grimm, Aktas, & Frevert, 2000) and  SETK 3 – 5 (Grimm, 2001). This study extends the 
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existing literature on the relationship between ToM, IC, behavioral problems and 
temperamental factors with a unique approach, investigating children with extensive batteries 
consisting of tasks appropriate for three developmental stages in preschool age. 
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2.1 Method 
Participants 
In total, 252 2-, 3- and 4-year-old children were investigated for this study. The 
sample of 2-year-olds consisted of 82 children (mean age = 24.0 months, SD = 0.5; range: 23 
months and 2 days to 24 months and 25 days; 41 girls). Information letters were sent to 
families with at least one child. Subsequently, children were registered by their parents for 
participation in studies on child development and were invited via telephone. Testing took 
place in a university laboratory in a mid-sized German city and consisted of two sessions, 
each lasting 30 minutes with a 10 minute warm-up phase at the beginning. The mean interval 
between both sessions was 6.95 days. The sample of 3-year-olds consisted of 90 children 
(mean age = 36.1 months, SD = 0.57; range: 35 months and 1 day to 37 months; 47 girls). 
Children in this sample were recruited via lists in daycare centers and via telephone, because 
children had been registered by their parents for participation in studies on child development 
earlier. Testing took place in a university laboratory in a mid-sized German city or in daycare 
centers and consisted of two sessions, each lasting 40 minutes with a 10 minute warm-up 
phase at the beginning. The mean time interval of the testing sessions was 7.6 days. The 
sample of 4-year-olds consisted of 80 children (mean age = 48.0 months, SD = 0.6; range: 46 
months and 29 days to 49 months and 5 days; 44 girls). Children in this sample were recruited 
via lists in day-care centers. Testing took place in day-care centers of a mid-sized German city 
and consisted of two sessions, each lasting 50 minutes with a 10 minute warm-up phase at the 
beginning. The mean time interval of the testing sessions was 8.0 days. 
One additional child (3-year-old) participated in the study but had to be excluded from 
data analyses because of developmental delay. Another eight children (four 2-year-olds, two 
3-year-olds, two 4-year-olds) attended the first testing session but were absent from  the 
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second testing session. A varying minor number of children refused to participate in some of 
the single tasks within the batteries. 
Procedure 
Testing was split into two sessions with a delay of approximately seven days in order 
to reduce the duration of testing. The ToM session included the assessment of ToM tasks 
whereas the IC session focused on IC tasks. The order of sessions was counterbalanced 
between participants (i.e., half of the participants received the ToM session first and the IC 
session second, whereas the other half of children received the sessions in the opposite order). 
At the end of the first session, parents and caregivers were given the questionnaires, 
accompanied by the instruction to complete and return them at the second session. To 
investigate test-retest reliability, every child received the first task of the first session again at 
the beginning of the second session. For the assessment of 2-year-old children, one trained 
experimenter was involved in the data collection. For the assessment of 3-year-old children, 
three trained experimenters were involved in the data collection. For the assessment of 4-year-
old children, seven trained experimenters were involved in data collection. Furthermore, for 
all age groups, an assistant was involved in data collection. 
Measures 
Theory of Mind Batteries 
The ToM batteries for each age group contained five established and partially 
modified tasks, examining four dimensions of mental states: the understanding of others’ 
goals, intentions, preferences and false beliefs. False-belief understanding was assessed by 
two experiments, an unexpected-content task and an unexpected-transfer task. Tasks for the 
three age groups are comparable concerning the mental states investigated and rise in 
complexity with increasing age.  
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Goal understanding – 2-year-old children. To investigate 2-year-olds’ goal 
understanding, an imitation task was modified (Carpenter et al., 2005). The experimenter sat 
in front of the children, facing them, at a table. The task consisted of two conditions, a house 
condition, where a physical final location was present, and a no-house condition, in which an 
imaginary final location was present. In the house condition, the experimenter placed two 
small houses (16 cm x 9 cm x 11.5 cm) on the left and right side of the middle of the table. 
The houses were placed within the children’s and experimenter’s reach approximately 20 cm 
away from each person’s side of the table. Within each condition, the experimenter 
demonstrated four actions directed at one of the final locations. Actions were demonstrated by 
holding a small toy animal (i.e., mouse or sheep) in the right hand and by moving it from the 
center of the table to one of the houses by a specific means (i.e., hopping or flying). The 
experimenter’s action was directed two times at the right house and two times at the left house 
in an alternating order. The no-house condition resembled the house condition with the crucial 
difference that no houses were present and all means were performed towards imaginary spots 
on the table. Every action was accompanied by a sound (“dumdumdum” for hopping, 
“duuuwummmm” for flying). Before the experimenter demonstrated the action, she directed 
the children’s attention to her action (“[Name of the child], look!”). When the experimenter 
finished the action, she smiled, gave the toy to the children, and said “Now it’s your turn!” 
Children’s behavior was scored as correct if they put the toy animal in the demonstrated final 
location. Consequently, children could receive one point for each trial they participated in. As 
they were presented with four trials in each of the conditions, they could receive a maximum 
score of 8 points. Each child received a total percentage score, which was derived by dividing 
the number of correct responses by the maximum number of correct responses that children 
could have reached. The order of conditions was counterbalanced across children. Half of the 
children received the house condition first, followed by the no-house condition. The other half 
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of the children received the conditions the other way around. The means and the locations 
within the conditions were counterbalanced across children.  
Goal understanding – 3- and 4-year-old children. I adopted an imitation task 
(Bekkering et al., 2000) to investigate 3- and 4-year-olds’ understanding of others’ goals. The 
experimenter sat in front of the children, facing them, at a table. As young children naturally 
imitate others’ gestures by mirroring them (Schofield, 1976), they were instructed “Do as I 
do!”. The task consisted of two conditions (dot condition, ear condition), which included a 
physical final location, and one condition (no-dot condition), with an imaginary final location. 
In the dot condition, the experimenter placed two blue dots in front of the children and two 
identical blue dots in front of herself. The dots were located approximately 20 cm away from 
the edge of the table within reaching distance. Within each condition, the experimenter 
demonstrated four uni-manual and two bi-manual hand gestures, i.e. she used either one hand 
(e.g., right or left) or both hands to touch the dots. When she used only one hand, the 
movements were either ipsilateral by moving the hand straight forward to the dots, or 
contralateral by moving the hand diagonally across the body midline to the dots. When she 
used both hands, the movements were either ipsilateral by moving the hands straightforward 
to the dots, or contralateral by moving the hands diagonally across the body midline to the 
dots. The ear condition differed from the dot condition only with regard to the final location. 
In the ear condition, no dots were present and the experimenter touched her ears instead. The 
no-dot condition differed from the dot condition also with regard to the final location. In the 
no-dot condition, an imaginary final location was present and all hand movements were 
directed at imaginary end points left and right on the table. Six hand movements (un-imanual-
ipsilateral right, uni-manual-ipsilteral left, bi-manual-ipsilateral, uni-manual-contralateral 
right, uni-manual-contralateral left, and bi-manual-contralateral) were shown within each 
condition (for a total of 18 movements). Children’s responses were scored as correct if they 
imitated the demonstrated hand movement towards the correct final location. With six trials in 
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each of the three conditions (i.e., dot, ear, no-dot) children were able to reach a maximum of 
18 points. Each child received a total percentage score, which was derived by dividing the 
number of correct responses by the maximum number of correct responses that children could 
have reached. The order of conditions and the order of hand movements within each condition 
were counterbalanced across children.  
Intention understanding – 2-year-old children. To evaluate children’s understanding 
of others’ intentions as rational choices of action plans, I used the established task of 
Buttelmann et al. (2008). The experimenter and the children sat at a right angle at the table. 
An assistant (sitting opposite the children) started a familiarization phase by putting a small 
bucket on the table, calling the experimenter’s name to get her attention, and put a little toy 
figure into the bucket. The experimenter looked into the bucket and took the toy figure out of 
the bucket. She smiled afterwards and said “Oh nice!”. This familiarization trial was 
presented three times in a row with different toys. Then the assistant proceeded with a fourth 
demonstration where the experimenter called the children’s name, and gave the bucket to the 
children. Children were then allowed to take the toy out. Then the demonstration phase began. 
The assistant removed the bucket and put a seesaw on the table. The slide was directed 
towards the children and the experimenter. The slide of the seesaw was blocked from below 
by a pink styrofoam cube. The assistant placed a toy figure on the top of the slide and called 
the experimenter’s name (“[Name], look!”). The experimenter explored the seesaw, bent over 
and looked left and right at each side of the seesaw. Her actions were accompanied by 
mumble (“Hm a ha.”). After inspecting the seesaw, she pushed the pink styrofoam cube to the 
side with her right hand, pushed the slide down and let the reward roll down onto the table. 
She picked it up and expressed delight (“Oh nice!”). This procedure was repeated another two 
times. Then, the test trials for the children started. The assistant repeated the same procedure, 
looked at the children and called their names while putting the toy figure on the seesaw 
(“[Name of the child] look!”). Subsequently, children were allowed to have the toy figure. 
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Two more test trials followed in the same manner. Then three more demonstration trials were 
directed at the experimenter again, before another three test trials for the children followed. 
Consequently, children received a maximum of six trials. Children’s behavior was scored as 
correct or incorrect, based on whether they successfully or unsuccessfully used the tool before 
grasping the reward. If children simply took the reward, they received no point. Each child 
received a total percentage score, which was derived by dividing the number of correct 
responses by the maximum number of correct responses that children could have reached. The 
order of toy figures was counterbalanced across children. 
Intention understanding – 3-year-old children. To investigate 3-year-olds’ 
understanding of others’ intentions I slightly modified a task by Schult (2002). An intention 
can be described as a plan of action to achieve a goal, thus it consists of both a goal and an 
action plan (Tomasello et al., 2005). The basic idea was to investigate, whether children are 
able to understand that intentions need to be fulfilled by the means that were planned. The 
experimenter and the children were instructed by the assistant to build a team for playing a 
game. Two differently colored boxes (blue and red) were put on a table approximately 2 m 
away from the experimenter and the children. The assistant asked the children to name the 
colors of the boxes to check whether they were able to identify the correct color. If the 
children were not able to identify the correct color, the assistant explained how to label the 
boxes. Then she explained the aim of the game: to collect six stamped images of an animal 
(i.e., zebra or elephant) to complete a graphic on a sheet of paper. She then explained the rules 
of the game:  In each box, one card was hidden by the assistant. In one box, she hid a card 
with the animal symbol (symbol card) and in the other box, she hid a blank card. To receive a 
stamped image for the graphic, the experimenter and the children had to find the symbol card. 
To find the symbol card, the experimenter had to toss a ball into the box children suspected to 
hold the symbol card. For every trial the assistant asked the children “I hid the symbol card in 
one of the boxes. It’s now either in here (pointing at the red box) or in here (pointing at the 
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blue box). Into which of the boxes shall [name of experimenter] now toss the ball?” While 
asking, she held a red card above the red box and a blue card above the blue box. After the 
children made their choice, she put the card on the floor in front of the box with the same 
color. At this moment an intention was illustrated by creating the action plan to receive the 
prize. The experimenter threw the ball and acted like she would try to hit one of the two 
boxes. The assistant removed the card from the box that was hit. If the experimenter hit the 
box holding the symbol card, children received a stamped image, but if she hit the box with 
the blank card, children received no stamped image. The assistant then asked the test question 
“Which box should [name of experimenter] have hit?”. The experimenter’s intention was only 
fulfilled, if she hit the box that children told her before. The intention was unfulfilled, if the 
experimenter missed the intended box and hit the other one instead. However, the reward 
could have been obtained in both scenarios. A match condition was either created when the 
means was fulfilled (the experimenter hit the intended box) and the reward was retrieved, or 
when the means was unfulfilled (the experimenter missed the intended box) and the reward 
was missed. A mismatch condition was either created when the means was fulfilled but the 
reward was missed, or when the means was unfulfilled but the reward was retrieved. Six trials 
were performed in each condition. Children’s behavior was scored as correct if they answered 
the test question with naming the intended box (e.g., “She wanted to hit the red box.”). Each 
child received a total percentage score, which was derived by dividing the number of correct 
responses by the maximum number of correct responses that children could have achieved. To 
compare the performance between conditions, the total performance score was additionally 
divided into a match-score and a mismatch-score. 
Intention understanding – 4-year-old children. To test 4-year-old children’s 
understanding of intentions, another task of Schult (2002) was modified. The experimenter sat 
in front of the children facing each other at a table. Two sets of picture stories (‘Tom’ and 
‘Maria’), each consisting of three different picture stories, were used (see Appendix A for 
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illustrations). In each of the picture stories, the protagonist had the same intention, i.e. a plan 
of action to achieve a goal. What varied between stories was the means that were used to 
reach the goal. In story type A, the end state was achieved by the protagonist himself but with 
a different means than planned before (e.g., Tom had the plan to jump into a puddle of mud to 
achieve his goal of having a dirty pair of trousers. While drinking chocolate he poured it 
himself and, by this, achieved the end state of having a dirty pair of trousers). In story type B, 
the end state was achieved by the same means but by another person (e.g., another child 
jumped into the puddle of mud, splattered Tom, and achieved the end state of having a dirty 
pair of trousers). Finally, in story type C, the end state was achieved by the protagonist using 
means very similar to the one planned, but these means happened accidentally (e.g. Tom fell 
into the puddle of mud by accident and achieved the end state of having a dirty pair of 
trousers). Consequently, although the protagonist always achieved his goal, the protagonist’s 
intention was always unfulfilled because the action plan was not realized. Having two sets 
allowed the experimenter to present children with two trials of each story type. At the end of 
each story, the experimenter asked two test questions. As the first, an open question, she 
asked children what the protagonist’s idea was. If the answer included cues to both the means 
(e.g., ‘jump’) and the end state (e.g., ‘dirty pants’) children were scored as correct. The 
second question was a forced-choice between two pictures, one showing the means the 
protagonist had planned to perform and the second showing the means that was actually used. 
The experimenter asked the children whether the protagonist wanted to achieve his goal by 
doing A or B. Children’s responses were scored correct if they pointed at or described the 
means the protagonist had planned to perform. Scores of mean performance in percentages of 
trials were calculated separately for story types A, B and C. Additionally, each child received 
a total percentage score, which was derived by dividing the number of correct responses by 
the maximum number of correct responses that children could have reached.  The order of the 
story sets and the story types were counterbalanced across children. 
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Preference understanding – 2-year-old children. To test children’s understanding of 
others’ preferences I modified a task by Repacholi and Gopnik (1997). During a warm-up 
period before the test session started, the assistant conducted a pre-test to identify children’s 
preferences. She presented six pairs of objects on a tray, one pair after another. Each pair of 
objects consisted of one colorful object (e.g., a toy figure) and one colorless object (e.g., a 
piece of cardboard or a plain empty paper box). On each presentation, children were asked to 
choose one of the objects. During the test phase, the experimenter and children sat at a table, 
opposite each other. The assistant placed the tray with two objects (the same pairs as in the 
pre-test) in front of the experimenter, who then expressed her preference or rejection for each 
object. She picked up one of the objects and demonstrated delight (“Oh aha!”, accompanied 
by raising her eyebrows and smiling) and put the object down. Then she took the other object, 
showed expressions of dislike (“Egh uh.”, accompanied by pulling a face and wrinkling her 
forehead) and put the object down again. Subsequently, she turned away and pretended to 
write a text. Meanwhile, the assistant put the tray closer to the children and out of the 
experimenter’s reach. The experimenter turned back, bent over, and extended her right hand 
towards the center of the tray with the two objects. Since she was unsuccessful, she asked the 
children “[Name of the child], give me one!” Two conditions were included. In the match 
condition, the experimenter preferred the same toy that the children had chosen in the pre-test. 
In the mismatch condition, the experimenter preferred the object that the children had not 
chosen in the pre-test. Three trials were performed in each condition, consequently, children 
received six trials in total. Each child received a total percentage score, which was created 
derived by dividing the number of correct responses by the maximum number of correct 
responses that children could have achieved. To compare performance between conditions, 
the total performance score was additionally divided into a match-score and a mismatch-
score. The order of the expressions and the order of pairs of objects were counterbalanced 
across children. 
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Preference understanding – 3-year-old children. This task was based on the task of 
Buttelmann, Call, and Tomasello (2009), which was originally carried out with great apes as 
test subjects. The experimenter sat opposite the children at a table. Then she turned away 
pretending to be busy. A tray with two opaque cups, turned up-side down, was placed on her 
side of the table. The assistant explained that the aim of the game was to find Haribos, a 
special kind of sweets. She showed the children two Haribos (differing in color and shape), 
placed an occluder on the table to block children’s view, and put one Haribo under each cup. 
Her actions were accompanied by saying “I put one Haribo under one cup and the other 
Haribo under the other cup. There is now one Haribo under each cup.” After this hiding 
procedure, she removed the occluder. The experimenter turned around and looked under one 
of the cups in such a way that the children were not able to see its contents. She expressed 
delight (“Oh aha”, accompanied by raising her eyebrows and smiling). Afterwards, she 
repeated the procedure with the other cup and expressed disgust (“Egh uh.” accompanied by 
pulling a face and wrinkling her forehead). She put the occluder in front of the cups, bent over 
and removed the Haribo she desired accompanied by chewing sounds. Children were not able 
to see which Haribo was removed, but saw and heard her chewing. She removed the occluder 
and said “I ate one Haribo, but one Haribo is still there.” She then put the tray with the two 
cups closer to the children and asked “Where is the one that is left?”. At this point, children 
had to infer that the experimenter had eaten the reward she liked, and consequently, had to go 
for the cup holding the reward the experimenter did not like. A total of eight trials was 
performed. Children’s behavior was scored as correct if they chose the cup still holding a 
reward. Each child received a total percentage score, which was derived by dividing the 
number of correct responses by the maximum number of correct responses that children could 
have achieved. The order of the expressions was counterbalanced across children.  
Preference understanding – 4-year-old children. To investigate if 4-year-old children 
understand that individuals act according to their individual preferences, a task of Buttelmann 
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et al. (2009) was modified. The experimenter sat in front of the children at a table, facing 
them. The experimenter presented children with six picture stories (see Appendix B for 
illustrations). All stories introduced two protagonists, Teddy and Paul. In each story, the 
protagonists found a pair of objects, with different objects included in each of the stories. The 
six pairs of objects were a ball and a toy car; a flower and a mug; pencils and a book; a toy 
mouse and a helicopter; a duck and a mouse; and a shoe and a cap. In every story, Teddy and 
Paul liked the same object and disliked the other one. After revealing these preferences, they 
placed a blanket over the objects so that the objects were no longer visible. Teddy then left the 
scene. Paul then took one of the objects without the children being able to see which object he 
took. Consequently, only one object remained under the blanket. At the end of the story, 
Teddy returned and the children were asked which object was left under the blanket for 
Teddy. Children’s responses were scored correct if they inferred that Paul acted according to 
his preference and, thus, took the preferred object, and so it was the disliked object, which 
was left for Teddy. After each trial children were asked which object they would have taken. 
Each child received a total percentage score, which was derived by dividing the number of 
correct responses by the maximum number of correct responses that children could have 
achieved. The order of the stories and the objects liked by the protagonists were 
counterbalanced across children. 
False-belief understanding – 2-year-old children. To investigate children‘s false-belief 
understanding an unexpected-content and an unexpected-transfer task were administered. For 
the unexpected-content task, I used an interactive helping paradigm created by Buttelmann et 
al. (2014). The experimenter sat down onto a cushion at the right side of the children, the 
assistant sat down onto a cushion on the left side of the children. Four identical looking 
cardboard boxes with pictures of colorful toy blocks at the front were placed in a cabinet 
opposite to the children. The experimenter mentioned that she would like to play with blocks. 
The assistant asked if she should go and get some.  The experimenter showed appreciation 
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(“Oh yes!”) so that the assistant went to the cabinet, took one of the boxes and sat down 
again. The assistant explained that this is a toy block box whilst she pointed at the pictures, 
then opened the box, revealed the block, and handed it over to the experimenter. The 
experimenter took the block and placed it in front of her. Afterwards, she said she wanted 
more. This procedure was repeated two times, so that the experimenter built a tower of three 
blocks. After the third demonstration, the experimenter said she had to leave for a while and 
left the room. In her absence, the assistant went and took the last box. She opened the box and 
found a spoon inside. She showed surprise (“Oh there is no block inside! Look, there is a 
spoon inside! But see, there are blocks on the box, this is a block box, but there is a spoon 
inside. This is strange.”). After both, the assistant and the children, examined the unexpected 
content, the assistant closed the box and put it back on the shelf in the cabinet. As soon as she 
sat down again, the experimenter entered the room. She brought a small bowl and mentioned 
that she found this bowl outside. She sat down, looked at the blocks, looked at the bowl, and 
touched both at the same time. She then looked up at the box on the shelf, performed a 
reaching gesture and called for the assistant’s attention (“I want this!”). The assistant lifted a 
large piece of cardboard, which laid in front of the cabinet, and revealed a spoon and a block. 
She said to the children “Look [name of the child], I have it here as well”, sat down again, and 
asked the children to go and get the experimenter what she wanted (“[Name of the child] go 
and get it for [name of experimenter]”). Children’s behavior was scored as correct if they 
gave the block. The object children touched first was coded as well. The positions of the 
objects placed under the piece of cardboard were counterbalanced across children.  
For the unexpected-transfer task, I used another interactive paradigm (Buttelmann, 
Carpenter, & Tomasello, 2009). Children sat on a cushion next to the assistant, and the 
parents sat behind their children. Two wooden boxes (a pink box and a yellow box) were 
placed in the middle of the room approximately 1 m away from each other and 2 m away 
from the children. The boxes were equipped with lids, which could be locked with pegs. The 
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boxes were unlocked when the experimenter approached. The pegs were placed in front of the 
two boxes. The experimenter approached the boxes, one after another, and lifted their lids. 
She demonstrated delight, smiled and said “Oh nice!”, then left the room. In her absence, the 
assistant told the children to explore one of the boxes together. She opened the lid, put a toy 
into the box, closed the lid, and locked it with the peg. She shook the lid a little to 
demonstrate that the box was locked. Afterwards, she pulled out the peg to unlock the lid, 
opened the box, and removed the toy from the box. She described each step of action. After 
this demonstration, she put the toy back into the box and asked the children to unlock the box 
alone. This practice trial was repeated until the children learned how to unlock the boxes on 
their own. They had to successfully open the box at least two times. If children still required 
help on the third try, the practice procedure was ended and the assistant continued with the 
task. The same practice trials were repeated for the other box.  After finishing the practice 
trials, the assistant locked both boxes and - together with the children - returned to the 
cushions. As soon as they sat down again, the experimenter returned and showed her favorite 
toy to them. She then tried to open one of the boxes to put her toy in. Since she had been 
absent while the functions of the boxes had been explained, she was not able to open the 
locked box and hesitated. The assistant requested the children to help the experimenter. While 
children unlocked the box, the experimenter turned away, thus, did not pay attention. If 
children were not able to open the box on their own, the assistant helped. The experimenter 
then put her toy into the opened box, closed the lid and left the room again. In her absence, 
the assistant removed the toy from the box and put it into the other box. During the transfer of 
the toy she giggled in a sneaky way, commented every action and mentioned that the 
experimenter was outside and could not see what they do. After she finished the hiding 
process, she returned to her cushion. As soon as she sat down again, the experimenter 
returned, went straight to the box into which she had initially placed her toy, and tried to open 
the lid (with three short pulls). Again, she was not able to open the box. In resignation, she sat 
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down in the center between both boxes. The assistant encouraged the children to help the 
experimenter (“Come on [name of the child], go and help [name of experimenter].”). If the 
children were not assisting after the second request, the experimenter asked the children to 
help her. If the children still hesitated, the assistant offered to join while helping the 
experimenter. If the children still refused to help, the parent was instructed to request the 
children to go and help the experimenter. If the children still hesitated, the assistant allowed 
the parent to go and help together with their children. Parents were instructed to let children 
take the lead and decide on their own what to do. Children’s behavior was scored as correct if 
they chose the box that now contained the toy. The box children touched first was coded as 
well. The location of the yellow box and the box in which the experimenter hid her toy were 
counterbalanced across children. 
False-belief understanding – 3-year-old children. For the unexpected-content task, I 
modified a task from Hansen (2010). The experimenter sat in front of the children at a table, 
facing them. She introduced a small hand puppet, a white duck (“Oh, see who is here! It’s the 
little duck. Isn’t she cute?”). Then, the experimenter put a box of chocolate 
(‘Kinderschokolade’, a well-known brand in Germany) on the table. The duck looked at the 
box and expressed delight (“Oh…ah!”). Subsequently, the experimenter explained “The little 
duck is very busy and has to go right now” and put the puppet under the table. After the duck 
disappeared, the experimenter asked the children what they thought was inside the box 
(reality question). If children were not able to answer the reality question, and therefore, did 
not demonstrate a belief, the task was stopped. If the children were able to answer the reality 
question, the experimenter opened the box and revealed that pencils were inside. The 
experimenter showed surprise about the content (“Oops, there is no chocolate in it, there are 
pencils in it!”). After this demonstration, she closed the box and asked the children about the 
actual content of it, to ensure they were aware of the actual content. If children answered 
incorrectly or did not answer at all, the actual content was revealed once again, followed again 
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by the reality question. If children answered incorrectly three times, the task was stopped. If 
children named the current content, the experimenter asked two questions. One question 
referred to the children’s former belief (self-question: “You and I know there are pencils 
inside. And what did you think earlier was inside this box?”). The other question referred to 
the belief of the duck (other-question: “You and I know there are pencils inside. If now the 
duck would come back, what would she think was inside the box?”). The children’s answer 
was scored as correct if they answered both questions with ‘chocolate’ or ‘sweets’. For the 
final analysis, the answer to the question about the hand puppet’s belief was used, because all 
tasks of the ToM battery measured the understanding of others’ mental states. The order of 
the questions was counterbalanced across children. 
A task created by Southgate, Chevallier, and Csibra (2010) was modified and used as 
the false-believe unexpected-transfer task. The experimenter sat in front of the children at a 
table, the two facing each other. There were two containers on the table, which were centered 
on the left and right side (a basket with a lid on the left side, and a cardboard box with a lid on 
the right side). The experimenter showed two novel objects (object A and object B) and 
placed them in the middle of the table. Children were then allowed to get familiar with the 
objects. After 20 seconds had elapsed, the experimenter put object A in the basket and object 
B in the cardboard box. She commented her actions (“I put this one in here, and I put this one 
in here.”). After she finished, she left the room. In her absence, the assistant switched the two 
objects’ locations in a sneaky manner (“[Name of the experimenter] cannot see or hear us. I 
have an idea! I take this one out and put it in here (putting object A into the cardboard box). 
And now, I take this one out and put it in here (putting object B into the basket).”) After she 
finished the exchange, she told the children not to inform the experimenter (“But [name of the 
child], shhhh!”). As soon as she sat down again, the experimenter returned and sat down at the 
table. She looked at both containers, pointed to the basket and said: “Now, I want to have the 
Modi!” By this, she demonstrated her knowledge of the object names, and that she wanted to 
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get object A as she put it in the basket at the beginning. She pushed both containers closer to 
the children simultaneously and centered her hand between the containers to receive the 
object. Their behavior was scored as correct, if children gave the object from the box the 
experimenter did not point at. The container children touched first was coded as well. After 
finishing the task, children were asked to point at the object they liked most, to identify their 
preference. The location of the containers and objects were counterbalanced across children. 
False-belief understanding – 4-year-old children. For the unexpected-content task 
(Perner, Leekam, & Wimmer, 1987), a package of a well-known chocolate (i.e., 
‘Kinderschokolade’) and colorful pencils served as material. During the warm-up procedure, 
children were asked to name their best friend. At test, after presenting the closed package of 
chocolate to children, they were asked what they thought was inside. If they were not able to 
label the content as chocolate or sweets, and hence, did not demonstrate a false belief, the 
procedure was not continued. If they answered ‘chocolate’ or ‘sweets’, the experimenter 
opened the box and revealed the unexpected content, i.e. pencils, showing surprise. The 
experimenter put the pencils back into the box, and closed the box. She then asked children 
the reality question, that is, what actually was inside the box, to ensure that children were 
aware of the real content. If children answered incorrectly, the experimenter revealed the 
actual content once more, followed by the reality question. The maximum number of 
demonstrations was three times. If children answered incorrectly three times, the procedure 
ended. If children answered correctly, the experimenter asked two test questions: One about 
the children’s former belief, the ‘self-question’ (“What did you first think was inside this 
box?”) and one about the belief of the best friend, the ‘other-question’ (“If [best friend’s 
name] saw this box, what would [she/he] think is inside?”). Children’s answers were scored 
as correct if they answered the test questions with ‘chocolate’ or ‘sweets’. For the final 
analyses, I only used the other-question because all tasks of the ToM battery measure the 
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understanding of others’ mental states. The order of the questions was counterbalanced across 
children. 
The unexpected-transfer task consisted of three puppet games which were based on the 
Maxi-and-the-chocolate task (Wimmer & Perner, 1983). Children sat at a table with the 
experimenter sitting opposite them. The experimenter played out each story with two hand 
puppets, which were well-known characters from a German television show for children. At 
the beginning of each trial, the experimenter told children the puppets’ names and 
subsequently tested whether they knew the names of the puppets (i.e., “Show me, who is 
Pittiplatsch!”). In one of the stories, Pittiplatsch owned a footlocker and Schnatterinchen 
owned a basket. Both characters put their containers onto the table and took a position behind 
their containers. Next, Pittiplatsch put a ball in front of his footlocker, opened the footlocker, 
put the ball inside, closed the lid, and left the scene. In his absence, Schnatterinchen opened 
the footlocker, put the ball in front of it, closed the lid, put the ball in front of her basket, 
opened the basket, put the ball inside, closed the lid, and left as well. All actions were narrated 
by the experimenter. After this demonstration, the experimenter asked the test question 
“Where will Pittiplatsch look for his ball when he returns?” Children’s responses were scored 
correct, if they indicated that Pittiplatsch will look for the ball in the footlocker, hence, were 
able to infer the false belief of Pittiplatsch. Subsequently, the experimenter asked the reality 
question “Where is the ball really now?”, and the memory question “Where did Pittiplatsch 
put the ball in the first place?”. The answers for the reality and the memory questions were 
coded as correct if children indicated the correct locations. If memory or control questions 
were answered incorrectly, children were excluded from the final analysis. Two other 
versions of the story were presented with different protagonists and objects but with an 
identical course of action. The second story was presented with Moppy and Sandmann who 
owned a pot and a small bucket and one rubber duck. The third story was presented with Mr. 
Fox and Ms. Magpie who owned a bowl, and a cardboard box, respectively, and one red 
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block. Each child received a total percentage score, which was derived by dividing the 
number of correct responses by the maximum number of correct responses that children could 
have achieved. The sides of protagonists and objects were counterbalanced. 
Inhibitory Control Batteries 
The IC batteries were designed to measure inhibitory control in various dimensions. 
Two tasks of each battery tested the inhibition of a dominant prepotent response in favor of a 
subdominant response. The dominant prepotent responses were either directed to a strongly 
associated concept, or a salient location. The third task of each battery tested the inhibition of 
a dominant prepotent response for a certain period of time, commonly referred to by the term 
‘delay of gratification’. Tasks for the three age groups are comparable concerning the 
dimensions of IC investigated and become increasingly difficult with increasing age. 
Inhibition of concept – 2-year-old children. A reverse categorization task from Carlson 
et al. (2004) was adopted to test children’s ability to inhibit a response referring to conceptual 
processes. The experimenter sat in front of the children at a table, the two facing each other. 
She put a big bucket (height = 27 cm, Ø = 25.5 cm) on the right side and a small bucket 
(height = 18.5 cm, Ø = 16.5 cm) on the left side on the table. In the familiarization phase, she 
told the children to sort the blocks into the buckets matching their sizes (“The small blocks 
have to go into the small bucket and the big blocks have to go into the big bucket.”). She 
performed six trials in the familiarization phase, three trials with small blocks (3 cm x 3 cm x 
3 cm), and three trials with big blocks (6 cm x 6 cm x 6 cm). After the familiarization trials 
she offered the children a big block and asked them to sort the block into the correct bucket. If 
they put the big block into the small bucket, the experimenter corrected them by 
demonstrating the correct action, i.e. she sorted the big block into the big bucket. After six 
trials the experimenter removed the blocks from the buckets and started the test phase. She 
explained that they will play a fun game. This time, the small blocks have to go into the big 
bucket and the big blocks have to go into the small bucket. After two demonstration trials, 
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children undertook twelve test trials in a pseudo-randomized order. No feedback was given 
during the test trials. Children’s behavior was scored as correct when they placed a block into 
the reversed sized buckets. Each child received a total percentage score, which was derived by 
dividing the number of correct responses by the maximum number of correct responses that 
children could have achieved. The position of the big bucket and small bucket was 
counterbalanced across children. 
Inhibition of concept – 3-year-old children. For the sample of 3-year-old children, a 
Stroop-like task (Carlson & Moses, 2001) was adopted. The experimenter sat in front of the 
children at a table, facing each other. She put two cards (i.e., a green and a white card) on the 
table next to each other with a distance of 15 cm between them. She asked the children to 
point to the white card if she says ‘grass’ and to point to the green card if she says ‘snow’. 
Two trials were performed, one trial for each of the cards. If children did not point to the 
correct card, the experimenter explained the rule again. A maximum of 3 rounds was given. If 
children did not perform correctly at the third round, the experimenter ended the task. As soon 
as children were able to complete one round (i.e., performing correctly in both trials), 16 test 
trials followed in a pseudo-randomized order. Children’s behavior was scored as correct for 
each trial where they pointed to the appropriate card. Each child received a total percentage 
score, which was derived by dividing the number of correct responses by the maximum 
number of correct responses that children could have achieved. The positions of the green and 
white cards were counterbalanced across children. 
Inhibition of concept – 4-year-old children. The day-and-night task (Gerstadt et al., 
1994) was conducted to test 4-year-old children’s inhibitory abilities concerning a conceptual 
conflict. Sixteen cards with a day or a night symbol were used. Eight day cards showed a light 
blue sky with a white cloud and a big yellow sun. Eight night cards showed a black sky with 
little yellow stars and a crescent moon. The experimenter started the task by telling children 
that they would play a fun game. The experimenter placed the pile of cards upside-down in 
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the middle of the table, took the first card (a night card) showed it to children and asked them 
to always say the word ‘day’ whenever seeing this card. Then the experimenter proceeded 
with the second card (a day card) and told children to say the word ‘night’ whenever seeing 
this card. The two cards were put back on the pile and one training round followed, to control 
if children were able to apply the rule. The experimenter showed the night card and asked 
‘What do you say to this card?’ and proceeded in the same way with the day card. If children 
gave correct responses to both cards, 16 test trials started in a fixed order (see Gerstadt et al., 
1994). If children gave incorrect response to one of the cards, the training round was repeated. 
A maximum of three training rounds was given. Children only entered the test phase if 
scoring correctly on at least one training round. During the test phase no feedback was given. 
Each child received a total percentage score, which was derived by dividing the number of 
correct responses by the maximum number of correct responses that children could have 
achieved. Furthermore, test trials were separated into two blocks and summed to obtain scores 
of mean performances of trials in the first block (trials 1-8) and of the second block (trials 9-
16). A division between a conservative scoring and a non-conservative scoring was made. For 
the conservative scoring, only the answers ‘day’ and ‘night’ were scored as correct. For the 
non-conservative version variations which still referred to the opposite concept were also 
scored as correct, for example, ‘dark’ or ‘light’. 
Spatial inhibition – 2 –year-old children. In a modified A-not-B task (Diamond, 
Prevor, Callender, & Druin, 1997), children played a searching game. The experimenter 
presented the children with a music box with a xylophone inside, put two little blocks (3 cm x 
3 cm x 3 cm) one after the other into it and thereby produced a descending sound. She then 
asked the children to throw two blocks into the box themselves. Then, she took a seat in front 
of the children at a table and put a tray on it. She performed three trials to familiarize the 
children with the searching procedure of the task. Therefore, she presented another block, put 
it on the tray, put an occluder in front of it to block the children’s view and removed the 
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occluder after a delay of 2 seconds. She put the tray closer to the children and asked them to 
take the block and put it into the music box. She then put a cup, which was turned upside-
down, in the middle of the tray, put a block under the cup, pushed it to the right side, put the 
occluder in front of the children, removed it after a delay of 2 seconds, and put the tray closer 
to the children while saying “It’s your turn to search for the block!”. The last trial was 
identical, except that she pushed the cup to the left side on the tray. In the test trials, she 
presented a block, put it under the cup, pushed it to the left side, put the occluder in front of 
the children, and put an identical cup on the right side of the tray. After a delay of 2 seconds 
she removed the occluder and put the tray closer to the children while saying “Now you are 
allowed to search for the block!” Thus, children were presented with two cups. The same trial 
was repeated until children lifted the cup containing the block two times in a row. If so, the 
following trial was performed by pushing the cup to the other side (i.e., to the right side). The 
procedure was repeated for a maximum of 10 trials. Consequently, they received a maximum 
of four switches. Children’s behavior was scored as correct for each successful retrieval of the 
block. If children were lifting the cup containing no block five times in a row, they received a 
trial with only one cup to keep their motivation high. Each child received a total percentage 
score, which was derived by dividing the number of correct responses by the maximum 
number of correct responses that children could have achieved. The side to which the first cup 
was pushed was counterbalanced across children. 
Spatial inhibition – 3-year-old children. In a modified version of the windows task 
(Russell et al., 1991), children could win stickers in a competitive game against an assistant. 
The assistant sat in front of the children at a table, the two facing each other. The 
experimenter sat at the head of the table and instructed the children to win as many stickers as 
possible by playing against an opponent (i.e., the assistant). She started a familiarization phase 
and put two identical opaque boxes (12 cm x 12 cm x 12 cm) in the middle of the table, 
between the children and the opponent. In each trial, the experimenter instructed the children 
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and the assistant to turn around. Meanwhile, as both were turned away from the table, she told 
them she would now hide a sticker under one of the boxes. After this procedure, children 
should point at the box, in which their opponent should search for the sticker. If this box 
contained the sticker, the opponent received it and children received nothing. If this box was 
empty, the opponent received nothing and the children received the sticker from the other 
box. After the children pointed at one of the boxes, the experimenter lifted it and exposed the 
content. If the sticker was inside, she gave it the opponent. If no sticker was inside, she lifted 
the other box and gave it to the children. A total of four trials were performed to familiarize 
children with the procedure. The experimenter controlled the familiarization phase and 
arranged for the children and their opponent to win two stickers each. That is, instead of 
actually hiding the sticker at the beginning of the trial, she secretly let it slip under the box 
when lifting the box. In this way, she was able to coordinate who should win the sticker. On 
the fifth trial, the training phase started. After children pointed at one of the boxes, the 
experimenter lifted both boxes, paused, and asked the children who received the sticker. This 
was done to check if they understood the rules. If children were not able to answer according 
to the rule, the experimenter explained the rule again. A maximum number of nine trials was 
presented. If children were not able to pass three trials of the training phase, the game ended. 
If children passed three trials, the experimenter started the test phase. She replaced the boxes 
with two similar boxes with an open side that faced the children. The opponent could not see 
into the boxes. The procedure of the test trials was identical to the procedure of the 
familiarization trials, except that the location of the sticker followed a pseudo-randomized 
order. A maximum of 15 trials was conducted. Children’s behavior was scored as correct for 
each trial in which they pointed at the empty box. Each child received a total percentage 
score, which was derived by dividing the number of correct responses by the maximum 
number of correct responses that children could have reached. 
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Spatial inhibition – 4-year-old children. To test 4-year-old children’s ability to inhibit 
a prepotent spatial impulse, the same task and scoring system was used as for the 3-year-old 
children. The task differed slightly only in two aspects. The first was that children only 
received two trials instead of four trials in the familiarization phase. The second change 
concerned the procedure of the 15 pseudo-randomized test trials.  The experimenter used an 
occluder to block children’s view of the boxes for 3 seconds at the beginning of each trial. 
Before every test trial the experimenter repeated the rule and afterwards lifted the occluder. 
Delay of gratification – 2-year-old children. To measure the ability to resist sweets, a 
waiting task was administered (Golden et al., 1977). The experimenter sat in front of the 
children at a table, the two facing. A tray and a bell were put in the middle of the table. For 
one training trial, the experimenter put a wooden block on the tray. Then she said that she will 
turn around and that the children should wait and should not take the block until she turned 
back and rang the bell. Children had to wait for 20 seconds until the experimenter rang the 
bell. If children did not wait, the trial was repeated. A maximum of five training trails were 
given. If children did not follow the rule, the task ended. If children waited, the experimenter 
continued with the first test trial. She put three identical cups upside-down on the tray and 
presented a gummy bear on a spoon (“Look what I have!”). She put the gummy bear under 
one of the cups and said “Wait until I ring the bell, afterwards you are allowed to take the 
gummy bear!” Ten test trials were performed, ranging in duration from 5 to 50 seconds in 
length and alternated via cups, which were chosen to hide the gummy bear. I coded the time 
until children touched the sweets, because this was always followed by the children eating it. 
For every child a mean total score was calculated and converted into percentages of mean 
performance. 
Delay of gratification – 3-year-old children. To measure children’s ability to delay a 
gratification I modified the task by Mischel et al. (1988). Materials consisted of a paper plate 
and two kinds of sweets; either two small bags of gummy bears or two small bars of 
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chocolate. Children were first asked if they preferred gummy bears or chocolate. Children 
were then asked if they preferred to have one package or two packages of their favored sweet, 
to test whether they really liked the sweet. If children were shy and answered they would just 
take one package, the experimenter smiled and asked if two of them would not be much 
better. When the experimenter repeated the question, all children said they wanted to have 
two of them. The experimenter opened one of the packages while saying that this is the first 
bag of gummy bears or the first bar of chocolate. The gummy bears were scattered on the 
plate. The bar of chocolate was broken into pieces. The experimenter smelled it and 
mentioned that it looked really good and smelled delicious. The experimenter then mentioned 
she had to leave the room for a moment and instructed children that they could either eat the 
treat right now or they could wait until she got back and would be then given the second 
package as well. The experimenter then left the room and waited outside for a maximum of 5 
minutes. In order not to leave the children unattended, an assistant stayed in the room, sat in a 
corner out of children’s view and pretended to write something in order to make children 
believe that they were unobserved. The duration of the period before the children touched, 
licked, or ate the sweets during the 5 minutes response period was measured. Children 
received a total score for the time that they waited before touching the sweets, before licking 
the sweets, and before eating the sweets. All scores were converted into percentages of 
waiting time (of a total time of 5 minutes). For the final analyses the scores until children 
touched the sweets were used, because the touch-scores revealed greater variance than the ate-
scores, since children were very good at resisting eating the sweets. Only 22 out of 90 
children actually ate the sweets. 
Delay of gratification – 4-year-old children. To test 4-year-old children’s ability to 
delay gratification, the same task and scoring system was used, as for the 3-year-old children. 
The task differed only with regards to the waiting time. Children had to wait for a maximum 
of 7 minutes. For the final analyses the scores for the periods until children touched the sweets 
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were used, because the touch-scores revealed greater variance than the ate-scores, since 
children were very good at resisting eating the sweets. Only nine out of 61 children ate the 
sweets. 
Language Assessment 
To assess children’s language abilities, sentence comprehension and word 
comprehension were assessed with the SETK 2 and SETK 3 – 5 (German language 
development test for 2, and 3- to 5-year-olds, Grimm, 2001; Grimm et al., 2000). Children 
received the SETK at the end of the first test session. The 2-year-old children were shown a 
selection of pictures. The experimenter read words and sentences to the children and they 
were asked to identify the picture representing what had been described (e.g., “Show me the 
picture in which children are sitting under the table.”). The 3-year-old children and 4-year-old 
children were presented with different objects arranged in a given order on the table. They 
were asked to follow the experimenter’s instructions, which always referred to simple actions 
to be performed with the objects (e.g., “Put the bag between the pencils.”). The raw values 
were transferred into T-values for the final analysis. 
Behavior and Temperament Assessment 
To assess behavioral problems and temperament traits parents were invited to 
complete two questionnaires, the CBCL (Child Behavior Checklist for Ages 1 ½ - 5, 
Achenbach & Rescorla, 2000) and the IKT (The Integrative Child Temperament Inventory, 
Zentner, 2011). To increase reliability and check whether children would be evaluated 
similarly by parents and caregivers, children’s kindergarten teachers were asked to complete 
the C-TRF (Caregiver – Teacher Report Form, Achenbach & Rescorla, 2000). The CBCL 
consists of 100 questions for which parents estimate the frequency of their children’s behavior 
over the last two months, deciding among ‘not true’, ‘sometimes true’ and ‘often true’. The 
items are assigned to eight scales of syndromes. Four scales relate to internalizing factors, 
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which are Emotionally Reactive, Anxious/Depressed, Somatic Complaints, and Withdrawn. 
The externalizing factors include the syndrome scales Attention Problems and Aggressive 
Behavior. Both scores are combined and combined with the remaining scales for Sleeping 
Problems and Other Problems to obtain a total problem score. For the final analysis, 
internalizing (α = .89) and externalizing scores (α = .92) were used, as well as the scores from 
the Other Problems scale. The C-TRF can be considered equivalent to the CBCL, but there is 
no syndrome scale for sleeping problems. For the final analysis I used the internalizing (α = 
.89) and externalizing scores (α = .96), as well as the scores of the Other Problems scale. The 
IKT offers 30 questions on a 6-point Likert-scale, ranging from ‘not true’ to ‘always true’. 
The raw values are summed up to five subscales of temperament dimensions containing 
Frustration (α = .81), Social Inhibition/Shyness (α = .80), Activity (α = .85), Attention (α = 
.81) and Sensory Sensitivity (α = .70). For the final analysis values were converted into 
percentile ranks.  
Data Reduction and Reliability 
Data Reduction. Since more than one main experimenter was involved in 
administering the tasks, I used Kruskal-Wallis tests to check for possible influences. I found 
group effects in the sample of the 3-year-old children for the spatial-inhibition task (²(2) = 
7.89, p = .019) and the delay-of-gratification task (²(2) = 7.47, p = .024). Post-hoc Mann-
Whitney’s U-tests revealed differences between Experimenter 1 and Experimenter 2 for the 
spatial-inhibition task (U = -2.40, p < .017) and the delay-of-gratification touch score (U = -
2.256, p < .024). For these two tasks, videos where rechecked and no differences in the testing 
procedures were found. Since protocols did not deviate from each other and differences 
appear only between two experimenters, no data reduction for this sample was performed. 
However, for the sample of the 4-year-old children data reduction was necessary. For the 
delay-of-gratification task, the data from one experimenter had to be excluded from the 
analyses due to a significant group effect (Kruskal-Wallis test, χ²(6, N = 72) = 13.8, p = .032). 
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Post-hoc tests using Mann-Whitney’s U-tests showed that the results from this experimenter 
differed from that of the four other experimenters (all p-values ≤ .046). For the preference 
understanding task, the data from another experimenter was excluded from the analyses due 
to a significant group effect (Kruskal-Wallis test, χ²(6, N = 78) =13.9, p = .031). Post-hoc tests 
using Mann-Whitney’s U-tests showed that the results from this experimenter significantly 
differed from two other experimenters (all p-values ≤ .012). For all other tasks, the analyses 
did not show any differences in children’s performances across experimenters (all p-values ≥ 
.078). 
Reliability. To determine interrater-reliability, two naïve independent persons coded 
25 % of the videos again. Agreement for the samples of 2-, 3- and 4-year-olds was excellent 
(α > .91 for the false-belief tasks and rs > .88 for the other tasks). Wilcoxon tests also revealed 
no differences between coders (all p-values ≥ .157). 
Test-Retest Reliability – 2-year-old children. Because the first task for each child was 
re-administered at the beginning of the second session, I analyzed test-retest reliability. For 
the sample of the 2-year-old children I found correlations between test and re-test values for 
goal understanding (rs = .685, N = 8, p = .061), intention understanding (rs = .802, N = 8, p = 
.017), preference understanding (rs = .808, N = 8, p = .015), inhibition-of-concept (rs = .939, 
N = 8, p = .001 ), spatial-inhibition (rs = .807, N = 10, p = .005) and delay-of-gratification 
tasks (rs = .641, N = 10, p = .046). The false-belief unexpected-content task showed 
acceptable reliability (α = .73, N = 4), whereas the false-belief unexpected-transfer tasks 
showed no reliability (α = .17, N = 7).  
Test-Retest Reliability – 3-year-old children. Test-retest reliability for the sample of 
the 3-year-old children showed high correlations between test and re-test values for the 
spatial-inhibition (rs = .900, N = 7, p = .006) and delay-of-gratification task (rs = .868, N = 9, 
p = .002), moderate correlations for the goal understanding (rs = .536, N = 7, p = .215), and 
only small correlations for the intention understanding (rs = .216, N = 9, p = .578) and 
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inhibition-of-concept task (rs = .171, N = 10, p = .637) . The false-belief unexpected-transfer 
task showed no reliability (α = .36, N = 10). Furthermore, the sample size for the preference 
understanding task was too small for a reliable analysis, as well as the sample for the false-
belief unexpected-content task because most children remembered the content revealed in the 
first session.  
Test-Retest Reliability – 4-year-old children. Test-retest reliability was confirmed with 
strong correlations for the intention understanding (rs = .815, p = .004), spatial-inhibition (rs = 
.718, p = .172) and delay-of-gratification tasks (rs = .500, p = .391), and with moderate 
correlations for the preference understanding (rs = .395, p = .333) and inhibition-of-concept 
tasks (rs = .316, p = .408). The false-belief unexpected-transfer (rs = .216, p = .607) and the 
goal understanding tasks (rs = .284, p = .397) only showed small correlation coefficients. The 
false-belief unexpected-content task was excluded from reliability analyses, because most 
children remembered the unexpected content from the first test session.  
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2.2 Results 
Descriptive Statistics 
To display the overall multidimensional understanding of mental states, each child 
received a total score of ToM, composed of the total scores of the goal understanding, the 
preference understanding, the intention understanding task and a collapsed score of the two 
false-belief understanding tasks, which were transformed into z-values for the correlational 
analyses. In the same way, each child received an IC score, composed of the total scores of 
the inhibition-of-concept task, the spatial-inhibition task, and the touch scores of the delay-of-
gratification task, which were also transformed into z-values for the correlational analyses. 
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics for the total scores of ToM, IC and language. 
 
Table 1. 
Descriptive Statistics for Scores of Language, ToM and IC of 2-, 3- and 4-Year-Old Children 
 
Mean SD
2-year-old children
Language 49.7 7.5 34.0 - 66.5
ToM 46.0 18.5 0.0 - 91.7
IC 56.4 16.2 24.0 - 100
3-year-old children
Language 50.0 10.1 23.0 - 71.0
ToM 53.5 11.8 20.8 - 90.0
IC 44.9 27.4 0.0 - 100
4-year-old children
Language 52.0 11.5 32.0 - 77.0
ToM 55.6 17.8 25.0 - 100
IC 54.4 27.9 0.0 - 100
Range
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Gender Differences 
For all tasks, Mann-Whitney’s U-tests were ran to check for gender differences. Two-
year-old girls scored better in the false-belief unexpected-content task than two-year-old boys 
(²(57) = 3.932, p = .047, r = .521). For the sample of the 3-year-old and 4-year-old children, 
there were no differences between girls’ or boys’ scores within the task batteries (all ps ≥ 
.079).  
Regarding gender differences in behavioral problems and temperament, Mann-
Whitney’s U-tests were run for the CBCL and C-TRF internalizing and externalizing scores, 
the scores of the Other Problem scale, and the IKT dimension scales. For parents’ ratings of 
2-year-old children, it was found that boys received higher scores than girls on the CBCL 
Other Problem scale (U = 533.5, N = 40, N = 39, Z = -2.429, p = .015, r = 0.273), concerning 
the CBCL externalizing scores (U = 532.5, N = 40, N = 39, Z = -2.432, p = .015, r = 0.274) 
and on the IKT Activity scale (U = 487.5, N = 40, N = 39, Z = -2.436, p = .015, r = 0.274). 
For parents’ ratings of the 4-year-old children, it was found that boys received lower ratings 
than girls on the IKT Activity scale (U =390, N = 38, N = 32, Z = -2.557, p = .010, r = 0.306). 
No statistically significant results were revealed for the sample of the 3-year-old children and 
for caregiver ratings in general. 
Session Order Effects 
It was also checked whether children scored differently depending on the type of 
session they received first. With regard to the large amount of tasks, only a few effects were 
revealed. Two-year-old children who received the IC session second, passed the inhibition-of-
concept task better than children who received the IC session first (U = 479.5, N = 32, N = 41, 
Z = -1.986, p = .047, r = 0.232). Analyzing the IC score in relation to the session order, no 
difference was found (p = .996). Four-year-old children who received the ToM session first 
passed the goal understanding task better than children who received the ToM session second 
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(U =566, Nfirst = 40, Nsecond = 38, Z = -1.971, p = .049, r = 0.223). For the delay-of-
gratification task it was found that 4-year-old children, who received the IC session first 
showed shorter times on waiting to touch the sweets than  children who got the task on the 
second occasion (U =332, Nfirst = 32, Nsecond = 29, Z = -2.063, p = .039, r = 0.264). 
Analyzing the ToM and IC scores in relation to the session order, no difference was found (all 
ps ≥ .053).  No other effects of session order were revealed (all ps ≥ .055). 
Correlation and Comparison of Parents’ and Caregivers’ Ratings 
Sample of 2-year-old children. Parents of the 2-year-old children completed and 
returned 96% of questionnaires of the CBCL and 96% of questionnaires of the IKT. 
Caregivers of the 2-year-old children completed and returned 57% of questionnaires of the C-
TRF. Pearson correlations were run and showed positive correlations between the CBCL 
externalizing and C-TRF externalizing scores. The following syndrome scales were positively 
correlated concerning parents’ and caregivers’ rating: Emotionally Reactive, Withdrawn, 
Aggressive Behavior and Other Problems scales (all rs ≥ .392, all ps ≤ .007). Additionally, 
caregivers’ ratings of C-TRF externalizing scores showed positive correlations to parents’ 
ratings on the IKT Frustration scale and negative correlations to the IKT Attention scale. 
Caregivers’ ratings on the Other Problems scale showed negative correlations to parents’ 
ratings on the IKT Attention scale. For correlation coefficients see Table 2. To enable a direct 
comparison of informants’ judgments, I further compared the internalizing scores, 
externalizing scores and the other-problems scores of parents and caregivers. A significant 
difference concerning mean scores of the scales was detected for the Other Problems scale 
and the externalizing scores. On average, parents rated children higher than caregivers did on 
the Other Problem scale (Wilcoxon test, N = 47, Z = -3.479, p = .001, r = .507) but lower with 
regards to externalizing scores (Wilcoxon test, N = 47, Z = -1.984, p = .047, r = .289). 
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Sample of 3-year-old children. Parents of the 3-year-old children completed and 
returned 96% of questionnaires of the CBCL and 96% of questionnaires of the IKT. 
Caregivers of the 2-year-old children completed and returned 93% of questionnaires of the C-
TRF. Pearson correlations were run and revealed no correlations for the internalizing and 
externalizing scores, or for the scores on the Other Problem scales. Positive correlations were 
found between the following syndrome scales concerning parents’ and caregivers’ rating: 
Anxious/Depressed and Somatic Complaints scales (all rs ≥ .382, all ps ≤ .001). Caregivers’ 
ratings of C-TRF externalizing scores correlated positively with parents’ ratings on the IKT 
Frustration scale. For correlation coefficient see Table 4. Regarding the direct comparison of 
informant’s judgment, a difference was found for parents’ and caregivers’ ratings for the 
internalizing and externalizing scores. On average, parents rated children lower on the 
internalizing and externalizing scores than caregivers (Wilcoxon test, internalizing scores: N = 
80, Z = -2.793, p = .005, r = .312; externalizing scores, N = 80, Z = -3.866, p < .001, r = .432).  
Sample of the 4-year-old children. Parents of the 4-year-old children completed and 
returned 89% of questionnaires of the CBCL and 88% of questionnaires of the IKT. 
Caregivers completed and returned 95% of questionnaires of the C-TRF. Pearson correlations 
were run and revealed no correlations for the internalizing and externalizing scores, or for 
scores on the Other Problem scale. Notably, only one statistically significant correlation was 
found between parents’ and caregivers’ questionnaires for behavioral problems. The CBCL 
Aggressive Behavior scale correlated positively with the C-TRF external scores (r = .251, p = 
.040).  The direct comparison of informants’ judgments detected a significant difference in 
scores on the Other Problems scale, as parents rated children higher than caregivers did 
(Wilcoxon test, N = 67, Z = -3.417, p = .001, r = .415).  
Comparison of behavior ratings across the different age groups. To compare the 
ratings of behavioral problems across all age groups, Kruskal-Wallis tests were run. A 
significant group effect was only detected for caregivers C-RTF internalizing scores (χ²(2, N = 
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206) = 9.0, p = .011). Post-hoc tests using Mann-Whitney’s U-tests showed that 3-year-old 
children received higher internalizing scores from caregivers compared to 4-year-old children 
(U = 2577.5, N = 83, N = 76, Z = -1.992, p = .046, r = 0.158). In addition, 3-year-old children 
received higher internalizing scores from caregivers compared to 2-year-old children (U = 
1338.5, N = 83, N = 47, Z = -2.972, p = .003, r = 0.261). Even if the difference between 2- 
and 3-year-old children is statistically significant, it should be noted that the sample size of 
the 2-year-old children is fairly small with an N of 47. For mothers’ ratings of behavioral 
problems, no statistically significant difference was found between the age groups. 
Correlations Among Age, Language, Theory of Mind, Inhibitory Control, Behavioral 
Problems and Temperament of 2-Year-Old Children 
For the final correlations of the 2-year-olds, total scores of language, ToM and IC, 
CBCL and C-TRF internalizing and externalizing scores, as well as the scores of the CBCL 
and C-TRF Other Problem scale were entered into Pearson correlations. Because the IKT 
does not offer a total score, all dimension scales were entered into the correlation. Language 
showed a positive correlation to IC scores and a negative correlation to the IKT Sensory 
Sensitivity scale, but showed no correlation to the any of the CBCL or C-TRF scores. The IC 
scores showed a significant negative correlation to the IKT Activity scale and at trend level a 
negative correlation to the C-TRF Other Problem scale. CBCL scores were correlated to 
various IKT scales. Within the IKT scales, Frustration was positively correlated to Activity 
and negatively correlated to Attention. Furthermore, age was negatively correlated to C-TRF 
internalizing scores. For correlation coefficients see Table 2. 
To control for language and gender as possible influencing factors, partial correlations 
were run to further investigate the link between IC, ToM, behavioral problems and 
temperament. The negative correlation at trend level between IC and the C-TRF Other 
Problem scale disappeared. All other correlations remained stable.  
  
Table 2. 
Pearson Correlation Coefficients Between Age, Language, ToM Scores, IC Scores, CBCL Internalizing and Externalizing Scores, Scores on the 
Other Problems Scale, C-TRF Internalizing and Externalizing Scores, Scores on the Other Problems Scale, and Scores on the IKT Dimension 
Scales for the Sample of 2-Year-Old Children 
Age -
          
SETK .058 -
ToM -.102 .047 -
          
IC .092 .234
* -.035 -
CBCL o.p. -.012 -.056 .010 -.020 -
CBCL int. -.014 .024 -.074 .128 .596
** -
CBCL ext. .027 -.039 -.113 -.013 .709
** .565 ** -
          
C-TRF o.p. -.130 -.203 -.196 -.260
t
.439 ** .119 .329 * -
          
C-TRF int. -.322
* -.051 -.035 .120 .202 .211 .232 .558 ** -
C-TRF ext. -.230 -.183 -.093 -.193 .351
* .120 .383 ** .727 ** .506 ** -
IKT frust. -.027 -.054 -.106 -.083 .522
** .580 ** .605 ** .223 .080 .319 * -
          
IKT inhib. .045 .087 -.074 .175 .207 .270
* -.027 .087 .203 -.092 -.046 -
          
IKT activ. -.022 -.094 -.136 -.246
* .301 ** .148 .407 ** .135 -.106 .067 .426 ** -.224 -
          
IKT atten. -.033 .045 .118 .104 -.330
** -.262 * -.493 ** -.323 * -.086 -.365 * -.550 ** .014 -.168 -
          
IKT senso. -.179 -.311
** -.046 -.044 .009 .286 * -.007 -.087 -.066 .073 .203 .033 .052 .050 -
          
CBCL 
int.
Age SETK ToM IC
CBCL 
o.p.
IKT 
activ.
IKT 
atten.
IKT 
senso.
CBCL 
ext.
C-TRF 
o.p.
C-TRF 
int.
C-TRF 
ext.
IKT 
frust.
IKT 
inhib.
Note: ** p < .01, * p < .05, t p < .10, all ps two-tailed. 
 
ToM = ToM total score, IC = IC total score; CBCL o.p. = CBCL Other Problem scale; CBCL int. = CBCL internalizing problems score; CBCL ext. = CBCL externalizing 
problems score; C-TRF o.p. = C-TRF Other Problem scale; C-TRF int. = C-TRF internalizing problems score; C-TRF ext. = C-TRF externalizing problems score; SETK = 
Language; IKT frust. = Frustration; IKT inhib. = Social Inhibition/Shyness; IKT active. = Activity; IKT atten. = Attention; IKT senso. = Sensory Sensitivity  
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Multiple Regression Analyses for the Sample of 2-Year-Old Children 
To investigate the relative importance of the temperament dimension Activity on IC at 
2 years of age, a standard linear regression was performed, entering the IC scores as the 
criterion, and IKT Activity as the predictor variable. The model showed statistical 
significance (F(1,73) = 4.620, p = .035) with R² = .060 (adjusted R² = .047). A hierarchical 
regression was performed to control for other influences. At step one, language and gender 
were entered to account for potential confounding effects with the variable of interest, then at 
step 2 IKT Activity was entered. The overall model reached statistical significance only at 
trend level (F(3,68) = 2.511, p = .066) with R² = .104 (adjusted R² = .062). Only language 
contributed significantly to the prediction of IC within the model. For a summary, see Table 
3. 
Table 3.  
Summary of Hierarchical Regression Analysis Predicting Inhibitory Control at 2 Years of Age  
  
β t F change R ² change
Step 1
   Gender .061 .511
   Language .240 * 2.009
Step 2
   Activity -.215  ͭ -1.773
Predictor Inhibitory Control at 2 Years of Age
2.126 .061
3.143 ͭ .043
Note: * p < .05, t p < .10, Gender is a dichotomous variable (1 represents female, 2 represents male) 
 
THEORY OF MIND, INHIBITORY CONTROL AND BEHAVIORAL PROBLEMS 76 
 
Correlations Among Age, Language, Theory of Mind, Inhibitory Control, Behavioral 
Problems and Temperament of 3-Year-Old Children 
For the final correlations of the 3-year-olds’ total scores for language, ToM and IC, 
CBCL and C-TRF internalizing and externalizing scores, as well as the scores of the CBCL 
and C-TRF Other Problem scale were entered into Pearson correlations. Language was 
significantly positively related to age and IC scores, and showed negative correlations to the 
C-TRF Other Problem scale and C-TRF externalizing scores only at trend level. Language 
was also positively correlated to IC, but only at trend level to ToM. No correlation between 
the ToM or IC scores and any of the behavior or temperament dimension scales were found. 
Various correlations were found between parents’ ratings on the CBCL and IKT. Within the 
IKT scales, Frustration was positively correlated to Activity and Sensory Sensitivity, and 
negatively correlated to Attention. Activity was negatively correlated to Attention. For 
correlation coefficients see Table 4.  
To further investigate the links between ToM, IC, behavioral problems and 
temperament, a partial correlation was run, controlling for language and gender. All 
correlations among behavior and temperament scales remained stable. No correlations 
appeared between the ToM or IC scores and any of the behavior or temperament dimension 
scales.
  
Table 4. 
Pearson Correlation Coefficients Between Age, Language, ToM Scores, IC Scores, CBCL Internalizing and Externalizing Scores, Scores on the 
Other Problems Scale, C-TRF Internalizing and Externalizing Scores, Scores on the Other Problems Scale, and Scores on the IKT Dimension 
Scales for the Sample of 3-Year-Old Children 
 
 
 
 Age -
          
SETK .220
* -
ToM .050 .184
t -
          
IC -.076 .316
** .041 -
CBCL o.p. -.085 .118 -.116 .047 -
CBCL int. -.014 .110 -.165 -.019 .690
** -
CBCL ext. -.047 .087 -.052 .071 .578
** .402 ** -
          
C-TRF o.p. -.018 -.211
t -.024 -.054 .123 .121 .036 -
          
C-TRF int. -.020 -.156 -.107 .124 .163 .170 .028 .709
** -
C-TRF ext. -.085 -.209
t .011 -.036 .100 -.055 .162 .696 ** .600 ** -
IKT frust. -.069 -.005 -.125 .043 .393
** .285 ** .638 ** .104 .160 .210 t -
          
IKT inhib. -.034 .053 .045 -.002 .129 .267
* -.099 .121 .209 t -.157 .009 -
          
IKT activ. .101 .013 .083 .167 .176 -.014 .439
** -.152 -.061 .078 .503 ** -.173 -
          
IKT atten. -.094 -.107 -.068 -.028 -.300
** -.137 -.465 ** -.111 -.009 -.097 -.444 ** -.079 -.374 ** -
          
IKT senso. .161 -.031 -.169 .006 .345
** .387 ** .214 -.076 .113 -.143 .231 * .158 .200 -.055 -
          
CBCL 
int.
Age SETK ToM IC
CBCL 
o.p.
IKT 
activ.
IKT 
atten.
IKT 
senso.
CBCL 
ext.
C-TRF 
o.p.
C-TRF 
int.
C-TRF 
ext.
IKT 
frust.
IKT 
inhib.
Note: ** p < .01, * p < .05, t p < .10, all ps two-tailed. 
 
ToM = ToM total score, IC = IC total score; CBCL o.p. = CBCL Other Problem scale; CBCL int. = CBCL internalizing problems score; CBCL ext. = CBCL externalizing 
problems score; C-TRF o.p. = C-TRF Other Problem scale; C-TRF int. = C-TRF internalizing problems score; C-TRF ext. = C-TRF externalizing problems score; SETK = 
Language; IKT frust. = Frustration; IKT inhib. = Social Inhibition/Shyness; IKT active. = Activity; IKT atten. = Attention; IKT senso. = Sensory Sensitivity  
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Correlations Among Age, Language, Theory of Mind, Inhibitory Control, Behavioral 
Problems and Temperament of 4-Year-Old Children 
For the final correlations of the 4-year-olds, total scores for language, ToM and IC, 
CBCL and C-TRF internalizing and externalizing scores, as well as the scores of the CBCL 
and C-TRF Other Problems scale were entered into Pearson correlations. Age was not 
correlated to any of the variables. Language was positively correlated to ToM and IC, but did 
not correlate with CBCL and C-TRF scores, or with IKT scales. IC was negatively correlated 
at trend level to C-TRF externalizing scores. ToM was negatively correlated to CBCL 
externalizing scores and the CBCL Other Problems scale, and positively correlated to C-TRF 
internalizing scores. Various correlations were found between parents’ ratings on the CBCL 
and IKT. However, caregivers’ ratings showed no links to any of the IKT scales. Within the 
IKT scales, Frustration was positively correlated to Social Inhibition/Shyness and Sensory 
Sensitivity, and negatively correlated to Attention. Notably, no correlation for any of the IKT 
scales and ToM or IC was found. For correlation coefficients see Table 5. 
To further investigate the links between ToM, IC, behavioral problems and 
temperament, a partial correlation was run, controlling for language and gender. The positive 
correlation between ToM and IC remained significant (r (73) = .243, p = .035). IC remained 
negatively correlated at trend level to C-TRF externalizing scores (r (71) = -.220, p = .062) 
and a negative relation to the CBCL Other Problems scale appeared at trend level (r (71) = -
.212, p = .072). ToM scores were still negatively correlated to CBCL externalizing scores (r 
(66) = -.231, p = .058) and the CBCL Other Problem scale (r (66) = -.209, p = .076), however, 
only at trend level, but reached significance in being positively correlated to C-TRF 
internalizing scores (r (66) = .281, p = .016). Additionally, ToM showed a positive correlation 
at trend level to the C-TRF Other Problem scale (r (71) = .209, p = .076). The correlations 
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between parents’ ratings on CBCL scales and IKT dimension scales remained significant for 
Frustration, Social Inhibition/Shyness, Attention and Sensory Sensitivity (all p < .05). 
  
Table 5. 
Pearson Correlation Coefficients Between Age, Language, ToM Scores, IC Scores, CBCL Internalizing and Externalizing Scores, Scores on the 
Other Problems Scale, C-TRF Internalizing and Externalizing Scores, Scores on the Other Problems Scale, and Scores on the IKT Dimension 
Scales for the Sample of 4-Year-Old Children 
 
Age -
SETK .014 -
ToM .112 .385 ** -
IC .045 .333 ** .329 ** -
CBCL o.p. -.048 .004 -.270 * * -.184 -
CBCL int. -.202 -.010 -.131 -.179 .735 ** -
CBCL ext. .051 -.113 -.258 * * -.006 .686 ** .567 ** -
C-TRF o.p. .104 -.005 .184 -.169 .033 .113 .128 -
C-TRF int. .007 -.079 .220 t -.095 -.005 .049 .203 .673 ** -
C-TRF ext. -.029 -.035 .080 -.207 t -.006 .017 .227 .617 ** .473 ** -
IKT frust. .057 -.034 -.139 .018 .449 ** .558 ** .542 ** -.061 .173 .052 -
IKT inhib. .053 .067 .022 .162 .257 ** .379 ** .085 .045 .086 -.163 .306 ** -
IKT activ. .045 -.031 -.033 -.079 .112 .050 .246 ** -.098 -.117 .064 .139 -.215 -
IKT atten. -.014 .124 .082 .086 -.183 -.267 ** -.392 ** -.070 -.182 -.125 -.437 ** .031 -.061 -
IKT senso. -.006 .095 -.105 -.021 .271 ** .453 ** .048 -.107 -.045 -.219 .424 ** .223 -.006 -.069 -
CBCL 
int.
Age SETK ToM IC
CBCL 
o.p.
IKT 
activ.
IKT 
atten.
IKT 
senso.
CBCL 
ext.
C-TRF 
o.p.
C-TRF 
int.
C-TRF 
ext.
IKT 
frust.
IKT 
inhib.
Note: ** p < .01, * p < .05, t p < .10 all ps two-tailed. 
 
ToM = ToM total score, IC = IC total score; CBCL o.p. = CBCL Other Problem scale; CBCL int. = CBCL internalizing problems score; CBCL ext. = CBCL externalizing 
problems score; C-TRF o.p. = C-TRF Other Problem scale; C-TRF int. = C-TRF internalizing problems score; C-TRF ext. = C-TRF externalizing problems score; SETK = 
Language; IKT frust. = Frustration; IKT inhib. = Social Inhibition/Shyness; IKT active. = Activity; IKT atten. = Attention; IKT senso. = Sensory Sensitivity  
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Multiple Regression Analyses for the Sample of 4-Year-Old Children 
To consider the contribution of cognitive factors to behavioral problems, standard 
multiple regressions were performed for ToM and IC related to CBCL and C-TRF 
externalizing and internalizing scores, as well as to scores on the CBCL and C-TRF Other 
Problem scale. For all models, IC and ToM were entered simultaneously as the predictors, 
CBCL and C-TRF scores were entered as the criterion. The model for C-TRF internalizing 
problems reached statistical significance (F(2,74) = 3.332, p = .041) with R² = .085 (adjusted 
R² = .059). ToM predicted internalizing behavioral problems rated by caregivers, whereas IC 
showed no direct influence (see Table 6). The model for C-TRF Other Problems reached 
statistical significance (F(2,74) = 3.606, p = .032) with R² = .091 (adjusted R² = .066). ToM 
predicted C-TRF Other Problems to a positive direction, whereas IC showed a negative 
prediction (see table 6.). The model for C-TRF externalizing problems reached trend level 
(F(2,74) = 2.486, p = .090) with R² = .065 (adjusted R² = .039). Only IC contributed to 
children’s C-TRF externalizing problems (see Table 6).  
 
Table 6.  
Summary of Multiple Regression Analysis Predicting C-TRF Internalizing Problems, C-TRF 
Externalizing Problems and C-TRF Other Problems at 4 Years of Age 
 
The model for CBCL Other Problems reached trend level as well (F(2,68) = 2.911, p = 
.061) with R² = .081 (adjusted R² = .053). Only ToM contributed to CBCL Other Problems (β 
= -.238, p = .070). All other models were statistically not significant. 
Predictors B SE B β B SE B β B SE B β
ToM 4.566 1.871 .289 * 2.407 1.869 .154 2.115 .950 .263 *
IC -2.381 1.838 .126 -.327 1.537 -.253 * -1.649 .781 -.249 *
Model: C-TRF Externalizing 
Problems score
Model: C-TRF Other 
Problems score
Model: C-TRF Internalizing 
Problems score
Note: * p < .05 
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For the statistically significant models, hierarchical regressions were assessed, 
controlling for other influences. At step one, language and gender were entered to account for 
potential confounding effects with the variables of interest, then at step 2 ToM and IC were 
entered. Neither language nor gender explained a significant portion of the variance of 
behavioral problems in any of the models. The model for predicting C-TRF internalizing 
problems reached statistical significance (F(4,73) = 2.928, p = .027) with R² = .145 (adjusted 
R² = .096), but still only ToM was related to internalizing problems (β = .365, p = .004). Also 
the model for C-TRF Other Problems reached statistical significance (F(4,73) = 2.734, p = 
.036) with R² = .137 (adjusted R² = .087). ToM predicted C-TRF Other Problems to a positive 
direction, whereas IC showed a negative influence. The model for predicting CBCL Other 
Problems reached statistical significance as well (F(4,67) = 2.855, p = .031) with R² = .153 
(adjusted R² = .100); there again, ToM was related to behavioral problems but only at trend 
level (β = -.251, p = .070). For a summary see Table 7. Only the model for predicting C-TRF 
externalizing problems did not reach statistical significance. 
  
Table 7. 
Summary of Hierarchical Regression Analysis Predicting C-TRF Internalizing Problems, C-TRF Other Problems and CBCL Other Problems at 4 
Years of Age 
 
F R ² F R ² F R ²
 change change  change change  change change
Step 1 
Gender .140 1.188 -.026 -.217 .192 1.567
SETK -.108 -.912 .137 1.152 -.012 -.095
Step 2
ToM .365 ** 2.938 .296 * 2.375 -.251 t -1.845
IC -.191 -1.550 -.300 * -2.419 -.214 -1.577
4.349 .117*
1.234 .037
4.743 .118*4.761 .118*
β
.990 .027 .666 .018
t
Model: CBCL Other Problems Model: C-TRF Other Problems 
Predictor β t β t
Model: C-TRF Internalizing Problems 
Note: ** p < .01, * p < .05, t p < .10 (SETK = language ability)  
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Since strong positive correlations appeared between language, ToM and IC, multiple 
linear regression models were run to regress the relative importance of language for 
predicting ToM or IC. In the first model, ToM was entered as the criterion measure, and 
language and IC were entered as the predictors. The model reached statistical significance 
(F(2,76) = 8.705, p < .001) with R² = .190 (adjusted R² = .169) and revealed that both 
language and IC  predicted ToM. The second model was composed to consider the relative 
importance of language and ToM on IC. For this model, IC was entered as the criterion 
measure, and language and ToM were entered as the predictor variables. The model was 
significant (F(2,76) = 7.122, p = .001) with R² = .161 (adjusted R² = .139) and revealed that 
both language and ToM predicted IC. For a summary, see Table 8. 
 
Table 8.  
Summary of Multiple Regression Analysis Predicting ToM and IC at 4 Years of Age  
Predictors B SE B β Predictors B SE B β
SETK .016 .006 .298 ** SETK .015 .007 .241 *
IC .198 .094 .235 * ToM .288 .136 .243 *
Model: IC Model: ToM
Note: ** p < .01, * p < .05, (SETK = language ability) 
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2.3 Discussion 
The aim of this study was to investigate ToM and IC as possible correlates of 
behavioral problems and temperament in children’s early years of life. In accordance with 
previous findings, the positive relationship between ToM and IC can be confirmed, although 
this link was only detected for children of 4 years of age. Language abilities were not 
correlated to behavioral problems, but showed a positive link to IC from 2 years onwards and 
to ToM at the age of 4 years. ToM and IC, in turn, predicted behavioral problems at the age 
of 4 years to different extents. The higher the ToM scores, the more internalizing behavioral 
problems and various behavioral problems (refers to the scores of the Other Problems scale) 
children showed. In contrast, the higher the IC scores, the fewer various behavioral problems 
children showed. Contrary to previous findings (Hughes & Ensor, 2007; Hughes & Ensor, 
2008), the results do not support the assumption of a robust relationship between ToM, IC 
and behavioral problems at the early ages of 2 and 3 years. Considering temperament, it was 
found that children high in activity performed weakly on IC tasks at the age of 2 years. 
However, this link disappeared when taking language into account. Based on the results, I 
suggest that behavioral problems in 2- and 3-year-old children occur largely independently of 
ToM and IC abilities, whereas behavioral problems in 4-year-old children show significant 
relationships to their ToM and IC. Thus, it can be assumed that mental state understanding 
and inhibition at 4 years of age contribute to children’s behavioral problems. 
The Relationship Between ToM, IC, Behavioral Problems and Language 
The main purpose of the current investigation was to extend the limited amount of 
research on the relationship between ToM, IC and behavioral problems in younger preschool 
children and to clarify the nature of the proposed connection (Capage & Watson, 2001; 
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Harvey et al., 2001; Lane et al., 2013; Wellman et al., 2011). Children’s ToM and IC were 
assessed comprehensively, and language abilities – as an important potential correlate – were 
also controlled for. Language showed a positive correlation to IC for all three age groups. 
Thus, it is suggested that language is a meaningful component for the development of 
regulation processes in preschool years (Martin-Rhee & Bialystok, 2008; Wolfe & Bell, 
2004). Referring to Vygotskiĭ and Cole (1978), language is a necessary tool for self-
regulatory processes like planning and executing own actions, as well as for controlling 
spontaneous impulses. An early promotion of verbal abilities would therefore be an essential 
element for fostering successful cognitive development. On the other hand, IC might also be 
a component of developing language abilities. Studies on adults suggested that the activation 
and also the suppression of information are required for language processing (Faust, Balota, 
Duchek, Gernsbacher, & Smith, 1997; Gernsbacher & Faust, 1991).  
Regarding the link between ToM and language, no statistically significant correlation 
was found for 2- and 3-year-old children, only for 4 year-old children. One explanation could 
be that the correlations simply reflect task demands. Thus, the ToM batteries for 2- and 3-
year-old children mainly included tests of implicit understanding. Two-year old children 
received tasks which they were able to solve exclusively non-verbally. They were always 
prompted to perform an action and by this, revealed their understanding of the other’s mental 
state. Three-year-old children were partially able to solve the task non-verbally. Only two 
tasks required a very rudimentary vocabulary. In the intention-understanding task, children 
had to indicate one of two buckets by naming the colors blue and red, and for the false-belief 
unexpected-content tasks, they had to state explicitly what they think the other character 
suspects is in a box. The verbal demands of both age groups are verifiably lower than the 
demands for the 4-year-old group, which could account for the missing link. Notably, this 
line of argument is based on the different requirements on productive language abilities. 
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However, receptive language abilities were required in the tasks of all age groups. Thus, an 
alternative explanation for the findings must be taken into account. Taking previous results 
into consideration, which indicated a positive relationship between both concepts in studies 
of longitudinal and training designs, a promoting effect of language on ToM might exist in a 
developmental perspective (Astington & Jenkins, 1999; Hale & Tager-Flusberg, 2003; Müller 
et al., 2012). Similar to the present results, authors of the cited studies could not show cross-
sectional correlations before a mean age of 3 years and 7.5 months. Based on the reported 
findings, I assume that there might be no direct observable relationship between language and 
ToM abilities at younger preschool age, but the connection gains more importance with 
increasing age, and children with high levels of language abilities at earlier stages of life may 
benefit from this advantages later. Sperber and Wilson’s (2000) theory about the common 
features of pragmatics of verbal communication and mental state understanding explained in 
Section 1.2., contributes to this assumption. It is conceivable that the process of pragmatic 
interpretation rises in complexity and achieves higher quality over the course of language 
acquisition. Children start with two-word combinations at 2-years of age, but expand their 
skills remarkably from 3 to 4 years of age. They reach major progress in vocabulary and in 
creative language use, they start to apply past tense, and develop an extensive mother tongue 
(Menyuk, 2000; Menyuk, Liebergott, & Schultz, 1995). Hence, the link between language 
and ToM should increase with age, when both abilities mature.  
If longitudinal studies and correlational data converge, an early promotion of 
language skills is advised because it could enhance regulative and social-cognitive 
competences. Regular documentation of children’s language development is essential for 
detecting potential deficiencies at an early stage. If one considers the usual practices at 
German day-care centers and the provisions of language assessment, a heterogeneous 
environment appears. The age children are tested at, the diagnostic instruments that are used, 
THEORY OF MIND, INHIBITORY CONTROL AND BEHAVIORAL PROBLEMS 88 
 
and also the consequences that would follow are the responsibility of the government of each 
federal state. In Thuringia, for instance, there is no provision for a statewide language 
assessment or a language training at all (Thüringer Ministerium für Bildung, Wissenschaft 
und Kultur, 2008). If there are no formal requirements that professional caregivers have to 
fulfill, the observation and support of children’s language development as an integral part of 
the daily routine remains an individual responsibility. This situation, however, demands a 
high level of attention and sensitivity, if early interventions should be introduced. With 
respect to the relationship of language to other cognitive competencies described above, the 
focus on adequate language skills should be of major importance. The present study 
investigated receptive language abilities, which can be easily trained in various activities. 
Picture book reading, asking searching questions about pictures, and listening to storybooks 
are possibilities which can be easily integrated into daily routine. Storytelling and promoting 
children’s participation (e.g., by answering questions or creating the ending of the story) 
could enhance receptive and productive competences at the same time. Since there is no 
reliable information about whether specific aspects of language are responsible for advances 
in ToM or IC, syntax, semantics and pragmatics could be included. Astington and Jenkins 
(1999) suggested that the syntactic structure of language is the basis for representing false 
beliefs. Likewise, other studies found a promoting effect of training sentential complements 
on false-belief understanding for children around 3- and 4-years of age (Hale & Tager-
Flusberg, 2003; Lohmann & Tomasello, 2003). Even if emotion understanding is rather 
considered as a precursor of ToM, it is important to note that training on mental state talk at 
3-, 4- and 5-years of age also promoted children’s insight to others‘ emotions, with the largest 
effects at 4 years of age (Gavazzi & Ornaghi, 2011).  
As I investigated the concepts of ToM and IC simultaneously in three age groups, I 
consider it an important aspect to briefly discuss the relationship found between the two 
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concepts. In this study, a positive connection was only detected for 4-year-old children. The 
link between ToM and IC is still the topic of lively debate. Previous works also showed 
positive relations between the concepts, but the underlying mechanisms responsible for the 
connection could not have been clearly proven so far. As described in Section 1.1., advocates 
of the expressional accounts rely on the idea that tasks, within which both concepts are tested, 
include similar requirements. More precisely, typical false-belief understanding tasks also 
demand a high level of IC (Carlson et al., 1998; Russell et al., 1991). Müller et al. (2012) 
expanded on this argument, as they did not find a direct correlation between IC tasks and a 
ToM battery of 2-year-old children. They referred to the fact that the tasks included in the 
ToM battery for the 2-year-old children did not require IC. In a visual perspective taking task, 
children received a picture and afterwards were asked by an experimenter if they could show 
him the picture. The task was passed if children took the experimenter’s perspective into 
consideration and turned the picture around. In the second visual perspective taking task, 
children saw their mothers covering their eyes with both hands. Children received the 
instruction to show a toy to their mother. They passed the tasked if they showed attempts to 
unblock their mothers’ view. The last task included in the ToM battery for the 2-year-old 
children was a pretense task. Children simply had to imitate a demonstrated action of 
pretense performed with small toys by the experimenter. Certainly, the missing inhibitory 
demands could be one reason for the results, but there is yet another shortcoming to consider. 
Viewed from a critical perspective, the abilities they tested (i.e., pretense and level 1 visual 
perspective taking) can be seen as precursors to ToM (Flavell, Everett, Croft, & Flavell, 
1981; Leslie, 1987). Our results cannot support the assumption that later occurring relations 
between ToM and IC are solely due to inhibitory task demands (Perner et al., 2002), 
otherwise the link would have occurred not only for the group of the 4-year-old children. 
Missing correlations between the task batteries of 2 and 3 years old children contradict the 
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hypothesis that inhibitory demands cause the connection because a view on the tasks of the 
ToM batteries reveals indeed a certain level of IC. For example, on the intention-
understanding task for 2-year-old children, the impulse of just using the easiest and most 
efficient way to reach the goal has to be suppressed in favor of operating the seesaw 
correctly. That is, children had to resist the spontaneous impulse to simply grasp the toy, and 
instead had to push the slide down to properly use the seesaw. In addition, on the preference-
understanding task of the 3-year-old children, the spontaneous impulse to reach for the cup, 
which was positively highlighted by the experimenter with vocal and facial expressions, had 
to be overcome to solve the task correctly, since children had to choose the negatively labeled 
cup to pass the task. To give a last example, false-belief understanding tasks also demand the 
ability to inhibit behavior, such as the false-belief unexpected-transfer tasks of the 2-year-old 
children. In the final sequence of this task, the experimenter mistakenly tried to open box A 
to get the toy, whereas to pass the task, container B needed to be opened, since the target 
object was transferred from container A to container B in the absence of the experimenter. 
Thus, children had to suppress the impulse to open the highlighted container A, in favor of 
opening container B. If commonalties in inhibitory processes are responsible for a positive 
link between ToM and IC, then the correlations should have been present for all age groups. 
Until now, investigations of younger preschool children have been rare, but the existing 
experiments could not show robust correlations between ToM and IC for 2-year-old children 
and indicated stronger links from 3 years of age onwards (Carlson et al., 2004; Müller et al., 
2012). Interestingly, they revealed positive long-term effects, as a well-developed IC at 2 
years of age positively predicted ToM at 3 years of age, and a well-developed IC at 3 years of 
age positively predicted ToM at 4 years of age. As the present study cannot provide 
longitudinal data, it is not possible to draw causal conclusions at this point. But taking 
longitudinal findings and the present results together, a functional dependency account is 
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favored. The identification of the cognitive processes, which might explain the relationship, 
is still an ongoing research topic. For example, Frye, Zelazo, and Palfai (1995) referred to the 
ability to reason, which is a key element shared by most tasks that ToM and IC are tested 
with. According to this account, the same structure of reasoning is found in inhibition-of-
concept as well as in false-belief understanding tasks. On the inhibition-of-concept task, 
children have to act according to one dimension while ignoring another dimension. This is 
similar to the typical false-belief understanding task, where children have to reason from one 
perspective (i.e., the agent’s) while ignoring another perspective (i.e., their own one).  Based 
on the findings of this dissertation project, it is not possible to endorse this theory, since 
batteries of all age groups contain tasks comparable in design. On the inhibition-of-concept 
tasks, for instance, children of 2, 3 and 4 years of age had to act according to a certain 
concept by ignoring the associated concept, and the ToM tasks also followed the principle 
explained above. If the reasoning structure is responsible for the link, the question remains 
why there was no correlation found for the batteries of the 2- and 3-year-old children. In 
summary, the study reported here cannot clarify any causality, but with its novel approach of 
using a design of tasks appropriate and comparable for three different age groups, it 
contributes to the clarification of possible underlying mechanisms responsible for links 
occurring during the preschool years. The basic finding indicates a positive connection 
between ToM and IC at the age of 4 years. By integrating all four mental states in a battery 
for 2- and 3-year-old children, it can be suggested that a direct connection between ToM and 
IC is not present at these early years. However, the present study, with its broad design, 
provides the foundation for future investigation concerning the relationship of ToM and IC 
comprehensively on a longitudinal perspective. 
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The Relationship Between IC and Behavioral Problems 
Significant relationships between behavioral problems and IC were revealed for 4-
year-old children. In the younger samples of 2- and 3-year-old children no significant links 
were found. The majority of previous studies examined children from 4 years onwards and 
demonstrated that children with well-developed IC abilities showed less attention problems, 
anger, and antisocial or aggressive behaviors (Espy et al., 2011; Hughes et al., 2000; 
Raaijmakers et al., 2008). For a similar age group, the current dissertation project revealed a 
robust negative link to teachers’ ratings on the Other Problem scale and a negative link on 
trend level to teachers’ scores on externalizing behavioral problems. Children who were 
better at resisting a strong desire and in controlling dominant impulses, showed less 
behavioral problems of different nature. Externalizing behavioral problems refer to attention 
deficits and aggressive behavior. The items clustered on the Other Problem scale resemble 
behaviors, which are not clearly correlative to specific syndromes. Thus, it is not possible to 
provide a specific label or classification. To give a better idea of symptoms, it can be 
emphasized that the 34 items describe maladaptive behaviors, which reflect imbalance in 
socio-emotional wellbeing such as jealousy, constantly seeking help, or frequent crying. One 
interpretation of the findings is that a well-developed IC might be one of the necessary 
features to reacting appropriately in numerous everyday situations. To regulate behavior and 
emotions in an appropriate manner, the inhibition of responses is an essential component. 
Barkley (1997) already illustrated the operation of inhibition processes on other executive 
functions in his hybrid neuropsychological model. According to this model, the ability to 
inhibit prepotent responses or to stop ongoing responses are not just directly connected to the 
system of motor control, but also supports the performances of working memory, self-
regulation of arousal, motivation and affect, internalization of speech, and reconstitution. 
Thus, it is plausible to assume that IC affects numerous actions of children’s everyday lives 
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and deficits in this area become visible in behavioral problems. If children, for example, are 
limited in their working memory due to a reduced IC, they are expected to experience 
difficulties in completing complex tasks or problem-solving. Distraction or any interference 
may cause serious issues to pursuing goals. Considering the demands of Western society, 
children are confronted from very early on with high standards of education. Precisely those 
syndromes of behavioral problems, which are positively linked to IC in the current study, 
might be a logical response if children may not meet the demands described above. They are 
conspicuous, for example, by the display of attention deficits or various other problems. If 
one draws the connection to self-regulation and regulation of arousal, it seems likely that 
deficits in both domains due to low IC could be apparent by externalizing behavioral 
problems. A lack of control, reflected in the inability to modulate impulsive expressions, was 
found to be linked to externalizing behavioral problems (Caspi et al., 1995). 
The question is why there was no relationship between IC and behavioral problems 
detected for the younger age groups. A previous study indicated less behavioral problems for 
3-year-old children with high scores on an EF battery (Hughes & Ensor, 2008). The reason 
for a difference in results could lie in the use of different measurements and in the different 
methods of data collection used. Hughes and Ensor (2008) created an aggregate score of 
different behavior questionnaires (Bayley scales of infant development, Bayley, 1993; 
Goodman, 1997; SSRS, Gresham & Elliott, 1990, SDQ) and integrated data of observations 
gained by the experimenter from video-based ratings of behavior. The experimenter 
completed the SSRS and the SDQ during face-to-face interviews with mothers and teachers. 
Researchers completed the Bayley rating scales. Taken together, both the assessment of 
behavior ratings on questionnaires and the video-based observations indicate a greater 
involvement of the experimenter in the data collection compared to the procedure of the 
current dissertation. It is possible that the closer involvement could have affected the 
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behavior evaluation (e.g., observer effects, response bias) and might be responsible for 
different results. In the present study, parents and teachers completed the questionnaires 
independently of the experimenter, because an unaffected evaluation of parents and teachers 
was considered an important criterion. Furthermore, the focus of the scales included in the 
aggregate score is to a large extent on externalizing behaviors like ADHD or conduct 
disorders, thus, behavioral evaluation was more restricted compared to the dimensions 
included in the current study. Most importantly, the EF battery included only a single IC task 
among four other tasks examining rule learning, rule shifting and working memory. Thus, IC 
was only a minor element in the battery of Hughes and Ensor (2008). The present study 
assessed IC by three different tasks and took paradigms into account, which were comparable 
for all three age groups. One potential reason as to why there was no relationship between IC 
and behavioral problems for the 2-and 3-year-old children could be due to altered 
expectations of adults towards children of different ages. It is likely that expectations of 
adults on children’s regulated expressions and behavioral impulses rise with increasing age of 
the children (Hughes & Ensor, 2008). This relates to a general increase of demands 
concerning a behavior, which is adapted to the social expectations of society (e.g., complying 
with rules and standards of everyday life). Likewise, the social settings and forms of play 
change over time and expand in terms of the number of persons who are directly involved in 
interactions and confront each other with different individual needs. The group sizes in 
daycare increase and consequently the potential for conflicts within these groups also 
increases. Hence, it seems reasonable that children with weaker IC might be at a disadvantage 
in terms of dealing with conflicts. Children with little ability to regulate their responses might 
react deviantly and express their discomfort through different psychological and 
physiological symptoms (Hughes & Ensor, 2008). An alternative possibility could be that 
connections become apparent later because IC itself improves remarkably in later preschool 
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ages (Gerstadt et al., 1994). It is conceivable that a guiding relationship only becomes visible 
when IC becomes more meaningful, specifically when IC actually can be effectively 
employed to regulate behavior in conflict situations in everyday life or to fulfill the demands 
in respect of desired behavior rules. If children at 2 and 3 years of age have a generally low 
level of IC and are not able to apply these rather rudimentary abilities independently in 
challenging situations, the missing link would be the logical explanation. Since the tasks of 
the batteries were adjusted to the performance level of the particular age group (i.e., the IC 
tasks of 2-year-olds had substantially lower requirements than the IC tasks of 4-year-olds), it 
is not possible to draw conclusions concerning differences in performances between the age 
groups.  
Due to the cross-sectional design of the present study, causal interpretations can only 
be discussed. It also must be considered that the weak performances on the IC tasks could be 
the result of behavioral problems. It is also possible that children with behavioral problems 
might not have the chance to develop a good IC. If children see themselves as confronted by 
psychological issues and due to this are impaired in behavior, it is conceivable that this is 
reflected in the impaired regulation of actions and impulses. However, studies with a long-
term design argue against this hypothesis. For example, although no cross-sectional 
correlations between IC and behavioral problems were found for children between 7 and 11 
years, clear long-term effects were detected 2 years later (Riggs, Blair, & Greenberg, 2004). 
Impressive effects of a well-developed IC at the age of 4 and 5 years were identified for later 
school performance and general social skills (Mischel et al., 1988). Children who were highly 
capable at delaying gratification at preschool age were later rated as being highly competent 
in dealing with stress and frustration, were indicated as being less stubborn, and also showed 
less jealousy (Mischel et al., 1988). Taken together, the current findings strongly suggest that 
a good IC can have a positive impact on behavior, especially at later preschool age. Notably, 
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the present study revealed only a single significant correlation for various behavioral 
problems, besides a trend for externalizing behavior problem scores. Whether these 
relationships would strengthen with increasing age could be provable by repeated 
measurements of the same sample, and thus forms an important task for future research. 
Clarity about underlying working mechanisms could be gained from studies with 
experimental training designs. Using results of a training of IC as the independent variable 
would contribute to identifying possible causal relationships between IC and behavioral 
problems. There are forms of training, which were already used to successfully enhance 
young children’s IC abilities. For instance, a significant improvement in inhibiting a response 
was achieved if delay times were integrated into the task, or if training on tasks with 
executive demands was practiced before (Dowsett & Livesey, 2000; Simpson et al., 2012). 
Children were better able to inhibit their responses if they were interrupted in various ways 
(Simpson et al., 2012). In a go/no-go task children saw 16 boxes and received the instruction 
to find the stickers hidden in some of these boxes. A sticker on top of each box indicated 
whether a sticker was hidden inside. Children learned that a square on top is the sign for a 
sticker inside the box (go trial), and a triangle is the sign for no sticker inside the box (no-go 
trial). Simpson et al. (2012) designed three conditions: In the immediate condition, children 
had to respond as soon as they saw the boxes; in the delay condition, the experimenter waited 
2 seconds before placing the signs on the box; and in the distraction-during-delay condition, 
children were requested to guess in which hand the experimenter was holding the signal 
before he placed it on the box. As expected, accuracy of performance on no-go trials was 
higher in the delay and distraction-during-delay condition. A positive effect of practicing 
inhibitory skills was provided by Dowsett and Livesey’s (2000) study. Children of 3 and 4 
years of age had to solve a go/no-go task. An apparatus with a red and a blue light released 
marbles as a reward. Children were instructed to press a bar in order to receive a marble when 
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the red light appeared, and not to react if the blue light appeared. Children were better solving 
the task if they had the chance to practice the tasks beforehand and furthermore, if they were 
trained on other tasks requiring executive demands (e.g., a card sorting game). These findings 
are essential to creating the basis for testing the cause of the discovered link. If IC training 
would actually lead to reduced behavioral problems, training in IC in early years would be 
crucial to exploiting the optimal existing potential, since individual differences in IC are 
stable in development (Kochanska et al., 1996; Miyake & Friedman, 2012), and thus, could 
have long-term effects. An exemplary effort into this direction is done by a program which 
practices self-control for children in second and third grade of primary school (PATHS 
Curriculum, Riggs, Greenberg, Kusché, & Pentz, 2006). Authors aimed to enhance children’s 
IC by providing them with strategies to stop and calm down, to promote alternative thinking, 
and to articulate problems. The program effectively promoted IC, and moreover IC was 
identified to mediate the positive effect of the program on behavioral problems. As 
highlighted in the present study, there are direct relationships between IC and behavioral 
problems determined already at preschool age, which strongly recommend earlier support for 
children. One program for training on general EF at preschool age (Tools of the Mind, 
Bodrova & Leong, 2007) was already evaluated and indicated a benefits for the trained group 
compared to the untrained control group in passing EF tasks (Diamond, Barnett, Thomas, & 
Munro, 2007). To set the course for a positive development of children at an early stage, it 
would be useful to design and implement such programs for German children from 4 years of 
age onwards to scientifically verify their effectiveness, and to introduce them to best practice 
at daycares. Facilities for promoting early skills should also be an integral part of the 
education of professional caregivers. 
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The Relationship Between ToM and Behavioral Problems 
Considering the relationship between ToM and behavioral problems, the findings 
from the 4-year-old children replicate previous research that suggested that a well-developed 
mental state understanding is positively linked to forms of behavioral problems (Renouf et 
al., 2010; Walker, 2005). High ToM scores predicted statistically significant internalizing and 
various behavioral problems. To provide more detailed information about the problems 
children showed, it is helpful to consider the syndrome scales for internalizing problems, and 
the characteristics of the items on the Other Problem scale. The syndrome scales of 
internalizing problems include maladaptive behaviors like anxiousness and depressions, 
social withdrawal, emotional reactivity, and somatic complaints. These are all behaviors, 
which indicate a disturbance in intropunitive emotions and moods (Zahn-Waxler, Klimes-
Dougan, & Slattery, 2000). Children develop negative feelings like fear, worry or guilt, 
which causes them to react within the self, rather than acting in the direction of others. The 
items on the Other Problem scale also do not indicate tendencies to hurt or offend others. As 
a sample, items like “seeks often for help”, “picks skin”, “rocks head and body” or “is over-
conformed” are included. Previous studies showed relationships of the same positive 
direction but rather to forms of aggressive behavior, a syndrome assigned to externalizing 
behavioral problems (Renouf et al., 2010; Walker, 2005). Walker (2005) found a positive link 
between aggressive behavior and ToM for boys. Three to 5-year-old boys, who were rated by 
their teachers as aggressive in social interactions with peers, showed good performances on 
false-belief tasks. She explained her results by referring to a general difference in the way 
boys and girls may deal with social interactions and reach personal social goals. Walker 
(2005) suggests that boys might try to reach their social goals with a dominant approach 
rather than a conciliatory approach. This could explain the positive link between ToM and 
aggressive behavior for boys, as well as the positive link between ToM and prosocial 
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behavior she found for girls. Further, Renouf et al. (2010) indicated a positive link to indirect 
aggression (i.e., trying to harm others by using indirect means like talking badly about others 
behind their backs). It is noteworthy that this finding was only present for children with an 
average or low level of prosocial behavior, which in this case allows for the assumption that 
the positive link between ToM and aggressive behavior cannot be generalized. However, 
even if different syndromes are affected there might be a single explanation, which could 
account for the findings: Exhibiting behavioral problems, regardless of the specific character, 
reflects concerns children are trying to cope with. Having a well-developed ToM implies a 
good understanding about others’ thoughts and behaviors, but at the same time it implies also 
the recognition of discrepancies when others’ mental states are incongruent with own mental 
states. This discrepancy in knowledge or interest could create some difficulties on an 
interpersonal level that children have to cope with. The finding of the positive link between 
ToM and internalizing behavioral problems may reflect these coping attempts. If we note 
from previous results that children with high ToM scores also displayed more negative 
perceptions of future events, and that estimated caregivers’ judgments on own performances 
were more critical than children with lower ToM scores (Dunn, 1995), it seems likely that 
recognizing others’ mental states and possible divergences may raise uncertainty or fear, 
which in turn could lead to internalizing behavioral problems. If children evaluate these 
everyday situations as being threatening or irritating, it could negatively affect their 
emotional well-being. Indeed, previous literature found a link between experiencing 
difficulties in emotional responses and internalizing behavioral problems (Jellesma, Rieffe, 
Terwogt, & Westenberg, 2009). Children in middle childhood showed more internalizing 
behavioral problems, when they had difficulties in handling negative situations and were not 
able to define internal feelings properly. The question remains as to why this link appeared 
only at the age of 4 years and not for the younger sample. Why might older children be 
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affected by recognizing others’ mental states but younger children are not? One possibility 
could be found in the difference between implicit and explicit ToM understanding. An 
explicit understanding of ToM is often tested by tasks requiring verbal judgments from 
children and is commonly found from 4 years onwards, whereas younger children show an 
implicit understanding of ToM (for an overview see Low & Perner, 2012). If children reach 
another level of knowledge by increasing age, in the sense that they not only represent other 
people’s thoughts and behaviors but are also able to make judgments about them (Clements 
& Perner, 1994), it is conceivable that only this higher level of knowledge might affect 
children’s behavior and thus, relationships become more apparent from 4 years of age 
onwards. As a further option, it is possible that a critical self-reflective perspective is 
responsible for a raise in uncertainty and irritation, when noticing incongruent mental states. 
Along with the development of mental representational capacities in later preschool age, self-
evaluative processes evolve and children start to develop a motivation to appraise themselves 
in relation to others and to seek social approval (Higgins, 1989). The missing correlation 
between ToM and behavioral problems within the younger samples could strengthen this 
assumption. If self-evaluative processes are not well-developed by 2 and 3 years of age and 
the wish for social approval and affiliation is not yet that intense, the perception of divergent 
mental states may not elicit discomfort with which children have to cope. Since this line of 
thought cannot be answered by the study, this perspective surely deserves attention in future 
research. However, the assumption that children are more focused on similarities between 
others and themselves by increasing age was already raised by studies on over-imitation. 
With increasing age, children, and even adults, readily imitate irrelevant actions of a model, 
which are not necessary for achieving a goal (McGuigan, Makinson, & Whiten, 2011). In the 
aforementioned study, participants imitated the causally irrelevant actions of a model to 
retrieve a reward from an apparatus with a significant age effect. Furthermore, 4- to 5 year-
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old children chose to imitate irrelevant actions only if the model, which presented the 
irrelevant actions, was present. If this model left the room, they did not imitate the irrelevant 
actions, but instead acted in a rational manner to achieve the goal (Nielsen & Blank, 2011). 
Authors explained this behavior by humans’ natural tendencies to affiliate with others. Since 
imitation might serve this function (Uzgiris, 1981) it is possible that the older children of the 
current thesis reflect the mental states of others more critically than the younger children, 
care about them on another level, and consequently are trying to cope with them when 
realizing less matches. 
The fact that the results of Hughes and Ensor (2007) showed direct correlations 
between ToM and behavioral problems for 2-year-old children appears puzzling. Though 
their design varied to large extent from our design concerning ToM assessment, they used a 
pretense, deception and mistaken-belief task for the ToM battery. The majority of these tasks 
can be considered as measurements for precursors of ToM (Leslie, 1987). The method the 
authors applied to evaluate behavioral problems also makes comparison to the present study 
difficult, because they combined different scales of three different questionnaires (Bayley 
scales of infant development, Bayley, 1993; Goodman, 1997, SSRS, Gresham & Elliott, 
1990, see also the prior section) and additionally included observational behavior ratings to 
create an overall aggregate score. On a whole, these comprehensive investigations 
exclusively focus on externalizing behavioral problems. It is feasible that the use of four 
different behavior measurements and the application of tasks measuring precursors of ToM 
contributed to the different outcome. For the younger age groups of the present sample, there 
was no evidence for a link to aggressive behavior, which means precisely that the ToM of 2- 
and 3-year old children was unrelated to externalizing behavioral problems. It should be 
noted, however, that statistically significant negative correlations were found between ToM 
and parents’ ratings on externalizing behavioral problems for the 4-year-old children on the 
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first analyses. Partial correlations, implemented to control for language and gender, weakened 
this result to a large extent and the regression model finally turned out not to be statistically 
significant. Existing literature demonstrates that positive correlations to aggression were 
typically found for children whose ToM was tested at around 5 years of age (Capage 
& Watson, 2001; Lane et al., 2013; Wellman et al., 2011). As outlined in the theoretical 
background of this thesis, the majority of studies which included younger children could not 
show these relations (Hughes et al., 2000; Slaughter et al., 2002; Yiwen et al., 2004). Here 
again, the conclusion can be drawn that relationships between both variables attain more 
importance with increasing age.  
The present results indicate that the relationship between social-cognitive skills and 
behavior cannot be simplified to a negative relationship, which would indicate that better 
cognitive skills would occur with fewer behavioral problems. Other theories also questioned 
this approach, since connections between a well-developed ToM and indirect aggression or 
bullying in late childhood and adolescent were found (Gini, 2006; Sutton, Smith, & 
Swettenham, 2001). Authors explained these findings by referring to the Machiavellian 
intelligence theory (Repacholi, Slaughter, Pritchard, & & Gibbs, 2003; Wilson, Near, & 
Miller, 1996), which states that humans who follow a general tendency to harm others, have 
to possess capabilities to estimate the impact of their actions on the others in advance. This 
includes the capacity to read the thoughts and emotions of others, besides a lower level of 
moral concerns. The theory of Machiavellianism says that people with these personality 
characteristics have the tendency to manipulate others in order to pursue their own interest 
(Wilson et al., 1996). Thus, it could be assumed that a person’s social knowledge might be 
connected with a person’s social functioning. However, investigations on the direct 
relationship between ToM and Machiavellianism at preschool and preadolescent age did not 
indicate a relationship (Repacholi et al., 2003). Findings of this thesis go in line with the 
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above mentioned studies, since results only delivered evidence that children with 
internalizing and other behavioral problems showed a better ToM, and these syndromes do 
not aim to harm others.  
Referring to the present findings, training solely on ToM might not lead to fewer 
behavioral problems, because a negative relationship is missing. The positive link between 
ToM and internalizing behavioral problems demand a sensitive and attentive attitude of 
caretakers and parents towards their children.  Preschoolers with a high understanding of 
others’ mental states might be at risk for internalizing and various other problems. In turn, 
internalizing problems hold the risk of persistent negative consequences in different 
situations of life. For example, they can negatively affect school life, as they have proven to 
be linked to poor academic performance (Lundy, Silva, Kaemingk, Goodwin, & Quan, 2010). 
In terms of a preventative approach, it could be helpful to make divergent mental states a 
regular subject of discussion and to provide helpful strategies to deal with them. Basically, it 
would be essential to investigate if children at the age of 4 years lack strategies for coping 
with divergences constructively. Interview measures to assess coping strategies are mainly 
provided for children from primary school age onwards (for a summery see Compas, Connor-
Smith, Saltzman, Thomsen, & Wadsworth, 2001). Longitudinal data of children from 4 to 12 
years revealed that instrumental coping (to act constructively to improve the situation) and 
positive cognitive restructuring (to think in a positive way about a problem) related to conflict 
situations among peers, reported by teachers increases over time (Losoya, Eisenberg, & 
Fabes, 1998). This indicates that children at 4 years of age may not require appropriate 
strategies to cope with interpersonal problems but to expand their abilities later on. To 
support children by introducing constructive coping strategies would be an essential part of 
elementary education. If one considers that 10-year-old children still naturally favor the 
strategy of seeking adult counsel (Burgess, Wojslawowicz, Rubin, Rose-Krasnor, & Booth-
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LaForce, 2006), it is obvious that preschool children need special support, especially children 
with the disposition towards avoidance and withdrawn stances who may benefit from these 
strategies. 
No links between the temperament dimension scales to ToM or to any of the 
dependent variables (C-TRF Other Problems scale and C-TRF internalizing score) were 
found. Since the basic features of temperament assessed for the present sample represent only 
a part of the personality, it would be interesting to investigate personality characteristics like 
neuroticism and prosocial tendencies to control if certain characteristics, which reflect the 
way children are dealing with interpersonal matters, moderate the relationship between ToM 
and internalizing behavioral problems. The temperament dimension scales used in this study 
do not include sociability and do not provide a comprehensive profile of neuroticism, which 
are determinants that are heavily involved in the maintenance of balanced emotional 
relationships. Besides anger and irritability, neuroticism also encompasses fear and anxiety 
(Shiner & Caspi, 2003). The latter are not specifically measured by the IKT, but it taps inner-
directed negative emotions, thus reflecting a general sensitivity and emotionally vulnerability 
in conflict situations. The investigation of these concepts in relation to children’s ToM and 
internalizing behavioral problems may contribute to the identification of children at higher 
risk, who should receive special attention for possible prevention programs.  
An alternative explanation for the correlation of the cross-sectional data should be 
considered as well. It cannot be ruled out that children who show higher internalizing 
behavioral problems have a better chance to develop ToM abilities. This alternative approach 
could be assumed if one argues that children who show more introversive behavior like being 
withdrawn, shy or fearful may have more chances to observe other people from a different or 
wider perspective, and by this gain a better insight into their minds. This alternative option 
raises the question as to whether the results would favor the emotional-reactive hypothesis 
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(Hare & Tomasello, 2005), which claims that a shy and withdrawn stance to other people 
could foster ToM abilities. One argument that contradicts this assumption can be found in the 
characteristics of the dimension scales summarized in the internalizing problem scores. The 
items of the withdrawn scale are clearly distinctive to shyness. They do not refer to shy 
reactions to new people and unfamiliar situations but rather indicate avoidance and social 
withdrawal in everyday life (e.g., „shows little affection“, „is apathetic“, „avoids eye 
contact“). From a theoretical point of view, the idea that internalizing behavioral problems 
should promote children’s ToM abilities by the age of 4 years in a positive way is difficult to 
justify. It is hard to believe that internalizing syndromes like emotional reactiveness, 
anxiousness and depression, or the avoidance of social interactions could draw a children’s 
attention to other people’s mind and promote the understanding of them because these 
children are dealing with intrapersonal problems, directed at themselves. Hence, it seems 
unlikely that they direct their attention to others to a great extent. 
Since robust findings were only revealed for caregivers’ ratings and correlations 
among parents’ and caregivers’ ratings were missing for the computed scales, I will discuss 
the issue of differences between informants’ reports in the following section. 
Caregivers’ and Parents’ Judgments 
ToM and IC only predicted behavioral problems of 4-year-old children with respect to 
caregivers’ ratings. No robust link was found for parents’ ratings on the equivalent 
questionnaire. Positive correlations among the major scales of interest4 on caregivers’ and 
parents’ questionnaires were obtained for 2-year-old children, but not for the sample of 3- 
and 4-year-old children. The correlations of parents’ and caregivers’ judgments for the 
youngest sample on the one hand, and the deviating judgments for the older samples on the 
                                                          
4 The major scales of interest include the internalizing and externalizing scores, as well as the score of the Other 
Problem scale. 
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other hand, would have been predicted by the group socialization theory of development 
(Harris, 1995). A person’s behavior is dominantly shaped through the social environment 
outside of the home, and personal characteristics that are inherent to a child are permanently 
modified by the group context. Different behaviors of caregivers or parents and the dynamics 
of these interactions influence children’s behavior even in early years (Harris, 1995; 
Rubenstein & Howes, 1979). The time children spend in daycare centers increases by age, 
therefore, a manifestation of context-specific behavior is likely. Research on children’s 
cortisol levels repeatedly showed an increase in cortisol level from morning to afternoon at 
daycare centers, whereas on days spent at home this effect could not be revealed. In addition, 
the overall cortisol level was lower at home compared to daycare centers (Dettling, Gunnar, 
& Donzella, 1999; Watamura, Donzella, Alwin, & Gunnar, 2003). A connection to behavior 
is given, as cortisol level was found to be positively related to aggressive behavior and poor 
self-control (Dettling et al., 1999). These findings allow for the conclusion that children 
behave in a context-specific manner and that this leads to deviating judgments of parents and 
caregivers. When the mean difference of scores on the major scales of interest was analyzed 
between both groups of informants, significant differences among caregivers’ and parents’ 
ratings were detected across all age groups. However, the revealed deviations do not allow 
for a clear conclusion about a homogeneous pattern. Lower mean caregivers’ ratings 
compared to parents’ ratings were found for 4-year-olds, but the opposite pattern was found 
for 3-year-olds, and patterns for the judgments of 2-year-olds even varied between different 
scales. It is not indicated that parents, or caregivers respectively, in general tend to judge 
children more strictly, but the findings substantiate the fact that informants’ judgments do not 
appear homogenous (see also Miner & Clarke-Stewart, 2008), which should be considered 
for future study designs.  
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An alternative explanation could also account for the differences. A prolonged period 
of time spent in daycare centers could increase the possibility that caregivers of 3- and 4-
year-old children have more experience with the children during everyday activities and with 
regard to inter-peer interactions than parents have. This could facilitate a broader picture of 
behavior and allow for comparison. In contrast, the parents and caregivers tend to spend a 
more equal amount of time with the child at 2 years of age. It is likely that caregivers have 
greater experience in professional evaluation processes and better comparison to other 
children of the same age. Advantages in terms of experience and objectivity would suggest 
that caregivers provide more reliable information, and by this delivered stronger relationships 
between ToM, IC and behavioral problems for the sample of the 4-year-olds. Although I can 
provide only assumptions which may account for the incongruence in the results, this 
difference in predictive values highlights the importance of a multi-informant design when 
investigating children’s behavior. 
Temperament as a Possible Correlate 
Regarding temperamental factors, only a single link was detected, which was found 
between activity and IC for 2-year-olds. Children with low levels of activity were better at 
inhibiting their own actions and thoughts, and could resist desired sweets for longer. As 
temperament is considered as a set of relatively stable early-developing characteristics 
(Rothbart & Bates, 1998), one might assume that high activity levels hinder children from 
controlling their impulses. However, this relationship was not found for 3- and 4-year-olds, 
which indicate that temperamental factors influence children’s inhibitory skills only early in 
life, but may lose in strength with the maturation of the frontal cortex, which causes 
remarkable improvement of inhibitory skills between the ages of 3 to 7 years (Diamond, 
2002). When controlling for other influences, a proportional shift occurred and only language 
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turned out to explain a significant proportion of the variance of the IC scores. Surprisingly no 
correlation between attention and IC was found for any of the age groups. As reported in 
Section 1.2, previous studies revealed a positive connection between attention focusing and 
IC tasks (Gerardi-Caulton, 2000; Wolfe & Bell, 2004). A crucial difference between the 
current investigation and these studies lies in the study design. The cited authors used a single 
paradigm for assessing IC and decided either for a spatial-inhibition task or for conflict-
inhibition tasks. The present thesis used both paradigms and complemented them by adding a 
delay-of-gratification task to the IC composite score. The waiting paradigm of the delay-of-
gratification task did not require children’s ability to focus attention and even facilitated 
children to pass the task when they were able to distract themselves. Nevertheless, it is an 
important task for measuring the ability to inhibit a dominant response and by this, is an 
essential part of investigating IC comprehensively. Considering the findings for all 
temperament dimensions included in the present study, there is no evidence for a direct link 
between temperament and IC at preschool age.  
The present results cannot confirm the suggested positive link between a shy 
temperament and children’s ToM abilities for the samples of 2-, 3- and 4-year-old children 
(Lane et al., 2013; Mink et al., 2014; Wellman et al., 2011). No links were detected between 
behavioral problems and the dimension scale Social Inhibition/Shyness, which refers to the 
inhibition of behavior in new and unfamiliar situations that is grounded in feelings of 
insecurity but not fear and is comparable to the shyness scale of the CBQ (Rothbart, Ahadi, 
Hershey, & Fisher, 2001) (r = .81).  A major difference between the recent studies and the 
present study lies in the temperament measurements themselves. In past studies, different 
syndrome scales and generated composite scores from of two different questionnaires were 
used (Lane et al., 2013; Wellman et al., 2011). Although the authors report their findings in 
the sense of temperament traits, I have to highlight that the composite score was calculated 
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from the shyness scale of the CBQ (Rothbart et al., 2001) but also from the withdrawn scale 
of the CBCL/2-3 (Achenbach, 1992). The combination of items from a questionnaire to 
assess temperament and items from a questionnaire to assess behavioral problems was 
justified by the high correlativity of the items. Strictly speaking, it is not advisable to use 
psychopathology criteria to assess temperament. Temperament traits rather indicate a wide 
range of behavior styles among normal developing children (Chess & Thomas, 1996).  
Temperament dimensions refer for instance, to a general shy stance towards unknown 
situations or people and describe children’s first reactions to them. Withdrawn, in terms of 
internalizing behavioral problems, however, refers to the general withdrawal into the self, 
which is not related to specific situations. Thus, the syndrome scale includes items like „is 
apathetic and unmotivated“, „is unresponsive to affection“, or „avoids eye contact“. 
Correlations among variables may indicate a connection and it is possible that behavior is 
elicited and shaped by temperament characteristics (Rothbart & Bates, 1998), but with a 
critical view on the items it cannot be assumed that correlations deliver evidence that 
identical concepts are measured. With a look at the positive link between ratings on this 
composite score and ToM in the aforementioned studies, these findings appear relatively 
close to the present finding for internalizing behavioral problems and ToM. As I used a 
questionnaire that specifically measures temperament dimensions and could not reveal a 
single correlation, it is proposed that the link between ToM and temperament might not be as 
clear-cut as previously suggested. It is quite possible that early temperament might influence 
children’s mental state understanding in the sense of later occurring long-term effects. 
Accordingly, Mink et al. (2014) confirmed this hypothesis, but also could not reveal 
significant links for cross-sectional data of 3-year-old children. To clarify the assumption that 
temperament might predispose children for later ToM development, a repeated data 
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collection of the current sample of 2-year-old children at 3 and 4 years of age would be 
suggested. 
Even though it was not the main concern of this dissertation project, I want to briefly 
discuss the correlations between temperament and behavioral problems. Previous studies 
suggest that temperament characteristics are reflected in behavioral problems (Rothbart, 
2011; Rothbart & Bates, 1998). For every age group in the current investigation, links 
between certain temperament dimensions and behavioral problems were revealed. The 
correlations among parents‘ ratings for all three age groups indicate that more socially-
inhibited children showed a high level of internalizing behavioral problems, children with the 
tendency to get easily frustrated showed a high level of externalizing behavioral problems, 
children with a high sensory sensitivity showed several internalizing behavioral problems, 
and children with a lower attention level displayed a high amount of external behavioral 
problems. At first view, the patterns found here suggest that the previous findings were 
confirmed, but I have to highlight two aspects that do not allow a simple confirmation of 
suspected patterns. Firstly, cross-sectional data was assessed, which provide no information 
about developmental courses. Secondly, a large part of these relationships is shown solely in 
terms of the parents’ ratings between the IKT and CBCL, and hardly between the 
assessments of parents’ and caregivers’ judgments on the IKT and C-TRF. Therefore, the 
scales often only correlated for the ratings of one and the same person. A detailed 
consideration of the items revealed high commonalities between the temperament dimension 
scales Attention and Frustration and the scales for externalizing behavioral problems. One 
might suspect that the correlations of parental assessment may be due to the very similar 
items on the particular scales of the questionnaires. However, the dimension scales Sensory 
Sensitivity and Social Inhibition/Shyness bear little resemblance to items of the syndrome 
scales of the CBCL, but still both showed positive links to the CBCL internalizing scores. 
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Taken together, the outcome of this dissertation project surely contributes to the topic of 
potential impacts of preschool children’s early temperament and could serve as the basis to 
explore developmental trajectories in a longitudinal design.  
Graphical Representation of the Current Model of Correlations  
This interim summary graphically displays the correlations found for all age groups 
before controlling for language. One major aspect, which is visible in the figures below, is 
that the number of correlations among the variables of interest clearly increases with 
increasing age. As discussed comprehensively in the sections above, the relationship between 
ToM, IC and behavioral problems only became apparent at the age of 4 years. The three 
variables did not correlate in the early years of childhood. The same conclusion can be drawn 
for the relationship between language and ToM. However, it is important to note that missing 
cross-sectional correlations do not exclude the possibility of existing long-term effects over 
the span of age range observed in this study. A remarkably constant relationship between 
language and IC is shown from 2 years onwards, which supports the assumption of a close 
connection between language development and regulation processes (Martin-Rhee 
& Bialystok, 2008). The relationship found between certain dimensions of child 
temperament, behavioral problems and social-cognitive constructs have already been 
discussed in the section above. Even if a correlation between activity and IC appeared at 2 
years of age, this connection weakened after controlling for language.  
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Figure 3 – 5. Graphical model of correlations between ToM, IC, behavioral problems, 
language and temperament for children at 2 years of age (left), 3 years of age (middle) and 4 
years of age (right), (green line: positive correlation; red line: negative correlation; black line: 
positive and negative correlation; thin line: correlation at trend level). 
Remarks About Test-Retest Reliability and Task Construction  
Before I discuss the relationships between children’s social-cognitive, inhibitory 
abilities and their behavior, I will turn to some particularities concerning the reliability of 
measurements and special issues of task construction. For all measures included, I assessed 
test-retest reliability, which is a significant advantage over previous studies. Significant 
correlations were found for the majority of tasks and for every age group. Moderate and small 
correlations appeared for the minority of tasks and could be explained by the small sample 
size. The duration of one test session was approximately 45 minutes. To avoid an overload of 
children’s capacity of concentration, it was only possible to repeat a single first session task 
at the second session in order to assess the test-retest reliability of this task. Thus, the sample 
sizes for test-retest reliability ranged only between four and 11 children per task, which 
surely weakened the results. Notably, all of the false-belief tasks have to be considered 
carefully concerning re-test reliability, because they involved an unexpected turn in their 
design, which was recalled by some children at the retest. For instance, on the false-belief 
unexpected-content tasks of 3- and 4-year-olds, pencils were found in a well-known box of 
Figure 3 – 2 years of age Figure 4 – 3 years of age Figure 5 – 4 years of age 
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chocolate instead of the sweets, or in the false-belief unexpected-transfer task of the 3-year-
olds the assistant played a trick on the experimenter and secretly switched the location of an 
object in her absence. The design of the false-belief unexpected-content task of 3- and 4-year-
olds required children to explicitly state their belief about the content of the well-known box 
of chocolate. It turned out that most of the children remembered the unexpected turn of the 
task on the second session and consequently said they actually expected pencils in the box. If 
this outcome occurred, the task could not be performed. This explicit question was not 
involved in all other false-belief tasks, hence, it is likely that the memory of the unexpected 
turn have affected the decision children made when they received the task for the second 
time, as there were no or only very small correlation coefficients revealed for the test-retest 
reliability of these tasks. Taken together, for the majority of tasks, test-retest reliability was 
confirmed. Due to the limitations described above, findings regarding the reliability of the 
false-belief tasks should be considered cautiously. However, it is an important first step to 
strengthen research quality criteria. For future study designs, capacities should be expanded 
to control as accurately as possible for the reliability of the data.  
Besides reliability, certain concerns about test validity remain. Thus, a minor amount 
of tasks will be discussed with respect to their designs. To start with, the distribution of the 
correct answers on one of the spatial-inhibition tasks appears unusual for a task which 
measures IC, since children achieved better results on the second block of trials compared to 
the first block of trials. Regarding the task design of the spatial-inhibition task of 3- and 4-
year-old children (i.e., the standard version of the windows task), the question may arise as to 
whether this task actually measures children’s IC, or if it measures children’s ability to infer a 
rule. It appears puzzling that performances of 4-year-olds improved with an increasing 
amount of trials, which was not the case for 3-year-olds. Simpson, Riggs, and Simon (2004), 
for example, argue that the standard windows task does not challenge children because of 
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inhibitory demands. They used a modified version for comparison, in which an alternative 
instruction eliminated the demand to infer the rule (i.e., point to the empty box for receiving 
the reward) and found that children passed this alternative version significantly better than 
the standard task. However, a major shortcoming of this version is that the direct instruction 
‘to point to the empty box’ leaves the box with the reward unattended (Simpson et al., 2004), 
draws the attention exclusively to the empty box, and by this, not only the demand to infer a 
rule is eliminated, the ability to inhibit and suppress a dominant response is also eliminated. 
Thus, the original version of the windows task seems to be more appropriate for measuring 
IC than this modified version. The authors further argue that children might just not be able 
to discern  what to do in the original version of the windows task, which would mean they 
simply do not understand the rule of the game (Simpson et al., 2004). This indeed could be a 
possible explanation for weak results. Importantly, to exclude this possibility, I included a 
training phase and only assessed the task if children passed the training phase by applying the 
correct rule at least three times. By doing so, I ensured that children understood the rule of 
the game. Other findings of Carlson, and Moses et al. (1998) contribute to the assumption 
that the windows task actually measures inhibitory control, by comparing two version of a 
deceptive pointing tasks, which had a similar structure like the windows task. In both 
versions of the task, children were sitting in front of two boxes. One box was baited and the 
other box was empty. An experimenter was naïve concerning the location of the bait. 
Children were instructed to deceive the experimenter when they are asked about the location 
of the bait, hence, they had to point to the empty box instead of the baited box. In the first 
version, children had to point spontaneously with their fingers. In the modified version, 
children had to point with a large board-game arrow instead of spontaneously pointing with 
their finger. Children performed better in the modified task compared to the standard task, 
which leads to the conclusion that the interruption while handling the large board-game arrow 
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helped children to inhibit the prepotent response. This interpretation is further strengthened 
by findings, which showed that children performed better on IC tasks when receiving a delay 
time before responding (Simpson et al., 2012). Taken together, the windows task is strongly 
suspected to measure IC, although a certain level of rule use and working memory is required 
for it as well. However, despite the wide agreement among research studies, it remains 
important to keep a critical perspective for interpreting the performance and for discussing 
the suspected cognitive processes underlying tasks (Zelazo et al., 2003).  
All tasks of the ToM batteries were designed to measure children’s ability to infer 
others’ mental states. More precisely, others’ intentions, preferences or beliefs which were 
not directly observable and thereby, had to be inferred. In the preference task for 2-year-olds, 
for example, an actor demonstrated to the children facial expressions of delight and dislike, 
each towards one of two objects. In the following, children were requested to choose one of 
the objects to hand to the actor, and by this, had to infer the preference of the actor for an 
object. To give another example, in the intention-understanding task for 3- and 4-year-olds, 
children listened to an action plan of an actor and from this they had to infer his intention. An 
exception, which differs from this task design, is represented by the goal-understanding tasks 
of all age groups and the intention-understanding task for the 2-year-olds. In these tasks, 
children were able to observe the actor’s goal, respectively his intention, directly by his 
actions. The final location in the goal-understanding task (i.e., the location reached by the 
experimenter’s hand) was visible to the children. Only the saliency of the final location 
varied. In the intention-understanding task for the 2-year-olds, the intention of the actor (the 
action plan and the goal) was also observable. The possibility of observing the goal or the 
intention of an actor directly, could lead to the assumption that children did not necessarily 
had to infer the goal or the intention in the sense of an actual mental state. However, imitation 
requires a certain level of interpretation, since children copy actions in terms of what they 
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think the other person is trying to achieve (Bekkering et al., 2000; Gergely et al., 2002). This 
cognitive process entails reasoning about the other’s mind. Thus, one could argue that 
children do infer the actor’s goal or intention as soon as they are representing it. Evidence 
that supports the theory of an interpretative act for the intention-understanding task is given 
by the original study of Buttelmann et al. (2008). Fourteen-month-old children were 
presented with two different conditions. In one condition the actor was constrained. He saw a 
reward in a box and wanted to obtain this reward. However, the box was blocked and he was 
not able to simply take the reward out of the box. Instead, he was forced to use a mounted 
seesaw. In another condition the actor was unconstrained. The box was not blocked, the actor 
could have easily grasped the reward, but decided to use the mounted seesaw. Thereby, he 
freely chose to use the seesaw. Differences in performance revealed that children imitated the 
use of the seesaw significantly more often in the unconstrained condition compared to the 
constrained condition, indicating they actually inferred the actor’s action as a significant part 
of his intention. Even if concerns about the design of the intention-understanding task can be 
eliminated, the deviating task design of the goal-understanding tasks from the other tasks of 
the ToM battery could be considered as a shortcoming of the study. As previous research 
does not provide goal-understanding paradigms for children between 2 and 4 years of age, in 
which the actor’s goal is not directly observable, the creation of novel tasks is strongly 
recommended for future investigations.  
In general, all tasks were chosen with respect to results children achieved on previous 
studies. The aim was to assign children to tasks of an appropriate level of difficulty, to obtain 
some variance for a successful correlation. In accordance with this, results across all age 
groups showed indeed a wide range of individual differences. Some children were found to 
be able to pass the tasks completely, whereas other children of the same age group failed the 
tasks. Besides the increase in performance within the spatial-inhibition task for the 4-year-
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olds discussed above, I found for the majority of the IC tasks the typical effect of decreasing 
performance with ongoing trials. This pattern is expected (see also Gerstadt et al., 1994), 
because IC can be considered as a cognitive resource, which requires strength to maintain and 
gets weaker through prolonged effort. The inhibition-of-concept tasks for 3- and 4-year-olds 
displayed this pattern of stronger performances on the first half of the trials compared to the 
performance of the second half of the trials, indicating that children were losing strength of 
inhibition over the course of the task. For the youngest age group there was no decrease of 
performance revealed. This could be grounded in the fact that on this task a large number of 
children performed exactly at chance level (24.7% of children scored at the chance level of 
50%). Reaching chance level on this task could have been the result of just sorting all blocks 
in one of the buckets. However, only eight children showed this sorting behavior. The 
explanation for this finding is very speculative, even if one could assume that these children 
did not follow the rule seriously. Regardless of this speculation, the high amount of children 
who performed exactly at chance level might be responsible for the missing effect of a 
decrease in performance between the first and the second block of trials analyzed for the 
entire sample size.  
Surprisingly, results of the false-belief-understanding tasks for 2- and 3-year-old 
children deviated more than expected from the results of previous studies. The false-belief 
unexpected-content task of the 2-year-olds, originally assessed by Buttelmann et al. (2014), 
was passed by 18-month-old infants, when comparing results of a false-belief condition to 
results of a true-belief condition. The children in our sample only received the false-belief 
condition and did not pass the task significantly, but instead performed at chance level. As 
the design of the task did not differ, the explanation might lie in children’s relationship to the 
test materials. Similarly to the original version, for the target object a block was used and for 
the unexpected object a spoon was used. It is possible that 2-year-old children are more 
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distracted by a spoon than 18-month-old infants. With increasing age, the independent use of 
a spoon increases and 2 -year -old children could be more focused on the spoon when 
instructed to bring an object for the experimenter, compared to 18-month-old infants. For 
passing the task, children have to read the other’s mind, but at the same time have to direct 
their attention from the unexpected object to the target object. There is a chance that the 
spoon was attracting high attention from 2-year-olds and, consequently, challenged the 
children to a higher extent to pass the task than the younger children of the original study. 
Although random statements from the parents are highly subjective and not reliable for this 
study, it is worth mentioning that a certain number of parents reported that spoons are of 
special interest to their child “at the moment”. For future investigations I advise the use of 
more neutral objects as study material to reduce chances of bias. Furthermore, it is important 
to mention the false-belief unexpected-transfer task for the 2-year-olds, originally assessed by 
Buttelmann et al. (2009) and passed by 18-month-old infants. In our sample, children failed 
the task significantly, which might be explained by a slightly modified task design described 
in the method section. The version used for this study contained the priming of one of the 
boxes. At the beginning of the task, children saw the experimenter pulling on the lid of one of 
the boxes three times in a row (box A), remaining unsuccessful with opening box A. Right 
afterwards children were instructed to open box A for the experimenter, hence, the 
experimenter was able to place the toy into box A. In this way, children already had contact 
with box A and assisted the experimenter before the actual test phase. Importantly, box A is 
the incorrect box in the later test phase, since the toy was switched from box A to box B in 
the absence of the experimenter and the children had to infer her false belief. This 
modification, the priming of box A, is likely responsible for the decrease in children’s 
success. Finally, it is important to address  the weak results of the false-belief unexpected-
transfer task for the 3-year-olds, the task for which was adopted from Southgate et al. (2010) 
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and originally passed by 17-month-olds. In the present study, 3-year-olds failed the task 
significantly. These findings remain puzzling because the procedure of this study is largely 
identical to the original version. Additionally, I assessed children’s own preference for an 
object after finishing the task and found no influence of children’s own preference on their 
performances, which could have contributed for an explanation of the weak performance. 
However, the study material could still account for the present results. Since the 
attractiveness of the study material could influence children’s performance to a negative 
direction (Buttelmann & Buttelmann, 2013, September), it could be possible that the novel 
objects we used were simply too boring for the children. The distribution of the results of all 
other tasks turned out as expected and are likely derived from the fact that mean ages differ 
between the original studies and the present investigations.  
When analyzing the single task results with respect to the session-order, only a minor 
number of effects were found. Children from the 2-year-old sample performed better on the 
inhibition-of-concept task, when solving this on the second session compared to children, 
who solved the task on the first session. Since, firstly, the same experimenter was involved in 
the second session; secondly, children received the same length of time for getting familiar 
with the experimenter during the warm-up phase as on the first session; and thirdly, no other 
task for the sample of the 2-year-olds resulted in  a statistically significant difference, an 
explanation for this finding is not clear. A vague possibility could be that children were more 
comfortable with the testing situation at the second session in general and, thus, were more 
relaxed and willing to follow the task instructions. Since high concentration is required in this 
particular task and the entertainment factor is relatively low compared to all other tasks, 
children who received this task at the second session might have had an advantage because 
they were already familiar with the situation to follow instructions by the experimenter. Other 
session-order effects were only found for the sample of 4-year-olds. Children who completed 
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the goal-understanding task at the first session performed better compared with children who 
completed the task at the second session, and children who completed the delay-of-
gratification task on the first session performed worse compared with children who 
completed the task on the second session. It is difficult to find an explanation for the first 
reported finding, whereas the latter finding might be explained in a similar manner to the 
effect for the 2-year-olds. If children developed a more relaxed mood within the second test 
session, they might have been less tense and better able to wait for the reward. As an 
alternative explanation, it could also be possible that children built up greater trust in the 
promised return of the experimenter, because they already knew the experimenter from the 
first session, hence, were more convinced that the experimenter would really return soon. 
Funder, Block, and Block (1983) already indicated a link between children’s characteristics 
like a general calm and relaxed mood and their ability to delay gratification. Nevertheless, 
these are only attempts to interpret the session-order effects. Compared to the large amount of 
single tasks I analyzed, only a very small proportion showed statistically significant results 
concerning effects of session order. Analyzing the IC and ToM scores for effect of session 
order, statistically significant differences were not present. Thus, it can be assumed that the 
order of the sessions did not influence children’s performance. 
Gender Differences and Internal Consistency of Tasks 
To complete the discussion concerning the single tasks, I briefly refer to gender 
differences and internal consistency. The only gender difference was detected for the sample 
of the 2-year-old children. Girls passed the false-belief unexpected-content task better than 
boys did. Results reported by previous research are mixed. On the one hand, gender effects 
indicated an advantage for girls on ToM tasks (Carlson & Moses, 2001; Cutting & Dunn, 
1999), but on the other hand not all previous studies could reveal significant gender effects 
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(Hughes & Cutting, 1999; Mink et al., 2014). Since the present dissertation project provides 
representative data by large sample sizes of three different age groups, the idea that there 
might only be a marginal advantage for girls outperforming boys on ToM is supported, since 
this difference did not appear for the majority of tasks, nor was it detected for different age 
groups. Consequently, it cannot be called a clear-cut finding. Investigations exclusively with 
regards to gender differences were done by Charman, Ruffman, and Clements (2002). They 
provided two representational samples, assessed independently in different laboratories, and 
revealed only weak effects consistently indicating an advantage for girls. A view on previous 
findings concerning gender differences on IC tasks delivered the same inconsistency as 
described for ToM tasks. Some studies found girls outperforming boys on several tasks 
(Carlson & Moses, 2001; Kochanska, Murray, & Coy, 1997), whereas other authors only 
report marginally advantages for girls (Carlson & Wang, 2007), or no differences at all 
(Apperly & Carroll, 2009; Gerstadt et al., 1994). In summary, as the representative sample of 
three age groups did not indicate any difference between girls and boys for IC performances 
and only a single effect related to ToM performances, I conclude there are no broad gender 
differences for mental state understanding and inhibition in preschool years that should alert 
major concern for a different treatment of boys and girls in terms of the promotion of 
competences.  
An incidental finding from the study is of interest for further investigation of 
children’s cognitive development. The results of the analysis concerning internal consistency 
of the batteries encourage the presumption that the different mental states map various 
concepts, which might form a unitary construct only later with progressive maturation. This 
perspective would support the positive gain accounts of ToM (Apperly & Butterfill, 2009; 
Low, 2010), which expect task-specific continuity rather than an overall coherence. In the 
same sense, Thoermer et al. (2012) found in a longitudinal study task-specific developmental 
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relations among false-belief understanding, but no relations between false-belief and desire 
understanding. Referring to the comparison of mean scores of the single ToM tasks, the 
question can be addressed as to whether the single mental states are of varying difficulty. For 
the 3- and 4-year-old sample, mean rank comparison revealed that children gained better 
results on goal understanding compared to all other mental states and that intention 
understanding received the second-highest ranking. Notably, children received the lowest 
mean scores for false-belief understanding. The fact that the same pattern was found for two 
batteries and samples would rather argue for differences in conceptual content than in task 
material and in design. The findings reflect the theory by Tomasello et al. (2005), who claim 
that goal- and intention-understanding emerges earlier than belief-understanding in the sense 
of developmental pathways. Other investigations detected differences in difficulty, mainly 
that the majority of children from 3 years onwards revealed worse belief-understanding than 
desire-understanding, however this pattern gained stability by 4 and 5 years of age (Wellman 
& Liu, 2004). Surprisingly, the present data showed no such pattern for the youngest sample, 
which remains puzzling. The question about the competences these tasks further measured 
could be posed. Although a reliable answer can hardly be provided, I would like to emphasize 
that competences, which are included to some extent (i.e., language abilities and IC), were 
assessed simultaneously and were not related to ToM for the two younger samples. If those 
abilities would have been mainly responsible for passing the ToM tasks, then children who 
performed weakly on ToM should have also performed weakly on IC and language 
understanding. This pattern was not present for the majority of samples. The present data 
delivers valuable insights for future research, since relationships between the different 
dimensions of mental state understanding have not yet been fully explored. 
In conclusion, all batteries consisted exclusively of established tasks, which were 
selected by a theory-guided approach and all tasks either aimed to infer others’ mental states 
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or to inhibit a prepotent response. Results of inter-correlation analyses are often used to 
warrant the formation of composite scores, but notably do not allow for valid conclusions 
about whether the single components actually measure the same cognitive processes. 
Therefore, I made the conscious decision to use the total scores of the multidimensional 
batteries for final analyses to avoid a small incremental procedure. 
Possible Limitations of the Current Study 
Some critical evaluations about the task construction were already discussed. Besides 
these remarks, a few additional comments concerning other limitations will follow. One 
shortcoming of this study is that the socio-economic status of the children’s families was not 
assessed. Even if the investigation of this relationship was not the major interest of the 
project, it would have been an advantage to control for maternal education and family 
income, since connections between socio-economic status and children’s behavioral problems 
and socio-emotional development have been found (Bradley & Corwyn, 2002; Dodge, Pettit, 
& Bates, 1994). If one considers the agents and institutions of a child’s microsystem (e.g., 
family, peers and daycare institutions), which influences the development of a child 
(Bronfenbrenner, 1979), it is not possible to control all cofactors, and control measures must 
be carefully selected. The decision to choose language as a control variable is substantiated in 
the fact that language repeatedly was revealed as a significant correlate to all variables of 
interest, which are behavioral problems, ToM and IC (Astington & Jenkins, 1999; Hinshaw, 
1992; Wolfe & Bell, 2004).  However, future research might expand the number of control 
variables that might affect the relationship between the concepts of interest. For instance, 
evidence for an existing link between the socio economic status and cognitive abilities was 
delivered (Bradley & Corwyn, 2002; Dunn & Cutting, 1999), although relationships have not 
yet been fully investigated. Furthermore, moderating or mediating factors should also be 
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considered. I previously mentioned possible influences of children’s prosocial attitude, but 
also parenting style could be involved in relationships between social-cognitive competences 
and behavioral problems (Ruffman, Slade, Devitt, & Crowe, 2006). In addition to all the 
benefits of control variables, it has to be recognized that the assessment of numerous 
variables are time-consuming and distressing for children. 
Another important matter is the size of the samples, which might have hindered us 
from detecting possible relations. Although the number of children included in our sample is 
indeed comparable to that of other developmental studies (Capage & Watson, 2001; Mink et 
al., 2014) or even higher, the still relatively small sample sizes of the current study should be 
borne in mind when interpreting the outcomes. Gaps in the data-sets resulted for instance 
from questionnaires, which were not returned, or absence at the second test session. For the 
sample of 2-year-old children only 57% of the caregiver questionnaires were completed, 
because not all of the children attended daycare. Firstly, this reduced the number of evaluable 
data, and secondly, it might assume a heterogeneous social background within this sample, 
because some children already experience social interactions in larger groups and education 
at kindergarten and others might experience mainly the interaction with their mothers. 
Particularly the 3-year-old children were somewhat less cooperative than the other age 
groups, which was why this sample size was increased as a reaction to this in the current 
project. Since capacities were limited for this project, it was not possible to expand the 
number of participants to a larger extent.  Especially for regression analyses, a large body of 
data would improve the statistical power and generalizability of the findings. Some results 
only reached statistical significance at trend level, and it might be expected that results would 
have been stronger, if the sample size had been larger.  
Furthermore, the study only provides correlational data and therefore delivers 
evidence for a link between ToM, IC and behavioral problems, but causal effects cannot be 
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drawn and require further investigations. In consideration of a developmental path it neither 
can be concluded that the same direct links persist in later childhood when cognitive, 
emotional and regulative competences improve, nor can it be excluded that earlier variables 
influenced the link which was found at 4 years of age. Thus, it is of future interest to use the 
current tasks for further longitudinal examinations.  
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2.4 Conclusion 
This study is the first providing extensive batteries for assessing the mental state 
understanding and inhibitory skills, including different dimensions of ToM and IC, for 2-, 3- 
and 4-year-old children. In this way, it was possible to investigate the unique contributions of 
ToM and IC to behavioral characteristics within different stages of early development. A 
major achievement is represented by the provision of comparable tasks for children from 2 to 
4 years of age, because the construction of tasks was matched to a high degree with respect to 
children’s age-specific cognitive abilities. With the multi-task and multi-informant design, I 
showed that there are no robust links between ToM or IC and behavioral problems at 2 and 3 
years of age. Accordingly, there is no indication that behavioral difficulties early in childhood 
could be explained by the capacity of mental state understanding or inhibitory skills. 
Importantly, the issue changes for older children. At the age of 4 years, IC and ToM are both 
correlated to different forms of children’s behavioral problems. By the detection of IC as an 
important predictor for behavioral problems, I offer the basis for future training programs 
aiming at a reduction of behavioral problems in preschoolers. The detection of the positive 
link between ToM and behavioral problems allows for the assumption that high social-
cognitive abilities may put children at risk for developing difficulties in behavior. It is 
noticeable that children who are better in recognizing others’ mental states show a high 
sensitivity to perceived impressions. This relationship and its underlying mechanisms appear 
quite complex and certainly deserves researchers’ attention in the future. The dissertation 
project delivers a substantial contribution to identifying possible factors, which may 
contribute to behavioral problems in preschool age. From my point of view, it highlights the 
necessity to not only monitor children’s early competences, but also on children’s personal 
sensitivities, to evaluate their development on a professional basis, and to provide them with 
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emotional support to guarantee positive growth. Particularly in today’s society, where 
diagnoses and treatment rates of psychological diseases have been reported to increase within 
recent years and thereby receive more attention (Aurich-Beerheide & Knieps, 2014; Torio, 
Encinosa, Berdahl, McCormick, & Simpson, 2015), the present results are of significance. 
Early prevention programs should be initiated, as late interventions against behavioral 
problems only showed limited success (McNeil, Eyberg, Hembree Eisenstadt, Newcomb, & 
Funderburk, 1991). Follow-up work is required to replicate the current findings and to 
investigate the development longitudinally. An exciting topic for subsequent research is 
whether the observed relationships at 4 years of age continue over the course of development 
and whether there are early risk factors of the younger samples, which are predictive in nature 
and show only late manifesting effects. 
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Appendix 
Appendix A - Material of the Intention-Understanding Task for 4-Year-Old 
Children 
1. Picture Story “Tom” 
1. Card 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2. Card 
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3. Card 
Story Type A 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3. Card 
Story Type B 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3. Card 
Story Type C 
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4. Card 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5. Cards shown for the forced-choice question. Pair of cards alternate according to story type.
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2. Picture Story “Maria” 
1. Card 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2. Card 
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3. Card 
Story Type A 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3. Card 
Story Type B 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3. Card 
Story Type C 
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4. Card 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5. Cards shown for the forced-choice question. Pair of cards alternate according to story type. 
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Appendix B – Material of the Preference-Understanding Task for 4-Year-Old Children 
 
1. Card 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2. Card 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3. Card 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4. Card 
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5. Card 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6. Card 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7. Card 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
8. Card for the forced-choice question. 
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Other pairs of objects. 
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Appendix C - Analyses of ToM and IC Batteries 
Friedman tests were run to compare mean performances on separate tasks within the 
batteries. For 2-year-old children no differences between the mean scores of the tasks 
included in the ToM battery were revealed (χ²(3) = 5.693, p = .151), but there was a 
statistically significant difference between the mean scores of the tasks included in the IC 
battery (χ²(2) = 35.678, p ≤ .001). For mean ranks see Table 8. Further analyses using 
Wilcoxon tests showed that children scored better on the delay-of-gratification task compared 
to the inhibition-of-concept task (N = 71, Z = -3.744, p ≤ .001, r = .444) and the spatial-
inhibition task (N = 71, Z = -5.329, p ≤ .001, r = .633).  
Table 8. 
Summary of the Mean Ranks of Tasks Included in the IC Battery at 4 Years of Age 
 
Analyses for the sample of 3-year-old children revealed statistically significant 
differences between the mean scores of the tasks included in the ToM battery (χ²(3) = 95.892, 
p ≤ .001) and the IC battery (χ²(2) = 29.470, p ≤ .001). For mean ranks see Table 9. Further 
analyses using Wilcoxon tests showed for the ToM battery that children showed lower mean 
performances on the false-belief tasks compared to all other tasks (preference understanding: 
N = 81, Z = -5.107, p ≤ .001, r = .567; intention understanding: N = 78, Z = -6.255, p ≤ .001, 
r = .708; goal understanding: N = 74, Z = -7.009, p ≤ .001, r = .815;), showed lower mean 
performances on the preference-task compared to the intention-understanding task (N = 78, Z 
= -4.700, p ≤ .001, r = .532) and goal-understanding task (N = 72, Z = -6.794, p ≤ .001, r = 
.801), and showed lower mean performances on the intention-understanding task compared to 
the goal-understanding task (N = 71, Z = -4.756, p ≤ .001, r = .564). Within the IC battery, 
children showed lower mean performances on the spatial-inhibition task compared to the 
IC Task Mean Rank
Inhibition of Concept 1.90
Spatial Inhibition 1.55
Delay 2.55
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inhibition-of-concept task (N = 67, Z = -4.909, p ≤ .001, r = .560) and the delay task (N = 57, 
Z = -5.236, p ≤ .001, r = .694).  
Table 9. 
Summary of the Mean Ranks of Tasks Included in the ToM and IC Batteries at 3 Years of Age 
 
Analyses for the sample of 4-year-old children revealed statistically significant 
differences between the mean scores of the tasks included in the ToM battery (χ²(3) = 61.622, 
p ≤ .001) and in the IC battery (χ²(2) = 8.757, p = .013). For mean ranks see Table 10. 
Further analyses using Wilcoxon tests showed for the ToM battery that children showed 
lower mean performances on the false-belief tasks compared to intention-understanding task 
(N = 79, Z = -2.231, p = .026, r = .251) and the goal-understanding task (N = 78, Z = -6.572, 
p ≤ .001, r = .744). Furthermore, children showed better mean performances on the goal-
understanding task compared to the preference-understanding task (N = 66, Z = -6.794, p ≤ 
.001, r = .836) and the intention-understanding task (N = 78, Z = -6.869, p ≤ .001, r = .778). 
For the IC battery Wilcoxon tests revealed no statistical significant differences. 
  
ToM Task Mean Rank
Goal 3.54
Intention 2.84
Preference 2.04
False Belief Score 1.57
IC Task Mean Rank
Inhibition of Concept 2.16
Spatial Inhibition 1.44
Delay 2.39
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Table 10. 
Summary of the Mean Ranks of Tasks Included in the ToM and IC Batteries at 4 Years of Age 
 
Additionally, analyses were run to examine inter-correlations between the four 
dimensions of ToM and the three tasks of IC. Analyses revealed no inter-correlations 
between the dimensions within the batteries of 2-year-old children (ToM battery α = -.15, IC 
battery α = -.113), 3-year-old children (ToM battery α = -.26, IC battery α = .12) and 4 -year-
old children (ToM battery α = .15, IC battery α = .40).  
Tasks of the ToM Batteries 
Goal-understanding task – 2-year-old children. Only the scores of the house 
condition were used, since 38 out of 82 children refused to participate at all in the no-house 
condition, or only performed half or less than half of the trials. Overall, children did not pass 
the task above chance level (Wilcoxon test, N = 66, Z = -.430, p = .667). For the means of 
performance, see Figure 6. 
Goal-understanding task – 3-year-old children. Overall, children performed with 
total-scores above chance level (Wilcoxon test, N = 75, Z = -7.383, p < .001, r = .852). No 
difference between conditions (ear, dot, no-dot) and no order effects were present. For the 
means of performance, see Figure 6. 
Goal-understanding task – 4-year-old children. Children performed with total scores 
above chance level (Wilcoxon tests, N = 78, Z = -7.703, p < .001, r = 0.872). A difference 
concerning conditions was not found. For the means of performance, see Figure 6. 
IC Task Mean Rank
Inhibition of Concept 1.75
Spatial Inhibition 1.95
Delay 2.30
ToM Task Mean Rank
Goal 3.54
Intention 2.36
Preference 2.13
False Belief Score 1.98
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Figure 6. Mean percentages of trials in which children performed correctly on the goal under-
standing tasks.  
 
Intention-understanding task – 2-year-old children. Overall, children did not pass the 
task above chance level (Wilcoxon test, N = 80, Z = -1.622, p = .105). No difference in 
scoring between the first block of trials and the second block of trials was found (Wilcoxon 
test, N = 77, Z = -.093, p = .926). No order effects were present. For the means of 
performance, see Figure 8.  
Intention-understanding task – 3-year-old children. Overall, children passed the task 
above chance level (Wilcoxon test, N = 81, Z = -5.163, p < .001, r = .574). They performed 
better in the match condition than in the mismatch condition (Wilcoxon test, N = 81, Z = -
2.858, p = .004, r = .318). For results see Figure 7. Children performed in the match 
condition above chance level (Wilcoxon test, N = 82, Z = -3.377, p = .001, r = .373). Children 
performed in the mismatch condition at chance level (Wilcoxon test, N = 82, Z = -.693, p = 
.488). No order effects were present. For the means of performance, see Figure 8. 
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Figure 7. Mean percentages of trials in which children performed correctly on the intention 
understanding tasks comparing the match and mismatch condition.  
 
Intention-understanding task – 4-year-old children. Children had difficulties in 
answering the open test questions. To avoid a bias due to children’s communications skills, 
only answers to the forced-choice questions were analyzed. Children did not show 
differences between the Tom- and Maria-picture stories in the three story types A, B and C 
(McNemar tests, χ²A (N = 79) = 2.065, p = .151; χ²B (N = 79) = .346, p = .556; χ²C (N = 78), p 
= .064). In all story types, children did not perform the forced-choice questions above chance 
level (Wilcoxon tests, NA = 79, ZA = -.866, p = .386; NB = 79, ZB = -1.236, p = .216; NC = 79, 
ZC = .000, p = 1.000). For the means of performance, see Figure 8. 
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Figure 8. Mean percentages of trials in which children performed correctly on the intention 
understanding tasks  
 
Preference-understanding task – 2-year-old children. Overall, children performed at 
chance level (Wilcoxon test, N = 79, Z = -1.306, p = .192). No difference in scoring between 
the match and mismatch conditions was found (Wilcoxon test, N = 78, Z = -1.344, p = .179). 
No order effects were present. For the means of performance, see Figure 10. 
Preference-understanding task – 3-year-old children. Overall, children chose a cup at 
chance level (Wilcoxon test, N = 84, Z = -.373, p = .709). No difference in scoring between 
the first block of test trials and the last block of test trials was found (Wilcoxon test, N = 81, 
Z = -.859, p = .390). For the means of performance, see Figure 10. 
Preference-understanding task – 4-year-old children. Overall children did not pass 
the task above chance level (Wilcoxon test, N = 68, Z = 1.622, p = .105). Children were better 
at passing the task if they had the same preference as the protagonist compared to when they 
had a different preference (Wilcoxon test, N = 58, Z = -3.452, p = .001, r = .453), see Figure 
9. For the means of performance, see Figure 10. Children who had the same preference as the 
protagonist passed the task significantly above chance level, whereas children who had a 
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different preference compared to the protagonist passed the task significantly below chance 
level (Wilcoxon tests, N = 58, Z = -3.452, p = .001, r = .453). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9. Mean percentages of trials in which children performed correctly on the preference 
understanding tasks comparing the conditions if they either had the same preference as the 
protagonist, or if they had a different preference to the protagonist. 
 
 
 
Figure 10. Mean percentages of trials in which children performed correctly on the 
preference understanding tasks.  
 
False-belief-understanding task – 2-year-old children. Children did not pass the false-
belief unexpected-content task (binominal test, N = 57, p = .791). They showed no difference 
in performance between their first touch and the actually given object (McNemar test, χ²(57) 
69.1 30.9
0
20
40
60
80
100
Preference Score if
Same Prefrence
Preference Score if
Different Preference
M
e
a
n
 P
e
rc
e
n
ta
g
e
s
 o
f 
T
ri
a
ls
 i
n
 
W
h
ic
h
 C
h
ild
re
n
 P
e
rf
o
rm
e
d
 C
o
rr
e
c
tl
y
     ** 
p = .001 
 
54.4 48.5 43.9
0
20
40
60
80
100
Preference Score of 2-
Year-Old Children
Preference Score of 3-
Year-Old Children
Preference Score of 4-
Year-Old Children
M
e
a
n
 P
e
rc
e
n
ta
g
e
s
 o
f 
T
ri
a
ls
 i
n
 W
h
ic
h
 
C
h
ild
re
n
 P
e
rf
o
rm
e
d
 C
o
rr
e
c
tl
y
THEORY OF MIND, INHIBITORY CONTROL AND BEHAVIORAL PROBLEMS 173 
 
= 35.581, p =.687). For the means of performance, see Figure 13. In the false-belief 
unexpected-transfer task, children significantly failed (binominal test, N = 74, p = .007). They 
also showed no difference in performance between their first touch and the actually opened 
box (McNemar test, χ²(74) = 74.000, p = 1.000).  For the means of performance, see Figure 
14. For both tasks, no order effects were found.  
False-belief-understanding task – 3-year-old children. Children failed the false belief 
unexpected-content task regarding the self-question (binominal test, N = 75, p = .005) and the 
other-question (binominal test, N = 69, p < .001). Children answered the self-question better 
than the other-question (McNemar test, χ²(68) = 13.505, p = .004, r = 1.638), see Figure 11. 
For the means of performance on the other-question, see Figure 13.  
 
Figure 11. Mean percentages of trials in which 3-year-old children performed correctly on 
the false belief unexpected content tasks comparing the self-question and the other-question. 
 
Children failed the unexpected-transfer task regarding the touch score (binominal test, 
N = 84, p = .021) and the actually given object score (binominal test, N = 84, p = .038). They 
showed no difference in performance between their first touch and the actually opened box 
(McNemar test, χ²(84) = 56.829, p = 1.000). Analyses showed that children did not choose 
the object they themselves preferred (binominal test, N = 81, p = .119). Their preference for 
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one object did not promote passing or failing the task (McNemar test, χ²(80) = .860, p = 
.479). For both tasks, no order effects were found. For the means of performance, see Figure 
14.  
False-belief-understanding task – 4-year-old children. In the false-belief unexpected 
content-task, children significantly passed the self-question (binominal test, N = 69, p < 
.001), but not the other-question (binominal test, N = 71, p = .342). Children performed 
significantly better on the self-question than on the other-question (McNemar test, χ²(69) = 
12.971, p < .001, r = .434), see Figure 12.  
 
 
Figure 12. Mean percentages of trials in which 4-year-old children performed correctly on 
the false belief unexpected content tasks comparing the self-question and the other-question. 
 
Further analyses revealed an order effect: Children were more likely to pass the self-
question if it was asked before the other-question. This might be explained by either limited 
memory capacities or by confusion after they had to think carefully about the other person’s 
mind. For the mean performance on the other-question, see Figure 13. For the false-belief 
unexpected-transfer task, the total score revealed that children correctly answered the test 
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question below chance level (Wilcoxon test, N = 75, Z = -2.288, p = .022, r = .264). For the 
means of performance, see Figure 14.  
Figure 13. Mean percentages of trials in which children performed correctly on the false 
belief unexpected content tasks (FB-UC = false-belief unexpected-content score) 
 
 
Figure 14. Mean percentages of trials in which children performed correctly on the false 
belief unexpected transfer tasks (FB-UT = false-belief unexpected-transfer) 
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Tasks of the IC Batteries 
Inhibition-of-concept task – 2-year-old children. Children passed the training phase 
by performing at above chance level (Wilcoxon test, N = 79, Z = -6.314, p < .001, r = .713), 
whereas performance in the test phase was not above chance level (Wilcoxon test, N = 77, Z 
= -.069, p = .945). When comparing performances on the first block of trials with that on the 
second block of trials no difference was found (Wilcoxon test, N = 72, Z = -.433, p = .665). 
No effect was found concerning the position of the buckets. For the means of performance, 
see Figure 15. 
Inhibition-of-concept task – 3-year-old children. Overall, children performed at 
chance level (Wilcoxon test, N = 76, Z = -.735, p = .462). There was a decrease in successful 
performance when comparing the performance in the first block of trials (74.02% of trials 
correct) with the performance in the second block of trials (60.94% of trials correct) 
(Wilcoxon test, N = 64, Z = -3.268, p = .001, r = .409). No effect was found concerning the 
position of the cards. For the means of performance, see Figure 15. 
Inhibition-of-concept task – 4-year-old children. A difference between the 
conservative and non-conservative version was detected. Children scored higher in the non-
conservative rating than in the conservative rating (Wilcoxon test, N = 73, Z = -3.681, p < 
.001, r = 0.428). Since this task was administered to investigate the ability to inhibit a 
specific concept independent of which word was used to refer to the concept, for further 
analysis the non-conservative scoring was used. Children performed better within the first 
half of trials (82.40% of trials correct) compared to the second half of trials (68.99% of trials 
correct) (Wilcoxon test, N = 48, Z = -3.262, p = .001, r = 0.471). For the means of 
performance, see Figure 15. 
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Figure 15. Mean percentages of trials in which children performed correctly on the 
inhibition-of-concept tasks. 
 
Spatial-inhibition task – 2-year-old children. Overall, children failed the task 
(Wilcoxon test, N = 77, Z = -2.670, p = .008, r = .304). Comparison of performances in the 
first block of trials with performances in the second block of trials showed no difference 
(Wilcoxon test, N = 74, Z = -.112, p = .910). No order effect was found. For the means of 
performance, see Figure 16. 
Spatial-inhibition task – 3-year-old children. Eleven children were excluded of the 
data set because of not understanding the rules of the task. Overall, children failed the task 
(Wilcoxon test, N = 73, Z = -6.113, p < .001, r = .715). Comparison of performance in the 
first block of trials with that in the second block of trials showed no difference (Wilcoxon 
test, N = 72, Z = -.898, p = .369). For the means of performance, see Figure 16. 
Spatial-inhibition task – 4-year-old children. Nine children were excluded of the data 
set because of not understanding the rules of the task. Overall, children did not perform above 
chance level (Wilcoxon test, N = 66, Z = -.831, p = .406). When dividing the task into two 
blocks, children scored better in the second block of the trials (47.97% of trials correct) than 
in the first block (62.50% of trials correct) (Wilcoxon test, N = 66, Z = -4.540, p < .001, r = 
0.559). For the means of performance, see Figure 16. 
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Figure 16. Mean percentages of trials in which children performed correctly on the spatial 
inhibition tasks. 
 
Delay-of-gratification task – 2-year-old children. To analyze if the duration of trials 
influenced children’s waiting performance, I analyzed whether children were more likely to 
wait during short trials (including trials from 5 to 20 s) than during long trials (including 35 
to 50 s). Children performed better in the short trials than in the long trials (Wilcoxon test, N 
= 77, Z = -3.415, p = .001, r = .389). For the means of performance of waiting time, see 
Figure 17. 
Delay-of-gratification task – 3-year-old children. As the procedure was slightly 
changed after the first few testing sessions, I checked for differences between the two 
versions of the task. The first version of the task was performed with only one piece of sweets 
(one gummy bear/one piece of chocolate), whereas the second version was performed with 
several pieces of sweets (a small bag of gummy bears/a bar of chocolate scattered over the 
plate). Mann-Whitney’s U-tests revealed one statistically significant difference: Children 
waited longer before touching the sweets when they were facing only one piece of sweets (U 
=217.5, Nfirst = 10, Nsecond = 68, Z = -1.971, p = .049, r = 0.228). Therefore, only children who 
had received the second version of the task were included in the final analyses. The total 
number of participants excluded from the data set was 22. This number also includes the 
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children who did not attend the second session. For the means of performance of waiting 
time, see Figure 17.  
Delay-of-gratification task – 4-year-old children. For the means of performance of 
waiting time, see Figure 17. 
 
Figure 17. Mean percentages of trials in which children performed correctly on the delay of 
gratification tasks. 
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